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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Global Information Infrastructure, also known as the "GII"
or "Information Superhighway," links suppliers and users of
electronic resources around the world, making it more difficult to
localize wrongdoing for purposes of criminal or civil litigation. The
same lack of localization makes it difficult to enforce judgments of
criminal and civil courts, and to organize civil discovery and tools of
criminal investigation, such as search warrants and subpoenas.
Conduct with potentially serious legal consequences is difficult for
traditional sovereigns to control in the GII because it is ephemeral,
invisible and crosses geographic boundaries easily. Geographically
based concepts of sovereignty must be squared with the nature of
open networks, which are indifferent to geographic boundaries.
Conventional doctrines of jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate
and to enforce legal decisions' must evolve to handle new disputes
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402-33 (1987) (ex-
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Whose substantive legal rules apply to a defamatory message
that is written by someone in Mexico, read by someone in Israel by
means of an Internet server located in the United States, injuring
the reputation of a Norwegian? Whose courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims of injury or violation of national rules? Must a
Norwegian go to Mexico or to the United States to find a legal insti-
tution with power over one of the two potential sources of compen-
sation? If not, and if jurisdiction exists in Norway, the most
convenient forum for the victim, how is a favorable decision by a
Norwegian tribunal ordering that the Mexican originator or the
American intermediary pay damages to be enforced outside of
Norway?
Similar questions, addressed by different rules, arise in the
criminal context. Suppose the message is criminal instead of de-
famatory, involving child pornography or indecency, or represent-
ing some sort of financial fraud, forgery or terrorism. Must the
wrongdoer be tried only where he or she is physically found? If the
answer is yes, how should the wrongdoer be apprehended and
moved to the place of trial? Whose substantive criminal law should
apply?
Arguably, in the hypothetical above, Norway has the greatest
interest in punishing the conduct, while Mexico has only a weak
interest, but legislatures usually focus on conduct occurring within
the jurisdiction in defining crimes, and criminal courts rarely exer-
cise power to prosecute for a crime against another jurisdiction's
laws. While conflict of law jurisprudence has wrestled with
problems like these for centuries, 2 the transnational character of
cyberspace will increase the frequency with which choice of law
questions arise. Also, questions may arise as to the suitability of
traditional choice of law formulations and their possible extension
into the criminal context.
plaining three types of jurisdiction). Jurisdiction to prescribe implicates civil
choice of law doctrines, and doctrines of universal crimes and extraterritorial ap-
plication of criminal law. Id. §§ 402-04. Jurisdiction to adjudicate implicates per-
sonal jurisdiction and venue doctrines in the civil context, and extradition and
trial in absentia doctrines in the criminal context. Id. §§ 421-23. Jurisdiction to
enforce implicates judgment-enforcement doctrines and post-conviction extradi-
tion. Id. §§ 431-33.
2. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. XIV
(4th ed. 1852) (discussing conflict of laws jurisprudence); see also JOSEPH BEALE,
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1916) (same); BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1963) (same); Ulrich Huber, De Conflictum
Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis, in vol. II, Book I, title iii of PRAELECTIONES
JURiS ROMANI ET HODIERNI (1689) (same).
1996]
3
Perritt: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
This Article explores how the legal system deals with informa-
tion technology procedurally, beginning with well-recognized
problems of civil and criminal jurisdiction,3 and discussing closely
associated problems in choice of law, 4 enforcement of judgments5
and discovery.6 Next, it explores new legal institutions designed to
deal with the trans-border difficulties caused by the GI. 7 Of the
several jurisdictional problems, the problem of criminal jurisdiction
is the most serious. In the civil sphere, personal jurisdiction and
choice of law pose no insuperable difficulties, because there is
growing agreement on the basic principles of both, which ade-
quately accommodate most of the special circumstances of the GII.
Enforcement of civil judgments presents somewhat greater dif-
ficulty, because the international legal framework is not sufficiently
comprehensive to allow parties confidence in enforcing a civil judg-
ment in another country where assets may be located. Neverthe-
less, the availability of arbitration as an alternative dispute
resolution forum, the decisions of which are nearly universally en-
forceable, provides a readily acceptable alternative to civil judgment
enforcement.8
In contrast, the power of criminal courts is rigidly localized;
they lack the flexibility afforded civil courts by the doctrine of per-
sonal jurisdiction supported by minimum contacts and choice of
law. Criminal jurisdiction based on extradition treaties may not in-
clude computer crimes. Moreover, the power to conduct criminal
searches and seizures across national boundaries is unevenly de-
fined through the treaty process and foreign intelligence coopera-
tive agreements, although the availability of civil discovery on the
American model is similarly circumscribed.
The underlying transactions in the GII are not entirely new.
International trade, international communications and interna-
tional payments have been occurring for several hundred years. If
changes in the legal system are needed to permit the GII to realize
3. For a discussion of civil and criminal jurisdiction problems, see infra notes
44-202 and accompanying text.
4. For a further discussion of choice of law issues, see infra notes 203-72 and
accompanying text.
5. For a further discussion of enforcement of judgments, see infra notes 273-
355 and accompanying text.
6. For a further discussion of problems with civil and criminal discovery, see
infra notes 356-477 and accompanying text.
7. For a further discussion of new legal institutions, see infra notes 478-530
and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of arbitration in
cyberspace disputes, see infra notes 478-98 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 41: p. I
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its potential, it must be because the new technologies for trade,
communications and payments diminish the suitability of existing
legal arrangements. The new technologies may make it more diffi-
cult to identify the time and place of legally significant events. Ad-
ditionally, the new technologies may reduce the cost of transactions
to the point where the cost of utilizing existing legal measures, in-
cluding the cost of uncertainty with respect to outcomes, may be-
come so important relative to the value of the transaction that they
discourage commerce. Finally, the new technologies may open up
international commerce to types of transactions that heretofore
mosdy occurred only within a single country. For these reasons, the
GIl will force the international legal community at least to modify
the way in which it deals with transnational conflict.
II. HYPOTHETICA.S
A hypothetical illuminates the relationship between the various
aspects of civil and criminal jurisdiction. Suppose someone in
country X operates a World Wide Web server on the Internet and
intentionally makes false statements in Web pages accessible
through this server for the purpose of inducing customers in Vir-
ginia to buy inferior merchandise through the server. The pur-
poseful direction of the misleading statements to Virginia would,
under World-Wide Volkswagen9 and Asahi,10 support personal jurisdic-
tion in a Virginia state court.1 ' Of course personal jurisdiction
would not exist unless the actor were served with appropriate pro-
cess, which probably would not include electronic notice alone
under current rules. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, how-
ever, might lead to the dismissal of a Virginia action because wit-
nesses and other evidence necessary to prove the mental state
elements of the fraudulent misrepresentation are more likely to be
found in country X.12 Choice of law arguments would focus on the
competing interests of country X and Virginia. Virginia has legiti-
mate interests in protecting its citizens from fraudulent misrepre-
sentation, but country X has an interest in discouraging fraudulent
conduct by persons operating from within its territory while also
allowing a sufficient ambit of legitimate or mistaken commercial
9. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
10. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
11. For a further discussion of personal jurisdiction, see Part IV, infra notes
44-202 and accompanying text.
12. There are also arguments, however, that evidence of injury in the reliance
can be found in Virginia.
1996]
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activity. Virginia substantive law probably would be applied,
although there is room for argument.
As to criminal prosecution, no court in Virginia would have
personal jurisdiction over the actor unless the actor could be made
physically available before the Virginia court. This could be accom-
plished through arrest while the actor is in Virginia, through extra-
dition from country X, or from extra-legal physical seizure and
transportation to Virginia followed by arrest there. Appropriate-
ness of criminal venue in Virginia would depend on the commis-
sion of a crime in Virginia; the commission of a crime in country X
would be insufficient, unless the fraudulent misrepresentation
through the Internet were viewed by Virginia law as an interna-
tional "universal" crime like piracy. Most likely, a crime has been
committed in Virginia only if the Virginia or federal criminal stat-
utes against fraudulent misrepresentation of this sort (perhaps wire
fraud or consumer fraud) have extraterritorial effect, in which case
the Virginia targeting of the conduct in country X probably would
satisfy the effects test under international law and justify extraterri-
torial application of Virginia or federal criminal law to the conduct.
Any civil discovery or search and seizure in country Xwould depend
on the cooperation of country X officials in responding to U.S.
requests.
Further, if there were less evidence that the purpose of the
statement was to induce persons in Virginia, as opposed to persons
in general, then there would be greater difficulty with personal ju-
risdiction in the civil case, and there also would be greater difficulty
with substantive application of Virginia or federal law in the crimi-
nal case-the criminal equivalent of choice of law. Of course, the
courts of country X would have personal jurisdiction over the actor
with respect to both civil and criminal litigation, but could enter-
tain a prosecution only for violation of criminal laws of country X
(unless an international crime is involved as noted earlier in this
section), or unless the criminal jurisprudence of country X allows
prosecution of a citizen of country X for violating foreign law (a
relatively unlikely prospect, though one that enjoys some case law
support in France and Germany). In the civil case, the courts of
country X would apply country X choice of law rules, which proba-
bly do not differ materially from those that would be applied by a
court sitting in Virginia. If the actor were an American citizen, that
would give the courts in Virginia a stronger basis to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction in the criminal prosecution, but that citizen or
she still could not be tried in absentia.
[Vol. 41: p. 1
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Finally, the analysis would be essentially the same, if, for in-
stance, the conduct involved intentional public distribution of pi-
rated material, infringing the copyright of a citizen of Virginia,
except that the civil action would be for copyright infringement in-
stead of fraudulent misrepresentation, and the criminal prosecu-
tion would be for criminal copyright infringement. There is no
reason that the outcome on any of the dimensions of civil or crimi-
nal jurisdiction would be different, although the availability of the
many reported cases could make resolution of the civil personal ju-
risdiction and choice of law questions more certain. Also, congres-
sional intent with respect to extraterritorial jurisdiction might be
different as between the copyright crime and the wire fraud or con-
sumer fraud crimes. These hypotheticals illustrate the problems
created by the GII. The contours of these problems, as well as some
possible solutions, are explored below.
III. RELATIONSHIP AMONG PERSONAL JURISDICTION, SERVICE OF
PROCESS, VENUE, CHOICE OF LAw, ENFORCEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS AND DISCOVERY
Criminal and civil jurisdiction proceed from common con-
cepts, although the detailed requirements are significantly different
in modem law. The two sections in this part explain the concep-
tual relationship among different aspects of the power of courts
over controversies, comparing and contrasting civil and criminal
doctrines, historically and in modern law.
A. Introduction to Determinants ofJudicial Power
Four procedural doctrines interact in circumscribing the
power of any court to decide a controversy according to particular
substantive rules: personal jurisdiction; notice by arrest, service of
process or otherwise; choice of law; and venue. A fifth doctrine,
enforcement of judgments, encompasses all of the other four. The
resjudicata effect of a judgment, and therefore its enforceability,' 3
depends on the court rendering the judgment having personal ju-
risdiction, being the appropriate venue and giving appropriate no-
tice to those bound by the judgment. Inappropriate choice of law
13. There may be other limitations on enforceability, based, for example, on
the absence of a procedural scheme for enforcing foreign judgments (such as with
Sweden). Recognition remains a threshold requirement, however, for enforcing
foreign judgments, and is available only for final judgments, in other words, those
with res judicata effect.
1996]
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also is a basis for challenging the efficacy of a judgment, albeit a
much weaker one.
The four doctrines were not particularly distinct in early Eng-
lish procedure, 14 but later diverged in nineteenth century and early
twentieth century American jurisprudence. Now, they are begin-
ning to converge again in civil procedure (though not in criminal
procedure). 15 The fair play and substantial justice test for personal
jurisdiction 16 requires interest analysis similar to that used to re-
solve choice of law disputes. It also overlaps considerably with fo-
rum non conveniens analysis used to determine venue. More
14. Blackstone explains that the first process for personal writs for injuries not
against the peace was a summons. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *279. If
the defendant disobeyed "this verbal monition," the next process was by writ of
attachment, followed in turn by a writ of distress. Id. at *280. If the defendant still
failed to respond, he would be "gradually stripped of... all [property] by repeated
distresses, till (sic] he rendered obedience to the King's writ; and, if he had no
substance, the law held him incapable of making satisfaction, and therefore looked
upon all further process as nugatory." Id. at *281. For cases of injury accompanied
by force, the law also provided for process against the defendant's person if he
neglected to appear on the process of attachment, through capias ad respondendum.
Id. In addition, for cases of peaceable but fraudulent injuries, capias also was al-
lowed, gradually expanding until "a capias might be had upon almost every species
of complaint." Id. at *282. Because this process was served by the sheriff's depu-
ties called "summoners," there is every reason to infer that process could not be
served beyond the territorial limits of that particular sheriff. If process could not
be served, there was no way to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of
courts. As to arrest, Blackstone says that a warrant from a justice of the court of
King's bench "extends all over the kingdom.... But the warrant of ajustice of the
peace in one county, [such] as Yorkshire, must be backed, that is, signed, by a
justice of the peace in another, [such] as Middlesex, before it can be executed
there." 4 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *291-92.
15. See generally Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for
Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. CoMP. L. 249, 280-90 (1991) (find-
ing that constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction can also serve as appropriate
limits on choice of law, but only if general jurisdiction is abolished); Linda J. Sil-
berman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules ofJuris-
diction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 584-85 & nn.75-80
(1991) (noting that relaxed personal jurisdiction rule leads to uncertainty because
of relatively few constitutional limitations on choice of law rules). In Judge Silber-
man's view, the choice of forum in many cases determines the outcome because
courts tend to prefer their own substantive law or because their choice of law rules
are different. Id. at 585 n.76. See also Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the
Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. Rv. 781, 784-85 (1985) (stating
that relaxation of personal jurisdiction and venue rules has led to greater reliance
on forum non conveniens as unpredictable and essentially unreviewable way of
limiting forum choice). Professor Stein argues that the distinctions among subject
matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue and forum non conveniens are
not sufficiently clear to justify current differences in doctrine. He urges decreased
reliance on forum non conveniens as a means of allocating political authority and
proposes a return to jurisdictional rules "that reflect the policy choices currently
made in the guides of forum non conveniens dismissals." Id. at 786.
16. For a further discussion of the fair play and substantial justice test, see
infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
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flexible rules for personal jurisdiction necessitate an expansion of
the types of notice that are acceptable. 17 Venue rules also interact
with choice of law rules. Choice of law analysis usually begins with
the forum's choice of law rule; thus, venue may determine the out-
come of choice of law.18
As commerce, and therefore litigation, becomes more interna-
tional in character, American personal jurisdiction, venue, choice
of law and notice rules must be reassessed and perhaps harmonized
with corresponding rules in other countries. 19 Analysis and harmo-
nization can be simplified if the convergence eventually results in
the atrophy of independent personal jurisdiction inquiry, replaced
by stronger forum non conveniens rules and clearer limitations on
choice of law.20 International reassessment and harmonization of
criminal jurisdiction must take place in the context of ongoing ef-
forts to define codes of international crimes and to develop con-
cepts for international criminal courts.
B. Historical Relationship Among Jurisdiction, Venue and Choice
of Law
The prospects for unifying personal jurisdiction, venue and
choice of law rules are influenced by the historical separation of the
rules, and their historical links to private international law con-
cepts. Historically, venue rules not only determined where a suit
17. When the limits ofjurisdiction are the physical boundaries of a sovereign
entity, notice can be confined to in-hand service of process. When the limits of
personal jurisdiction cross physical boundaries, mail service and constructive ser-
vice by publication become necessary.
18. Moreover, in the federal system where forum non conveniens analysis may
result in the transfer of a case to another district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404
(1994), the choice of law rule of the original court must be used by the transferee
court. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (extending § 1404(a)
rule to transfer initiated by plaintiff).
19. See generally Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non
Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform
Standard, 28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 501 (1993) (noting that procedural idiosyncracies at-
tract international litigants to U.S. courts, and substantive rules in antitrust and
products liability areas attract plaintiffs, requiring frequent application of personal
jurisdiction and choice of law rules in marginal cases, and also challenging judg-
ment enforcement rules except when foreign defendants have assets in United
States).
20. See id. at 584-90 (acknowledging proposals and implementation in Austra-
lia, as well as objective basis for rejecting transient jurisdiction, but expressing con-
cern that limited review of venue decisions and lack of clear constitutional
restraints on choice of law would make nationwide service of process undesirable)
(citing Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22
RUrGERS L.J. 611 (1991)).
1996]
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could be brought, subsuming personal jurisdiction inquiries, 21 but
also determined what law would be applied. Until Pennoyer v. Neff2 2
territorial limitations were imposed mostly by state (or national)
venue statutes. Venue, in turn, depended on whether the cause of
action was "local" or "transitory." Local causes of action had only
one acceptable venue, while transitory causes of action might have
several. All crimes except piracy were local. Choice of law mean-
while was hardly an issue; it was assumed that any court would apply
its own substantive law. Choice of venue thus determined choice of
law.23 There was, under these early formulations, little difference
between criminal and civil jurisdiction and venue. For both civil
and criminal cases, courts exercised jurisdiction only over those
physically before the court.2 4 Once a court had jurisdiction over
the defendant, it applied its own substantive law.
One of the best explanations of the original relationship
among venue, personal jurisdiction and enforcement is found in
Livingston v. Jefferson,25 a trespass action against Thomas Jefferson.
The alleged trespass occurred in New Orleans, and Jefferson was
found in Virginia. The Virginia circuit court dismissed the action,
finding that it was local and therefore could be brought only where
the trespass occurred. 26 Jefferson was not found in that district and
21. Of course, service of process also was necessary. Sir John Fortesque de-
scribes the English jury process as involving a kind of reference from the common
law courts to the sheriff of a particular county who assembles a jury from the
"where the fact is suppose to be." SIRJOHN FORTESQUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM AN-
GLAE 85 (Francis Gregor trans., 1847). In chapter 26, he explains that the jury
heard evidence presented by the parties and then retired to agree on a verdict. Id.
at 91-93. But see Stein, supra note 15, at 781, 788 (distinguishing venue from per-
sonal jurisdiction; noting that venue relates to appropriate place for trial within
given jurisdiction, while personal jurisdiction represents allocation of judicial
power among different sovereign jurisdictions). Professor Stein acknowledges-
indeed he argues-that sharply distinguishing venue as involving private privilege
from jurisdictional rules involving political power is misplaced. Id. at 793. Profes-
sor Stein also acknowledges that the distinction at common law between venue and
jurisdiction was not altogether clear. Id. at 798.
22. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer constitutionalized personal jurisdiction by
making it clear that the U.S. Constitution imposes territorial limits on the exercise
of judicial power by state courts. Id. at 722-30.
23. See A.E. ANTON & PAUL R. BEAUMONT, PIvAT INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2d
ed. 1990) (stating assumption that choice of judge determined law had to be re-
laxed as trade spanned boundaries of traditional sovereigns, while intellectual jus-
tifications had to be developed for applying foreign law).
24. This was true only in the earliest days of English procedure. See XVI IN-
TERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW Civil Procedure ch. 2 (1982) (not-
ing English preoccupation with obtaining presence of defendant in civil cases,
reinforced by sophisticated essoins).
25. 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411).
26. Id. at 662.
[Vol. 41: p. 1
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therefore could not be sued there. Under the prevailing analytical
framework, he apparently could not be sued anywhere. Neverthe-
less, both John Marshall, sitting as Circuit Justice, and Judge Tyler
agreed that the rule was long established that trespass actions were
local rather than transitory, thereby limiting venue to Louisiana.2 7
As important as the holding is, the explanations offered by
Chief Justice Marshall and Judge Tyler are even more illuminating.
In trespass actions, Marshall explained, the title and bounds of land
might come into question, and only ajury from the vicinage of the
land could appropriately determine such facts.28 Judge Tyler rea-
soned that ajudgment for the plaintiff would potentially necessitate
execution by the sheriff and his posse to remove the trespasser, if
necessary: "And suppose the sheriff and jury should deny the
power of the court, could they be coerced?"2 9 In other words, the
power of the court should be circumscribed by the court's power
over the officer that must execute the court's judgment.30 If execu-
tion could be had only in one place, then only the court of that
place had the power to try the case.31 Judicial power was limited
both by convenience analysis (proximity to the subject matter of
suit), the focus of modem venue analysis, and also by considera-
tions of judgment enforceability.
Transitory actions were different. For them, venue existed
more or less wherever the defendant could be found. Contract was
the archetypal transitory action, based on a legal and moral obliga-
tion in the person to perform his promises, and such actions thus
were not tied to any particular place.32 There was a loose corre-
spondence between real actions and local actions, and between per-
sonal actions and transitory actions. When enforcement required
27. Id. at 662-65; see also Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 249 S.W.2d 994, 995-96
(Ark. 1952) (reviewing rationale for Livingston v. Jefferson and concluding that basis
for distinguishing local and transitory actions no longer made sense, in part be-
cause courts easily could obtain knowledge of legal rules applicable in jurisdictions
where land lies). Tax claims were another prominent example of purely local
claims. The courts in England, for example, would not entertain a claim by France
for taxes due in France. But by the mid-1950s, the rule had begun to erode, at
least with respect to interstate jurisdiction within the United States. See Oklahoma
v. Neely, 282 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Ark. 1955) (explaining why rule originally may have
made sense, but did not any longer).
28. Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 663 (Marshall, J.). Early juries used their own
knowledge of the facts as well as testimony adduced from witnesses.
29. Id. at 662 (Tyler, J.).
30. Similar issues of control arise in the extraterritorial enforcement of in-
junctions. For a further discussion of these issues, see infra notes 307-45 and ac-
companying text.
31. Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 662 (Tyler, J.).
32. Id.; accord, id. at 664 (Marshall, J.).
19961
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doing something with respect to a res, only the local sheriff could do
it. Conversely, when enforcement involved a person who might
move around, enforcement could occur wherever the person was
found, through imprisonment for debt, or simply through a "capias
ad satisfaciendum'3 3 or "capias ad respondendum. ,5 4
These limitations, however, were purely common-law limita-
tions.35 The distinction between real and personal actions achieved
constitutional status in Pennoyer86 some sixty-six years later, in which
an action proceeded as though it were personal when the remedy
sought was in rem.37 In Pennoyer, the United States Supreme Court
reasoned that the territorial limits on the power of state courts are
like the territorial limits on the power of courts in nation-states. If a
sovereign purported to decide a personal action when it lacked the
power to serve process on the person of the defendant, its judg-
ments were not entitled to recognition or enforcement in other
states.3 8 Conversely, the same court could exercise power over a
real action because it had de facto power over the res located within
its territorial limits.3 9 Of course, an important feature of this dis-
tinction was that an in remjudgment could be enforced only to the
limits of the value of the thing.40 The Pennoyer Court held that pur-
porting to decide cases against persons not within the personal ju-
risdiction of the court violated due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.41
33. A capias ad satisfaciendum is a writ of execution calling for the arrest of a
judgment debtor in order to compel him to satisfy thejudgment. See Perlmutter v.
DeRowe, 274 A.2d 283, 286 (N.J. 1971).
34. A capias ad respondendum is ajudicial writ directing the sheriff to arrest the
defendant and bring him into court to answer a complaint filed against him. See
Vermont Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 445 A.2d 1122, 1124 (N.H. 1982) (quashing exparte
capias procedure used to initiate civil contempt proceeding).
35. Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 663-65 (Marshall, J.) (emphasizing role of English
common law in Virginia).
36. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
37. See id. at 720. The Court commented:
[Tlhe property here in controversy sold under the judgment rendered
was not attached, nor in any way brought under the jurisdiction of the
court. Its first connection with the case was caused by a levy of the execu-
tion. It was not, therefore, disposed of pursuant to any adjudication, but
only in enforcement of a personal judgment, having no relation to the
property, rendered against a nonresident without service of process upon
him in the action or his appearance therein.
Id.
38. Id. at 729-30.
39. Id. at 730-31.
40. Id. at 731-32 (citing Kilboum v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37 (N.Y. 1809)
(holding judgment and action forjurisdiction obtained by attachment of bedstead
could not exceed value of bedstead)).
41. Id. at 733. But see id. at 734-35 (exempting status decisions such as divorce
[Vol. 41: p. 1
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The distinctions between personal and real actions and be-
tween local and transitory actions have largely disappeared from
personal jurisdiction analysis for civil actions. Further, the inher-
ently non-local nature of information technology might seem to
make the distinction entirely irrelevant in analyzing civil procedure
issues for the GII, but that is not so. The traditional distinction
between local and transitory actions appropriately sought to con-
form doctrine to practical limits on judicial power. The rationale
used by Judge Tyler in Livingston is a good example. Even though
interests analysis is the centerpiece of the law of personal jurisdic-
tion 42 and choice of law analysis,43 the pragmatic power dimension,
along with an assessment of efficiency and convenience, becomes
more important in deciding, as a practical matter, where a lawsuit
over electronic conduct should be litigated and where judgments
resulting from such a lawsuit can be enforced practicably. The sim-
ple answer, as in Livingston and Pennoyer, is that judicial power may
be exercised over the GII wherever a human defendant may be
found and wherever some assets are located. The GII may span
geographic boundaries, but its human actors are present in some
traditional jurisdiction, and the hardware, software and financial as-
sets used to operate each part of the GII are located in some tradi-
tional jurisdiction. Lawsuits will be efficacious in those
jurisdictions. The practical interaction between judicial power and
electronic actors and assets appropriately guides application of
modem personal jurisdiction, choice of law, venue and enforce-
ment doctrines considered in the next several sections.
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Personal jurisdiction in both the criminal and civil context is
the basic precondition of jurisdiction to adjudicate. Personal juris-
diction refers to the power of a court over the defendant. As the
historical sections of this Article explain, personal jurisdiction origi-
nally derived from physical control or custody over the defendant.
It has been relaxed in the civil context to allow power to be asserted
over persons with certain connections with the forum state who are
given formal notice through service of process. In the criminal con-
text, however, personal jurisdiction still signifies physical custody.
and requirements that nonresidents consent to jurisdiction and appoint agents for
service of process).
42. For a further discussion of personal jurisdiction, see infra notes 44-202
and accompanying text.
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Exploring application of personal jurisdiction concepts in cyber-
space requires review of the "minimum contacts" and "fair play and
substantial justice" concepts of civil personal jurisdiction, initially
articulated in International Shoe:,44 an understanding of the forum
non conveniens doctrine that sometimes pretermits exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction when it exists; and the various techniques, includ-
ing extradition and extralegal obtaining of custody that extend into
the international sphere, involved in criminal personal jurisdiction.
A. Personal Jurisdiction in Civil Cases
Personal jurisdiction of an American court, state or federal, de-
pends on the interaction of an affirmative statutory or common law
source ofjurisdiction and limitations imposed by constitutional due
process. Traditionally, as the preceding section explains, state
courts asserted jurisdiction over persons physically present within
their territorial boundaries and served with process while they were
there, and asserted jurisdiction over things found within their terri-
torial boundaries and attached while they were there.45
These affirmative bases of jurisdiction are constitutionally per-
missible merely because they are traditional under the Supreme
Court's decision in Burnham v. Superior Court.46 But states, in addi-
44. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
45. STORY, supra note 2, §§ 532-38, at 900-05. Personal jurisdiction in Roman
law, for example, was limited to the domicile of the defendant except for in rem
actions which could be brought where personal or real property was situated. Id.
Jurisdiction also existed in the place where the contract was made or was to be
fulfilled, if the defendant or his property could be found there, even if it was not
the place of his domicile. Id. "Considered in an international point of view, juris-
diction, to be rightfully exercised, must be founded either upon the person being
within the territory, or upon the thing being within the territory; for, otherwise,
there can be no sovereignty exerted." Id. § 539, at 905. Story noted questions
about quasi in remjurisdiction. Proceeding against nonresidents by attaching prop-
erty found within the jurisdiction is not personally binding on the party as a judg-
ment in personam; "it only binds the property seized or attached... and is in no just
sense a decree or judgment, binding upon him beyond that property. In other
countries, it is uniformly so treated, and is justly considered as having no extraterri-
torial force or obligation." Id. § 549 at 921-22. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1994)
(federal in renjurisdiction); CoLo. R. Crv. P. 4(e), (f) (1), (f) (2) (personal jurisdic-
tion); CoLo. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) (in remjurisdiction); IOWA R. CIv. P. 56.1 (personal
jurisdiction); see also Stein, supra note 15, at 798-99 (describing early British prac-
tice as contemplating worldwide power of King's court, but limited by inability to
enter defaultjudgment against persons not present, which in turn was mitigated by
distraint of property; venue was determined initially by location of King, and later
by need for jury familiar with facts and controversy). Professor Stein also explains
the early distinction between transitory and local causes of action. Id.
46. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). There is some doubt about the effect of the Burn-
ham case, because the rationale stated in the text was embraced by only four jus-
tices. Id. Therefore, one must be careful in characterizing the holding of
Burnham The Scalia opinion, emphasizing the traditional basis of physical pres-
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tion to asserting jurisdiction over persons or things found within
the forum state, also frequently assert jurisdiction in other cases
under long arm statutes.47 Typical of long arm statutes are the pro-
visions of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act,48 which authorizes jurisdiction over persons served (usually by
mail49) out-of-state when they have certain connections with the fo-
rum state. Long arm statutes typically authorize the exercise of ju-
risdiction to the extent permitted constitutionally5° under a line of
Supreme Court cases beginning with International Shoe.51
Under this line of cases, jurisdiction over a person or a corpo-
ration not served with process within the jurisdiction is permissible,
but only when the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum
state5 2 and only when the assertion of jurisdiction satisfies consider-
ations of fair play and substantial justice.53 Within this analytical
ence, enjoyed the support of four justices: Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Kennedy and Justice White. Id. The competing view that would have vali-
dated jurisdiction based on minimum contacts analysis, without any particular
weight given to the traditional character of the jurisdictional basis, similarly only
enjoyed the support of four justices: Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor. Id. at 606. See Silberman, supra note 19, at 569 (characterizing "two
competing views that predominated" following Burnham).
47. See UNIF. INTERSTATE & INT'L PROCEDURE Acr, 13 U.L.A. 355 (1986)
(adopted by Arkansas, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania
and Virgin Islands).
48. Id.
49. The growing use of digital information technologies introduces the possi-
bility of electronic service of process, including telex, fax and e-mail, although
these methods of service are not yet countenanced widely. For a further discussion
of electronic service of process, see infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
50. The Constitution is a limit on personal jurisdiction, while long arm stat-
utes affirmatively grant jurisdiction. The Constitution influences drafters of long
arm statutes because they want to draft a statute that does not go beyond what the
Constitution allows and thus be vulnerable to constitutional attack.
51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52. See id. at 316; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (assess-
ing defendant's minimum contacts by focusing on "the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation").
53. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
(explaining interaction of minimum contacts and fair play and substantial justice).
The best way to combine the two considerations is to realize that when minimum
contacts analysis results in a close question, fair play and substantial justice factors
should have greater weight. The fair play and substantial justice part of the inquiry
sometimes is called the Gestalt inquiry. It considers five factors:
(1) the burden on the defendant;
(2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute;
(3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
the controversy;
(4) the interstate judicial system's interest in the most efficient resolu-
tion; and
(5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.
15
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framework, contacts such as sending goods into the forum state or
permitting instrumentalities that cause injury to enter the forum
state count as minimum contacts only if they are purposeful; mere
foreseeability of contact with the forum state is not enough. 54 Also,
entering into a contract with someone in the forum state may satisfy
minimum contacts requirements when the contract provides for a
repetitive series of transactions with the forum state. 55
Personal jurisdiction analysis in Europe places less emphasis on
service of process while a defendant is physically present and
greater emphasis on factors that fit comfortably within the mini-
mum contacts concept in American jurisprudence. 56 Thus, a de-
fendant always may be sued where he or she lives, and nonresident
defendants also may be sued when they have intentionally engaged
in transactions with someone in the forum state. 57 Beyond that,
some European jurisdictions, such as France and Scotiand, assert
what is known as "exorbitant bases of jurisdiction."5 8 One exorbi-
tant basis permits courts in the plaintiffs place of residence to hear
suit against nonresident defendants, at least when the claim has
some relationship to the jurisdiction. Another allows what Ameri-
cans would call quasi in rem jurisdiction. A third allows jurisdiction
over anyone served with process while temporarily present within
the forum-so-called "tag" jurisdiction. 59
The Constitution permits in rem jurisdiction when a civil de-
fendant has property located in the forum state and the dispute
relates to the property. Quasi in remjurisdiction-when a defend-
ant has property in the forum state but the dispute is unrelated to
the property-probably is permissible only when the plaintiff can
show exigent circumstances, such as a practical inability to effect
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980), and identifying factors);
see also Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Burger King,
471 U.S. at 477, and listing factors).
54. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-96 (setting forth foreseeability
principle); Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109-12 (same).
55. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-80.
56. See generally Friedreich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and
in the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195 (1984).
57. The Brussels Convention binds signatory states-the members of the Eu-
ropean Union-to rules for jurisdiction and enforcement roughly corresponding
to the rules under International Shoe and its progeny. See A.E. ANTON & PAUL R.
BEAUMONT, ANTON & BEAUMONT's CIVILJUIUSDICTION IN SCOTLAND ch. 5, at 90-124
(1995) (explaining bases of jurisdiction under Convention).
58. Id. § 1.10, at 6-7 (explaining exorbitant bases of jurisdiction with
examples).
59. Id.
[Vol. 41: p. I
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personal service on the defendant. 60 While it may be tempting to
suppose that quasi in rem or in remjurisdiction could be used expan-
sively to obtain meaningful relief by a wrongdoer by computer, In-
ternet technologies decrease, rather than increase, the likelihood
of valuable assets being located in the jurisdiction of the plaintiff.
Even if an argument could be sustained that an Internet server used
to disseminate the harmful information is vicariously "present" in
the forum state, turning the property into money requires the prac-
tical exercise of dominion and control over something that can be
sold, and vicarious presence is not sufficient. If the server is a
SPARC station and is located in Luxembourg, the plaintiff and
judgment creditor will get money only if the SPARC station can be
sold and that requires obtaining control over it in Luxembourg.
Vicarious presence of that computer in Virginia because it is easily
accessible from Virginia is not enough to permit it to be sold in
Virginia.
Longarm jurisdiction in civil cases knows no real counterpart
in criminal personal jurisdiction because of the rule that persons
may not be tried in absentia. Thus, while it is tempting to compare
the service of process in anotherjurisdiction with extralegal acquisi-
tion of custody, the resources required to do the latter are substan-
tially greater than those required for the former, and the affront to
the sovereignty of the place of service or acquisition of custody is
much greater for the latter. On the other hand, the effect of the
apparent difference is narrowed by similarities in the problems of
judgment enforcement. 61
B. Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction over Publications62
A number of cases apply the minimum contacts and fair play
and substantial justice factors to print publications. These cases are
helpful in applying personal jurisdiction doctrine to the GII be-
cause print publications, like electronic ones, spread out and come
in contact with a multiplicity ofjurisdictions, based on conduct that
is concentrated at the place of the author or publisher. A publica-
tion usually satisfies the minimum contacts analysis if it has a sub-
60. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208-12 (1977) (noting that presence
of property in state "does not automatically confer jurisdiction over the owner's
interest in that property").
61. For a further discussion of enforcement of judgments, see Part VI, infra
notes 273-355 and accompanying text.
62. The research and initial drafting of this section was done by Andrew J.
Vella, Villanova Law School Class of 1996, law clerk to the author.
19961
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stantial circulation in the jurisdiction 63 or if the defendant
publisher intended to cause injury in the jurisdiction.64
Similar minimum contacts analysis applies when the defendant
makes an allegedly tortious statement which is later published by
another, although the maker of the statement may have less respon-
sibility for where circulation occurs. In Madara v. Hall,65 the plain-
tiff, a California resident, brought suit in a Florida district court
against the defendant for an allegedly libelous statement made by
the defendant in California during a telephone interview with a
magazine reporter. 66 The statements were later published in a
magazine which was circulated in Florida.67 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the traditional
minimum contacts analysis in considering whether the defendant
had sufficient contacts with Florida to warrant personal jurisdiction
over him.6
8
The court determined that the defendant was "not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Florida."69 First, the forum was not conve-
nient to either of the parties.70 Second, Florida had little interest in
adjudicating the dispute because neither party resided in the
state. 71 Finally, "neither the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies nor the in-
terest of the states in furthering fundamental social policies would
be served by subjecting Hall to the jurisdiction of Florida courts."72
In Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto,73 the plaintiff brought a
defamation action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
63. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (holding
that defendant "continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire mar-
ket" by circulating its magazine in that jurisdiction).
64. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (holding that California's
exercise of jurisdiction was proper over Florida defendants in libel action arising
out of article written and edited by defendants in Florida which was intended to
cause injury to plaintiff in California).
65. 916 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1990).
66. Id. at 1513.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1514-17.
69. Id. at 1519 (distinguishing Keeton and holding no personal jurisdiction
present). In distinguishing Keeton, the court stated that "[s] imply giving an inter-
view to a reporter is not enough to cause Hall to anticipate being haled into court
in Florida. Hall was not the magazine's publisher and did not control its circula-
tion and distribution; thus, he is in a qualitatively different position than the de-




73. 26 F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 1994).
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trict of Massachusetts against the defendant, a California resident,
for statements he made during a telephone interview which were
later published in a Massachusetts newspaper. 74 The court held
that two factors determine purposeful availment: foreseeability and
voluntariness. 75 It stated that if "the source of an allegedly defama-
tory remark did not initiate the pivotal contact, and the in-forum
injury is not reasonably foreseeable, jurisdiction may not be as-
serted over the source based on the comment."76 The defendant
did not make the initial contact, but the in-forum injury was fore-
seeable. 77 But then the Court of Appeals "evaluate[d] the fairness
of asserting jurisdiction in the totality of the circumstances" 78 and
found that it would be fundamentally unfair to assert personal juris-
diction over the defendant,79 in part because of the burden on the
defendant of defending in Massachusetts. Requiring "a California
resident to appear in a Massachusetts court is onerous in terms of
distance, and there are no mitigating factors to cushion that bur-
densomeness here."80 It would not be fair "on the strength of a
single remark uttered in the course of a single unsolicited tele-
phone call from a Massachusetts-based journalist, to compel a Cali-
fornia resident to defend a tort suit in a court 3000 miles away."81
The touchstones of personal jurisdiction analysis drawn from
print publication cases are appropriate for GII cases. An electronic
publisher should be subject to personal jurisdiction in any place to
which the electronic publisher intentionally sends its publication.
Thus, subscription-based commercial systems like CompuServe or
America Online should be subject to personal jurisdiction in places
74. Id. at 203-04. The court framed the issue by asking "whether an individ-
ual who merely answers a telephone call, but, having done so, knowingly directs his
comments into the forum state .... purposefully avail [s] himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the state." Id. at 207.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 208.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 209.
79. Id. at 210. But cf. Dion v. Kiev, 566 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D. Pa. 1983). In Dion,
the defendant was contacted by a Philadelphia Inquirer reporter and gave statements
to that reporter during a telephone interview. Id. at 1388-89. The court asserted
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, reasoning that:
[T] he defendant was fully aware that the reporter was from the Philadel-
phia Inquirer and that it was a major metropolitan newspaper in Penn-
sylvania with a major distribution in the Philadelphia area. It was readily
foreseeable to [the defendant] that his statement about plaintiff could be
published in the Philadelphia area and result in harm to plaintiff.
Id. at 1390.
80. Alioto, 26 F.3d at 210.
81. Id. at 212.
1996]
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where significant numbers of their subscribers reside. The resi-
dence of subscribers is known to these services; they derive revenue
from those subscriptions, and there is little reason to distinguish
between the electronic subscriber and the print subscriber. If an
electronic publisher (including an individual poster) publishes a
statement intended to injure someone, the publisher should be
subject to personal jurisdiction in the place where the injured party
is located, under the precedent represented by Calder v. Jones,82
although the Gestalt factors might be brought into play and lead to
a different result as in Madara.
There are many conceivable GII cases in which publication
does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction so strongly.
For example, one might post a message to a list. The list causes
dissemination to all those subscribed to the list. But the poster usu-
ally has no knowledge of the extent of the list and thus the dissemi-
nation of this posting to a particular person is usually neither
purposeful nor foreseeable, unless other facts indicate specific
knowledge of a particular recipient of messages posted to that list.
Absent such special facts, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is not
appropriate merely based on the dissemination of messages
through the list. An even weaker case for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction arises from placement of material on servers connected
to the Internet or Internet-like open architectures. Then, the act
resulting in the receipt of the message in a particular place is the
act, not of the publisher, but of the retriever. Publication in these
circumstances should not subject the publisher to personal jurisdic-
tion in places where the information is retrieved, under the ration-
ale of Hansen v. Denckla.8s
The Internet, and especially its World Wide Web application,
creates a publishing infrastructure in which responsibility for "send-
ing" information depends on the particular technological configur-
ation. Many of them, unlike print publishing, rely on the consumer
to come to the publisher and to trigger the transmission to that
particular consumer. An exchange the author had online through
one of the Counsel Connect (CC) electronic seminars with another
participant fairly frames the characterization issue. The other CC
participant said that the system operator in cases like the one shown
in Figure 1 below is like someone who leaves a number of objects
82. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). For a further discussion of Calder, see supra note 64
and accompanying text.
83. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Hansen held that the unilateral acts of others cannot
subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction based solely on minimum contacts. Id.
at 250-54.
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on the floor. The requester is like someone who uses a vacuum
cleaner to pick the objects up. The vacuum cleaner bag is like the
FIGURE 1
Juris A Juris B
server
f iX-  client
jurisdiction in which the effect of the information is felt. No sensi-
ble person, he said, would assert that the person leaving the objects
on the floor had placed them in the bag of the vacuum cleaner.
The author preferred a different metaphor, comparing the
electronic service to a vending machine in which the operator had
placed different types of items in particular compartments for cus-
tomer selection. The electronic customer is then like the vending
machine customer, who selects a particular type of item, inserts
money if necessary, and pulls the handle or pushes a button caus-
ing that type of item to be delivered. The vending machine com-
parison lends support to the fairness of treating the operator as a
seller of that particular item, subject to regulation by whomever has
jurisdiction over the vending machine compartments. That is so
even though the vending machine operator was in some sense pas-
sive, and the actual delivery of the item occurred only when the
customer acted to cause it to be delivered. Of course both meta-
phors involve conscious placement of items in a place from which
they will be retrieved. Both metaphors recognize that determining
who causes the content in question to enter a particularjurisdiction
seeking to regulate the content is important in determining
1996]
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whether that jurisdiction may regulate it.84
The typical bulletin board/electronic publisher concept is il-
lustrated in Figure 1. The server not only provides pointers and
other finding and retrieval value, represented by the rectangles be-
low the circle; it also publishes content, represented by the circle.
The client has dealings only with the server, which looks like a con-
ventional publisher, except that the publisher does not send any-
thing (or even make a copy) until the client requests it.
FIGURE 2






In Figure 2, the operator simply sets aside an electronic space
within which others can exchange material. The content originator
posts a file to the server, from whence it is retrieved by the client.
In that situation, the operator may have no knowledge of what
items are being offered and retrieved, and thus it is more difficult
than in Figure 1 to conclude that the operator is responsible for the
contact between the item and Jurisdiction B. Not only was the oper-
ator not the initiator of the transmission to Jurisdiction B, but it
may have lacked knowledge that the particular item was available
for transmission to Jurisdiction B. Still, the the server has control
over its facilities and could have blocked the content originator
from posting material there.
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1987) (list-
ing categories of jurisdiction); id. §§ 402-03 (stating bases of, and limitations on,
jurisdiction to prescribe).
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The typical Web server is in yet a different situation, as shown
in Figure 3. Web server X never has possession of the content. It
points to seer Y, which in turn points to the content on the server
of the content originator. Transactions 1-4 with servers Xand Yare
requests for and transmissions of pointers only. The eventual re-
quest for and retrieval of the content transpires entirely between
the client and the content originator in transactions 5 and 6. The
Web server that simply points to other (content) siveers is rather
like one who gives directions to the dirty movie theater or to the
drug dealer. While the supplier of the pointers can be said to be
involved in the distribution chain, he or she never comes in contact
with the accused material.
In the Web often the information is transmitted indirectly as a
result of interactions between user/requesters and intermediaries
who point to particular information objects-sometimes without
the knowledge of the person making the information object avail-
able. Such an infrastructure is not only two-layered; in many cases a
pointer points, not directly to the full information resource, but to
another collection of pointers, which may point to still other collec-
tions of pointers and so on, as in Figure 3, collectively marking a
trail to the complete resource. The computer programs involved
assemble a trail from the three pointers and then retrieve the de-
1996]
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sired content from wherever it resides, directly into the computer
of the requester, without the content having to traverse all the in-
termediary computers. Whether an intermediary points directly or
indirectly to the desired resource is inherently an engineering deci-
sion driven by performance considerations. In many cases, the de-
cision to maintain copies of a particular information resource is
made entirely automatically without any human intervention. A
clear example of this is in the caching of recently-retrieved re-
sources within a World Wide Web browser such as Netscape.
Unless one is to accept a broad stream of commerce theory of
personal jurisdiction, which was rejected in World-Wide Volkswagen8 5
and Asahi,8 6 none of the publishers, save the one in Figure 1 above,
are within the personal jurisdiction of courts in Jurisdiction B.
Moreover, it is dubious whether the content originator in Figure 2
is within the jurisdiction of the courts of Jurisdiction B. While the
originator-or his or her computerized agent-purposefully sent
the information item into Jurisdiction B, the sending occurred in-
stantaneously in response to the address supplied by the client,
without any advance arrangement by the content originator. The
only place that clearly hasjurisdiction over the content originator is
Jurisdiction D. Jurisdictions A and C have jurisdiction over the in-
termediaries X and Y, but the victim may not have a cause of action
against them.87
In Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.,88 a split panel
of the intermediate Florida court held that Florida courts lacked
personal jurisdiction over a New York travel agent who contracted
to use an airline reservations system with its main database located
in Miami, Florida. 89 The majority opinion expresses rhetorical con-
cern over the implications of holding that the location of computer
databases could determine personal jurisdiction over suits against
85. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
86. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). A more
limited stream of commerce theory is consistent with Asahi. An actor who places
something into a "narrow" stream, going only to a few places, is subject tojurisdic-
tion in the destinations of the stream.
87. Compare Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (imposing no intermediary liability based on lack of knowledge of
defamatory item) with Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL
323710, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 24, 1995) (finding intermediary potentially
liable as publisher for defamatory item because it undertook to screen items ap-
pearing through its service). See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp.
1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding intermediary strictly liable for copyright-in-
fringing item).
88. 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
89. Id. at 1353.
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those who use them, but offers little analysis as to why personal ju-
risdiction should not have existed under Burger King.9o The dissent
is more persuasive. 91
Plus System, Inc. v. New England Network, Inc.92 provides more
guidance than Pres-Kap. In Plus System, a Colorado-based ATM net-
work sued its New England affiliate for refusing to implement a new
royalty charge.93 In rejecting the challenge to personal jurisdiction,
the district court found, among other things, that the defendant's
regular use of the plaintiffs computer system located in Colorado
was an availment of Colorado and its law.94 The defendant benefit-
ted from the services provided by plaintiff's computer system, and it
made no difference that the defendant's connection occurred indi-
rectly through a service organization in Wisconsin. 95 There were,
to be sure, other contacts, including a visit and tour of the Colo-
rado computer facility by defendant's personnel, a contractual
choice of law clause that pointed to Colorado and signature by the
plaintiff, at least, of the contract in Colorado.96
C. Venue
Even when personal jurisdiction exists, venue may not be
proper.97 Civil actions in federal court based on diversity jurisdic-
tion may be brought in a judicial district where any defendant re-
sides, where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise
to the claim occurred, where a substantial part of the property that
is the subject of the claim is situated or in "a judicial district in
which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the
action otherwise may be brought."98 The rules for actions based on
90. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985)).
91. Compare id. at 1353 (expressing concern about Westlaw, Lexis and other
databases) with id. at 1354 (Barkdull, J., dissenting) (arguing that executing con-
tracts and making rental payments in Florida put appellant on notice of possible
suit in Florida).
92. 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992).
93. Id. at 115.
94. Id. at 118.
95. Id. at 119.
96. Id. at 118.
97. Venue rules have become more important in civil cases as limitations on
the exercise ofjudicial power as personal jurisdiction-based limitations have dimin-
ished. See Stein, supra note 15, at 803 (noting expansion of personal jurisdiction).
Because personal jurisdiction in criminal cases has remained relatively unchanged,
the independent role of venue doctrine is less important in criminal cases.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1994) (establishing venue rules for jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship).
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federal question jurisdiction are the same, except that the catch-all
allows litigation in "a judicial district in which any defendant may
be found," as opposed to one in which the defendant is "subject to
personal jurisdiction."99 These venue rules are typical; most state
rules are similar. These basic venue rules would permit litigation in
any forum in which personal jurisdiction exists, because the transac-
tional link necessary to support personal jurisdiction, a fortiorari,
would support venue.
Reuber v. United States,100 a case involving electronic conduct,
provides some interesting guidance on venue under a specialized
statute. Reuber filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), which authorizes venue only in the judicial district where
the plaintiff resided or "wherein the act or omission complained of
occurred."'01 The language limiting venue is a more restrictive ver-
sion of the language in the general federal venue statute.102 The
plaintiff filed one suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, and another, against a co-defendant, in Mary-
land state court, which was removed to the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland. The District of Columbia action
was transferred to Maryland,103 and the United States claimed im-
proper venue in the action against it. The court of appeals distin-
guished a case involving an FTCA suit over an air traffic controller
transmission from Utah to a pilot flying over Montana causing that
pilot to crash.10 4 The court found that the radio transmission was
directed specifically to the pilot in Montana and thus the situs of
the act in that case could reasonably be perceived as including the
place where the tortious radio transmission was targeted and where
the foreseeable harm would occur.10 5 But in Reuber's case, the al-
legedly tortious conduct involved disclosure and dissemination of a
letter critical of him, and the court of appeals found that even
though some communication occurred in Maryland, the tortious
99. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1994) (establishing federal question juris-
diction) with id. § 1391(a) (1994) (establishing diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction).
100. 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1994) (establishing venue rules for tort claims
against United States).
102. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1988) (establishing venue for tort claims
against United States) with id. § 1391 (a), (b) (establishing venue for diversity juris-
diction and federal question jurisdiction cases).
103. Reuber, 750 F.2d at 1046.
104. Id. at 1047 (analyzing and distinguishing Forest v. United States, 539 F.
Supp. 171 (D. Mont. 1982)).
105. Id.
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act was complete upon the release, which occurred in the District of
Columbia.
Forum non conveniens is a more significant practical limita-
tion on venue than express limitations in statutes authorizing
venue. 0 6 Forum non conveniens is a doctrine that permits the dis-
missal of cases on the grounds that the venue is inconvenient. It
depends on a showing that venue lies in another, more convenient
place.10 7 Forum non conveniens dismissals are less common in fed-
106. Forum non conveniens is a relatively recentjudicial doctrine, dating only
from roughly the middle of this century. See Stein, supra note 15, at 796. Pressure
is growing to unify forum non conveniens doctrines with the closely related fair
play and substantial justice analysis of personal jurisdiction and to rationalize appli-
cation of venue concepts to foreign plaintiffs. See generally Silberman, supra note
19, at 501 (proposing federal legislation to govern jurisdiction over alien defend-
ants and access to U.S. courts by foreign plaintiffs). Professor Allan Stein would
unify the doctrines of judicial authority to focus on identifying "the court with the
paramount interest in a controversy," so that it may adjudicate the case. Stein,
supra note 15, at 842. This criterion protects against choice of forum that unduly
burdens the forum state's courts and deprives a more appropriate forum of its
regulatory prerogatives. He would also de-emphasize access to evidence, based in
part on improvements in technology and transportation. Id. He would incorpo-
rate into personal jurisdiction doctrine the relationship between the court and the
controversy. Id. at 843. If "the forum appears to have no legitimate regulatory
stake in the controversy, then we should say that the court does not have jurisdic-
tion to resolve the dispute or that the court does not have jurisdiction if the alter-
native forum does." Id. Finally, he would eliminate the deference accorded to
plaintiff's choice of forum. Id. at 844. Although I am impressed by Professor
Stein's careful analysis and his argument in favor of incorporating many of the
forum non conveniens factors into more formal notions of jurisdiction, I am un-
persuaded by his seeming preference for the identification of a unique forum for
adjudication. The needs of litigants and governments may be perfectly well served
byjurisdictional doctrines that permit adjudication in several fora of equal compe-
tence and convenience.
Professor Stanley E. Cox urges that jurisdictional doctrines be simplified by
adoption of his thesis "that courts exist only to interpret, create and apply their
own government's laws." Stanley E. Cox, Razing Conflicts Facades to Build Better Juris-
diction Theoty: The Foundation- There Is No Law but Forum Law, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 1,
3 & n.1 (1993). From this thesis, he derives three "subtruths:" a court has jurisdic-
tion only when it can apply its own substantive law; a court with jurisdiction must
always apply its own law rather than exploring choice of law rules; and a court
cannot create shared sovereignty between governments unless the interested sover-
eigns have unequivocally negotiated for shared sovereignty. Id. at 4-6 & nn.4-5.
107. Compare Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981) (approving
dismissal of case brought by Scottish plaintiff as result of air crash in Scotland) with
Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990) (reversing dismissal
of suit by foreign employees of American company), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024
(1991), and Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., 576 A.2d 518, 529 (Conn. 1990)
(reversing dismissal of suit by Canadian plaintiffs on forum non conveniens
grounds) (videotape depositions make it more difficult for defendant to satisfy
burden of showing inconvenience). But see Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 16
(Cal. 1991) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal and adopting rationale of
Piper); Myers v. Boeing Co., 794 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Wash. 1990) (affirming dismissal
of damage claims by foreign plane crash victims).
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eral than in state courts because transfer to a more convenient fo-
rum is straightforward. 108 According to the United States Code,
"[f] or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought." 0 9 In addi-
tion, the multidistrict litigation procedure allows cases involving
one or more common questions of fact pending in different dis-
tricts to be consolidated for pretrial proceedings based on an appli-
cation to the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation.110 Forum
non conveniens may exert considerable influence on the choice of
forum for litigating GII disputes. In Figure 3 above, for example,
Jurisdiction B would rarely qualify as a convenient forum, com-
pared with Jurisdictions A, C or D.
In Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech System Pte. Ltd.,' the Ninth
Circuit applied an analytical framework that requires the person
moving for dismissal to demonstrate the existence of an adequate
alternative forum and a balance of private and public factors mili-
tating in favor of dismissal." 2 The private factors include: "(1) rel-
ative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, and cost
of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; (3) possibility of view-
ing subject premises; [and] (4) all other factors that render trial of
case expeditious and inexpensive."' " 3 In the case before it, the
court thought the first factor favored dismissal because all of the
records and most of the witnesses were located in Singapore. The
fourth factor favored dismissal because a parallel lawsuit in the Sin-
gapore courts was more advanced than the U.S. action. The third
factor was neutral, while the second factor militated against dismis-
sal because most of the expert witnesses resided in California."14
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1994) (allowing district court to transfer any civil
action for convenience).
109. Id. § 1404(a) (establishing change of venue rules).
110. Id. § 1407 (establishing procedural rules for coordination or consolida-
tion of pretrial proceeding in multidistrict litigation).
111. 61 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal on forum non con-
veniens grounds of copyright infringement suit by one Singapore corporation
against another). For a further discussion of Creative Technology, see Lynn Carino,
Note, Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech System Pte. Ltd.: The Ninth Circuit Sends
a United States Copyright Infringement Case to Singapore on a Motion of Forum Non Con-
veniens, 41 ViLL. L. REv. 325 (1996).
112. Creative Technology, 61 F.3d at 699 (citing Contact Lumber Co. v. P.T.
Moges Shipping Co., 918 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988))).
113. Id. at 703 (citing Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 832 F.2d 1477, 1485 (9th Cir.
1987) (citing Gu/f Oi4 330 U.S. at 508).
114. Id.
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The public interest factors identified in the court's opinion in-
clude: "(1) administrative difficulties flowing from court conges-
tion; (2) imposition ofjury duty on the people of a community that
has no relation to the litigation; (3) local interest in having local-
ized controversies decided at home; (4) the interest in having a di-
versity case tried in a forum familiar with the law that governs the
action; [and] (5) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in con-
flicts of law." 115 The court of appeals agreed with the district court
that the first and fourth factors were neutral in effect, while the
second factor favored dismissal because both plaintiff and defend-
ant were residents of Singapore and the wrongful acts of copyright
infringement occurred there.1 16 CircuitJudge Ferguson dissented,
noting that he was "astounded when I read that it is not convenient
to try an American copyright case in an American court for copy-
right infringement that takes place solely in America... [and] by a
decision that the convenient place to hold the trial is in Singapore,
particularly when the majority have not the slightest idea that a
court in that nation would even recognize an American
copyright."117
Greater certainty with respect to the place of litigation can be
obtained through the use of forum-selection clauses, which are an
important determinant of venue. Historically, such clauses were
not favored, but in a series of cases beginning with The Bremen v.
Zapata OffShore Co.,"18 the Supreme Court has been increasingly
hospitable to them. In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. RICOH Corp.,119
the Supreme Court held that federal law rather than state law gov-
erns the enforceability of a forum-selection clause in a contract
within the diversity jurisdiction of a federal district court.12 0 Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion explain-
ing that enforcement of forum-selection clauses protects party
expectations and furthers vital interests of the justice system, thus
extending the rationale of The Bremen to federal courts sitting in
115. Id. at 703-04 (citing Zipfe4 832 F.2d at 1485 (citing Gu/f Oi4 330 U.S. at
508)).
116. Id. at 704.
117. Id. at 705 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
118. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
119. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
120. Id. at 27-28 (concluding that federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), governed
under application of Erie doctrine). In Erie Railroad Go. v. Thomkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), the Supreme Court held that state law must be applied in diversity cases,
unless a federal rule of procedure, statute or constitutional provision governs. Id.
at 78; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (holding that federal law
must be applied when valid federal rule of civil procedure governs issue).
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diversity. 121
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,122 the Supreme Court
made it more difficult to avoid forum-selection clauses even when
they are contained in form contracts and not actually negotiated. 23
The Court acknowledged that forum-selection clauses are subject to
judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness and suggested that they
are unenforceable if there is evidence of their inclusion for the pur-
pose of discouraging parties from pursuing legitimate claims by as-
signing litigation to a remote and alien forum, by proof that
resisting parties lacked notice of the clause or evidence of fraud or
other overreaching. 124 Nevertheless, it extolled the virtues of such
clauses as ways of dispelling confusion about where suits for breach
of contract might be brought and defended "sparing litigants the
time and expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct fo-
rum and conserving judicial resources that otherwise would be de-
voted to deciding those motions."' 25 In addition, the facts of the
case made the forum designated by the clause-Florida-entirely
appropriate and did not support the court of appeals's conclusion
of inconvenience to the consumer. 2 6 Although Carnival Cruise
Lines was an admiralty case, there is no suggestion in the opinion
that diversity or federal question cases would be treated any
differently.
The presumption in favor of enforcing forum-selection clauses
regularly is extended to clauses in international contracts that pro-
vide for litigation in the fora of other countries. 127 Further, the
forum-selection clause cases have important implications for elec-
tronic commerce. They permit reduction of the uncertainty with
respect to the place of litigation, and they also reduce uncertainty
121. Sterart, 487 U.S. at 33 (KennedyJ, concurring) (filing separate opinion
in support of forum-selection clauses).
122. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
123. Id. at 593 (noting that contract was "purely routine and doubtless nearly
identical to every commercial passage contract issued by petitioner and most other
cruise lines"). "Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form
contract the terms of which are not subject to negotiation, and that an individual
purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining parity with the cruise line." Id.
124. Id. at 595.
125. Id. at 594.
126. Id. at 594-95 (finding fairness because chosen forum, Florida, was cruise
line's principal place of business and location of many of its departure and arrival
ports).
127. See Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1993) (re-
jecting arguments that clause requiring litigation in English courts imposed suffi-
cient financial hardship to justify not enforcing it and concluding that English
remedies adequately would vindicate plaintiffs substantive rights under securities
laws), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1113 (1994).
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about the methods of binding the user of an electronic service to a
forum-selection clause. Forum-selection clauses not only resolve
venue issues; they also resolve personal jurisdiction issues because a
valid clause constitutes consent to personal jurisdiction in the fo-
rum selected. The Carnival Cruise Lines case reduces the likelihood
that a participant in electronic commerce could avoid a forum-se-
lection clause on the grounds that there was no negotiation over it.
It should be enough to show that the resisting party had notice of
the clause, and that the forum selected by the clause was reasonable
in light of the nature of the contract.
D. Service of Process and Attachment
Service of process performs two functions in Anglo-American
civil procedure: it represents assertion of judicial power of the fo-
rum state over the person of the defendant, and it is the formal
means of providing notice to the defendant so that he or she may
defend the lawsuit. 128 Sections A through C above considered the
power dimension of personal jurisdiction. This section considers
the notice requirement of procedural due process in the civil litiga-
tion context. Service of process is a more important concept for
civil procedure than criminal procedure because of the nearly uni-
versal prohibition in criminal justice systems against trials in absen-
tia-the analog of a civil default judgment. 129
In early Anglo-American procedure, a defendant subjected to
personal jurisdiction was entitled to pre-seizure or pre-arrest notice
except for claims involving breach of the peace or malice, in which
case personal jurisdiction could be asserted by arresting the defend-
ant under a writ of capias ad respondendum. Even when no breach of
the peace or malice was involved, capias would issue if the defend-
ant did not respond to the initial notice. Real claims-those involv-
ing what later came to be known as in rem jurisdiction-always
could be commenced simply by attaching or otherwise levying on
the property itself, regardless of whether separate notice was given
to the person entitled to possession. Now, constitutional due pro-
cess entitlements prohibit significant deprivation of liberty or prop-
erty interests until notice is given. Thus, capias and commencement
128. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1950) (distinguishing between service of process as means of exercising power
and service of process as constitutionally sufficient means of giving notice).
129. In some minor criminal cases, a defendant is served with a summons
rather than being arrested, but the penalty for not showing up is issuance of an
arrest warrant, not a default conviction. See, e.g., PA. R. CIuM. P. § 102 (West 1989)
(using summons or warrant of arrest in criminal cases).
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of an action by attachment are reserved for exigent circumstances,
such as those which involve a risk that the defendant will abscond
or dispose of property before notice can be given.1 30
The Supreme Court has noted that "[p] ersonal service of writ-
ten notice within the jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always
adequate in any type of proceeding."13 1 Other forms of notice may
be constitutionally adequate when reasonably calculated under the
circumstances to give actual notice. 132 Of course, constitutional ad-
equacy is not enough; the method of notice also must be author-
ized by some affirmative source of law representing the service of
process rules of the forum. Additionally, service of process must
occur within the time limits set by civil procedural rules, although
extensions can be granted by the court.8 3
The growing use of digital information technologies in-
troduces the possibility of electronic service of process, including
telex, fax and e-mail, 134 although these methods of service are not
yet countenanced widely.13 5 Despite the practical feasibility and at-
tractiveness of electronic service of process, authorization for elec-
tronic service is thin. On occasion, this form of service has been
authorized in particular cases.' 36 Some commentators have urged
130. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1991) (invalidating lien on
real estate imposed based on five-sentence affidavit; risk of erroneous deprivation
of property interest too great); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601, 608 (1975) (invalidating prejudgment garnishment under Fuentes); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972) (holding prejudgment attachment unconstitu-
tional in absence of exigent circumstances and safeguards for property interests of
person attached); Vermont Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 445 A.2d 1122, 1124 (N.H. 1982)
(quashing ex parte capias procedure used to initiate civil contempt proceeding).
131. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
132. Id. at 313-14; see also Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 444 (1982) (invali-
dating service of process by posting notice on door of low-income housing
project).
133. See Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger GmbH, 46 F.3d 1298, 1305 (3d
Cir. 1995). The court remanded the denial of an extension of time to serve pro-
cess and the dismissal of complaint against the products liability defendant. Id. at
1311. The court also held that revised Rule 4(m) mandates an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review; here, the plaintiff made inexcusable errors by relying on the
verbal assurance of an unknown person in the Secretary of State's Office, failing to
inquire when notice of acknowledgment was not returned, claiming that mailing
to Texas would be fruitless, and failing to inquire whether the corporation was in
good standing with the Secretary of State's Office. Id. at 1306-07.
134. In addition, there is the conceptual possibility that service by publication
might be accomplished by electronic publication in an appropriately public forum.
135. For example, changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 were dis-
cussed in 1995 among the members of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, but
none were officially proposed.
136. See, e.g., New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (authorizing service on Ira-
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authorization of service by facsimile,13 7 but most jurisdictions only
authorize the use of facsimile or service of process after the initial
service of summons and complaint.18 8 Some older state rules au-
thorize telegraphic service,139 but fax service has the advantage that
fax machines automatically produce an acknowledgment thus pro-
viding a form of proof of service.
Although the federal rules authorize service of process pursu-
ant to the law of the forum state or the law of the state in which
service is effected, 140 and by the law of foreign countries in which
service is to be made or under international treaty,141 the explicit
provisions of the federal rule provide only modest possibilities for
electronic service. 142 The appellate rules permit individual courts
of appeals to permit papers to be filed "by facsimile or other elec-
tronic means."' 43 Few state rules permit electronic service. The
Federal Rules Advisory Committee, supported by courts in which
electronic service experiments were conducted, has dicussed
amending the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure to
permit electronic service. 144
Service of process is not the only way to commence an action
against one within the personal jurisdiction of the court if a foreign
defendant has minimum contacts with the foreign state. 145 An ac-
tion may be commenced by attaching property within the jurisdic-
nian defendants in Farsi and English by telex, followed by personal service on
counsel and copies by mail, under FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) (1) (E) as it then existed).
137. See, e.g., David A. Sokasits, Note, The Long Arm of the Fax: Service of Process
Using Fax Machines, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 531, 539-43 (1990) (pro-
moting use of fax machine for serving initial process of summons and complaint).
138. See id. at 547-49 (reviewing New York and Oregon rules).
139. Id. at 549 (citing IDAHO R. Civ. P. 4(c) (3); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-3-501;
UTAH R. Civ. P. 4(1)).
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (providing rules for service upon individuals
within judicial district of United States).
141. Id. 4(f) (authorizing service of process in foreign country pursuant to
any convention on service abroad ofjudicial and extra judicial documents); see also
id. 4 cmt. (1993 amendment) (explaining intent and application of new subdivi-
sion (f)).
142. Id. 4(d)(2)(B) (failure-of-service provisions permitting notice of com-
mencement of action and request that defendant waive service of summons, which
can be "dispatched through first-class mail or other reliable means" (emphasis
added)).
143. FED. R. APP. P. 25(a) (Supp. 1995) (requiring, however, that local roles
be consistent with standards established by Judicial Conference of United States).
144. The Federal Rules Advisory Committee has not officially proposed these
amendments to allow electronic service of process; however, there have been dis-
cussions centered around this possibility.
145. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203 (1977) (requiring minimum con-
tacts as prerequisite for commencing action by attachment).
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tion belonging to the defendant. 146 This might seem a remote
basis for commencing an action growing out of an electronic com-
munication, until one realizes that the property belonging to the
defendant might take the form of obligations under a service con-
tract between the defendant and a service provider within the juris-
diction. 147 When jurisdiction is obtained in this way, any judgment
must be limited to the value of the property attached, although the
rationale for this restriction is unclear, the suggestion that the na-
ture of the jurisdiction effected by valid attachment is personal was
made by Shaffer v. Heitner1 48
Thus, in the unlikely event that a cyberspace defendant owned
hardware that was physically located within the jurisdiction, and as-
suming that the defendant satisfied minimum contacts, a plaintiff
could commence action by attaching the hardware. Far more likely
is a situation in which the defendant has intangible rights to service
provided by in-jurisdiction entities. For example, a foreign defend-
ant might be a subscriber to America Online. In such a situation,
the obligation by America Online to provide service could be sub-
ject to attachment or writ of garnishment. The problem, of course,
is that the value of such a service contract is likely small. Of greater
potential significance is the possibility that execution of the attach-
ment could effectively cut off the defendant from some or all access
in the forum jurisdiction.1 49
146. See Alessi v. Belanger, 644 So. 2d 778, 789 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (allowing
commencement of action against out-of-state defendant by attaching wedding
ring).
147. In Cameco Indus., Inc. v. Mayatrac, 789 F. Supp. 200 (D. Md. 1992), the
district court held that an action could be commenced by a writ of garnishment
against a bank account in state, but only if the defendant also had minimum con-
tacts. Id. at 202-03. It held that the bank account by itself did not constitute mini-
mum contacts under Shaffer. Id. at 202; see also Britton v. Howard Sav. Bank, 727
F.2d 315, 318-19 (3d Cir. 1984) (reversing district court and holding that action
could be commenced by attaching certificates of deposit based on allegations that
defendant was evading service of process; records showed ample contacts with state
to satisfy due process).
148. 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977).
149. See generally Friedt v. Moseanko, 498 N.W.2d 129, 133 (N.D. 1993) (ruling
that money or property, other than earnings, held by third party is subject to gar-
nishment). There is some room for argument, however, that services due would
not be sufficiently liquidated to be subject to garnishment. See generally Harpster v.
Reynolds, 524 P.2d 212, 215 (Kan. 1974) (holding no garnishment of wages from
personal service contract when payments are made in advance of services per-
formed); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Romano, 482 A.2d 50, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1984) (holding that promise to advance funds not subject to garnishment).
The rationale for the rule stated in Harpster apparently is that no payments are yet
due; indeed, they are never due when a writ of garnishment is served on the em-
ployer. Rather, the employee is always indebted to the employer for the advances.
Harpster, 524 P.2d at 216; see Haines v. Public Finance Corp., 218 N.E.2d 727, 729
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E. Personal Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases
Despite the infrequency of use of the term, at least some com-
mentators have described jurisdiction over the person in criminal
prosecutions as "personal jurisdiction."150 Personal jurisdiction in
criminal cases universally is based on physical presence, usually ob-
tained through arrest. Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires the defendant's presence at the trial.151 Many
countries, in addition to the United States, guarantee defendants
the right to be tried in their presence. 52 In addition, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifically prohibits
trials in absentia.153 Commentators report that the defendant's pres-
ence is a requisite for a criminal trial under the national laws of
many industrial countries. 54 Once the trial commences, however,
the continued presence of the defendant is not always required, 55
(Ohio Ct. App. 1966). (holding that intangible property subject to garnishment
must be subject to appraisal; denying garnishment of invasion of privacy claim not
yet sued on). But see Weir v. Galbraith, 376 P.2d 396, 401-02 (Ariz. 1962) (holding
that installment contract payments due from purchaser to merchant were subject
to garnishment).
150. Jacques Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal Courts: Making
Sense of United States v. Rauscher, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 71, 72 & n.3 (1993) (finding
that doctrine of specialty "limits personal jurisdiction in the federal and state
courts" to crime for which criminal defendant has been surrendered).
151. FED. R. CriM. P. 43(a). The rule states: "The defendant shall be present
at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the
impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of
sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule." Id.
152. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identi-
fying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitu-
tions, 3 DuKEJ. COMp. & INT'L L. 235, 279 n.215 (1993) (listing over 20 countries
that guarantee defendant's presence at own trial). Through a discussion with Pro-
fessor Emmanuel Gross of the University of Haifa, I learned that Israel's rule re-
quiring the defendant's presence is also similar to the United States.
153. Id. at 280 n.218 (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
GA. Res. 2200 (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, pt.
III, art. 14(3)(d), at 54, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)).
154. See generally RICHARD J. TERRILL, WORLD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A
SuRvEY (1984) (describing criminal justice systems throughout world). Specifi-
cally, Professor Terrill describes England, France, Sweden and Japan. Id. at 51-52,
150-51, 209-11, 278. But see Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856, 865-66 (D. Conn.
1959) (ordering extradition to Italy of fugitive despite his argument that he was
convicted in absentia), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
155. FED. R. CRiM. P. 43(b) states that a defendant's continued presence is
not required:
The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the ver-
dict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have
waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present,
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced (whether or
not the defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to
remain during the trial), or
(2) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will
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as when the defendant flees during the trial 156 or is removed from
the courtroom due to disruptive conduct.15 7 Furthermore, under
American law, the defendant's presence is not required in four
other situations: 158 (1) if the defendant is a corporation, it may be
represented solely by counsel; 159 (2) if the offenses are punishable
by a fine or imprisonment of not more than one year;160 (3) "at a
conference or argument upon a question of law";161 and (4) for a
reduction of sentence.1 62 Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction over
international computer crimes requires obtaining custody of the in-
dividual defendant which can be obtained through the formal pro-
cess of extradition or by extralegal means. 165
F. Pre-Trial Extradition
International extradition is a means of obtaining criminal juris-
diction over a defendant not found within the territorial limits of
the forum state.164 Extradition arose in the mid-nineteenth century
cause the removal of the defendant from the courtroom, persists in con-
duct which is such as to justify exclusion from the courtroom.
Id.
156. FED. R. CrM. P. 43(b)(1) (allowing court to proceed if defendant is vol-
untarily absent); Bassiouni, supra note 152, at 279-80 (discussing exceptions to re-
quirement of defendant's presence).
157. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b) (2) (allowing court to remove defendant after giv-
ing defendant warnings).
158. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c) states:
A defendant need not be present in the following situations:
(1) A corporation may appear by counsel for all purposes.
(2) In prosecutions for offenses punishable by fine or by imprison-
ment for not more than one year or both, the court, with the written
consent of the defendant, may permit arraignment, plea, trial, and impo-
sition of sentence in the defendant's absence.
(3) At a conference or argument upon a question of law.
(4) At a reduction of sentence hearing under Rule 35.
Id. 43(c).
159. Id. 43(c)(1).
160. Id. 43(c) (2). The defendant must give the court written consent and the
court may then proceed without the defendant's presence. Id.
161. Id. 43(c)(3).
162. Id. 43(c)(4).
163. Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement in the Inter-
national Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 813, 813-14, 857-
60 (1993) (stating that options for U.S. law enforcement officials include request-
ing extradition, requesting informal methods such as deportation or forcing fugi-
tive out of requested country, requesting that foreign government prosecute
fugitive in its own courts, or obtaining custody by abduction or trickery).
164. See generally Marian Nash Leich, Contemporaty Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 154 (1982) (describing extradition
process through State Department and diplomatic channels, and describing con-
tent of extradition treaties).
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in order to impose legal obligations on signatories to extradite fugi-
tives from other signatories, thus limiting unfettered discretion to
grant asylum to any fugitive. 165 Reluctance to enter into extradition
treaties, however, stemmed from a reluctance to extradite persons
charged with political crimes in the requesting state (or to extradite
victims of ethnic or religious persecution). Because of the difficulty
in defining political crimes, the result was treaties drafted to re-
quire extradition only for enumerated crimes, reinforced by the
doctrine of specialty, which prohibits prosecution in the requesting
state for crimes other than those used as the basis for extradition.1 66
The United States has extradition treaties with 100 nations. 167
Historically, they were limited to certain crimes, but more recently
include any crime subject to the principle of dual criminality: one
is not extraditable under the treaty unless the crime for which his
extradition is requested violates the criminal laws of both the re-
questing state and the requested state. 166 U.S. policy is to replace
enumerated crimes and extradition treaties with the dual criminal-
ity principle, subject to a political offense exception.1 69
Procedurally, the designated authority of the requesting state
makes an official request for the extradition of a particular person.
The courts of the requested state, acting upon a formal document
issued by the justice or foreign affairs ministry, issue an arrest war-
rant. Once the target is arrested, he or she is entitled to a judicial
hearing in which two findings must be made before extradition can
proceed: first, that the arrested person is the person named in the
extradition warrant; and second, that there is probable cause to be-
lieve that the person named committed the crime identified. 170
165. Nadelmann, supra note 163, at 823-29 (describing history of extradition
treaties, beginning in Europe, explaining American resistance to multilateral trea-
ties and emphasizing recent focus on drug offenses); Semmelman, supra note 150,
at 80-81 (describing history of and bases for extradition treaties).
166. See Semmelman, supra note 150, at 80 (discussing origins of doctrine of
specialty).
167. Andr6 M. Surena et al., Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Law, in
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 85TH ANNUAL
MEETING 383, 384 (1991).
168. Nadelmann, supra note 163, at 829-31 (explaining how dual criminality
provision supplanted more and more cumbersome enumerated list of extraditable
offenses).
169. Surena et al., supra note 167, at 384.
170. See Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 65 (D.D.C. 1995) (invalidating
U.S.-Canadian Extradition Treaty). In virtually all cases, a request for extradition
for trial must be supported by sufficient evidence to establish probable cause at the
preliminary hearing stage in the United States. In re Extradition of Garcia, 890 F.
upp. 914, 922 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (determining that probable cause question is not
whether evidence is sufficient to justify conviction, but only whether there is com-
1996]
37
Perritt: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The process under international extradition statutes resembles
interstate extradition within the United States. Virtually all states
within the United States have adopted the Uniform Criminal Extra-
dition Act ("Act").1 71 Under the Act, the governor of one state has
a duty to arrest and to deliver to the executive authority of any
other state any person charged with a crime in the other state who
is found in the first state.' 72 Demands for extradition must be in
writing and allege that the accused was present in the demanding
state at the time the alleged crime was committed and thereafter
fled from the state. 173 The writing requirement apparently has not
been construed to include or exclude a computer message.
Once the demand has been made, "[i]f the Governor decides
that the demand should be complied with, he shall sign a warrant
of arrest.., directed to any peace officer or other person whom he
may think fit to entrust with the execution thereof."'174 Although
the governor has a nondiscretionary duty to honor an extradition
request, apparently there are no means of compelling him or her to
honor it.175 No person may be returned after an arrest on an extra-
dition warrant without being afforded the opportunity to challenge
the legality of the arrest under a writ of habeas corpus or other-
wise. 176 The statute also allows for arrest without a warrant upon
reasonable information that the accused is charged in the courts of
petent evidence to justify holding respondent for trial); Leich, supra note 164, at
158 (reporting revised directive on international extradition issued to all State De-
partment and foreign service personnel).
171. See UNIF. CuM. ExTRADITION Acr, intro., 11 U.L.A. 97 (1995) (listing ju-
risdictions wherein Act has been adopted). The Uniform Act implements the ex-
tradition clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2
(providing that "[a] Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand
of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime"); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3182, 3194-
95 (1994) (providing procedural rules to execute extradition clause of United
States Constitution).
172. UNIF. CRIM. EXTRADITION Acr § 2, 11 U.LA. at 113 (providing duty of
governor in state where person fleeing justice is found).
173. Id. § 3, at 158 (requiring that demand also be accompanied by copy of
indictment, information, affidavit and warrant or judgment of conviction or
sentence).
174. Id. § 7, at 296 (providing procedure for issue of governor's warrant of
arrest).
175. Matter of Lucas, 343 A.2d 845, 850 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.) affd, 346
A.2d 624 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 354 A.2d 306 (N.J. 1975); see also
Allen v. Leach, 626 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Colo. 1981) (finding rendition of fugitive
permissible as matter of governor's discretion).
176. UNIF. CRim. EXTRADITION Acr § 10, 11 U.L.A. at 337-38 (detailing rights
of accused person).
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any state with a capital crime or a serious felony. 177 In the event of
such a warrantless arrest, the arrestee may be confined for a period
not to exceed thirty days while the governor is given time to issue a
warrant under section 6 of the Act. 178 The warrantless arrest au-
thority adequately covers situations in which the request for extradi-
tion or a less formal request to arrest a fugitive is communicated
electronically.
G. Extralegal Seizure
The United States Supreme Court has held that extradition
pursuant to a treaty is not the only way in which criminal jurisdic-
tion of someone located in a foreign country can be obtained. As
an alternative, the person may be seized and delivered physically
into forum-state territory by foreign officers, by private citizens,179
or by forum-state law enforcement officials or military personnel. 0
While these cases involve the assertion of U.S. criminal law, their
reasoning, based on international law, would support the assertion
of criminal jurisdiction by another country over a person seized and
removed from the United States. In United States v. Alverez-
Machain,181 the Supreme Court held that a federal court did not
lose jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution because the defendant
had been abducted in Mexico and brought to the United States
without resort to the extradition treaty then in effect between the
two countries.18 2 In so holding, it noted that historical views of in-
ternational law permit jurisdiction to be exercised even though a
person or thing is seized abroad in violation of international law,
despite the general principle of international law that one govern-
ment may not exercise its police power in the territory of another
state.183 Significantly, the treaty with Mexico did not prohibit ab-
duction nor did it adopt a suggestion of a group of Harvard law
177. Id. § 14, at 406 (detailing circumstances of lawful arrest without
warrant).
178. Id. § 15, at 411.
179. Nadelmann, supra note 163, at 813 (commenting that historically, most
irregular detentions were arranged through private detectives and bounty
hunters); id. at 865-68 & nn.241-53 (noting that recent irregular detentions have
involved cooperation between U.S. and local police agents, typically to put fugi-
tives on airplane and send them to U.S. or to international territory where they
may be seized by U.S. officials).
180. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992) (re-
jecting argument that U.S.-Mexican Extradition Treaty prohibited international
abductions); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
181. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
182. Id. at 669-70.
183. Id. at 668-69.
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professors, advanced as early as 1935, that "[i]n exercising jurisdic-
tion under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any
person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject
to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international
law or international convention without first obtaining the consent
of the State or States whose rights have been violated by such
measures."
18 4
In other words, the remedies for extralegal obtaining of cus-
tody do not include dismissal of the prosecution.18 5 The U.S. Crim-
inal Code186 provides that one who commits an offense against the
United States may be arrested and imprisoned for that offense,18 7
contemplating the need to reach beyond the territorial boundaries
of the United States to obtain the presence of some defendants:
Section 3041 [providing the power of courts and magis-
trates] of this title shall apply in any country where the
United States exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction for the
arrest and removal therefrom to the United States of any
citizen or national of the United States who is a fugitive
from justice charged with or convicted of the commission
of any offense against the United States, and shall also ap-
ply throughout the United States for the arrest and re-
moval therefrom to the jurisdiction of any officer or
representative of the United States vested with judicial au-
thority in any country in which the United States exercises
extraterritorial jurisdiction, of any citizen or national of
the United States who is a fugitive from justice charged
with or convicted of the commission of any offense against
184. Id. at 666 n.13 (quoting Article 16 of Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, reprinted in 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935)).
185. Paul Hoffman et al., Kidnapping Foreign Criminal Suspects, 15 WHITrIER L.
REv. 419, 421-33 (1994) (discussing remedies for abduction by U.S. law enforce-
ment agents, including civil liability and criminal prosecution for dismissal of
prosecution).
186. The Criminal Code is located in Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (1994). Providing the power of courts and magistrates,
§ 3041 states:
For any offense against the United States, the offender may, by anyjustice
or judge of the United States... at the expense of the United States, be
arrested and imprisoned or released as provided in chapter 207 of this
title, as the case may be, for trial before such court ... of the offense.
Copies of the process shall be returned as speedily as may be into the
office of the clerk of such court, together with the recognizances of the
witnesses for their appearances to testify in the case.
[Vol. 41: p. I
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the United States in any country where it exercises extra-
territorial jurisdiction.
Such fugitive first mentioned may, by any officer or
representative of the United States vested with judicial au-
thority in any country in which the United States exercises
extraterritorial jurisdiction and agreeably to the usual
mode of process against offenders subject to such jurisdic-
tion, be arrested and detained or conditionally released
pursuant to section 3142 of this title, as the case may be,
pending the issuance of a warrant for his removal, which
warrant the principal officer or representative of the
United States vested with judicial authority in the country
where the fugitive shall be found shall seasonably issue,
and the United States marshal or corresponding officer
shall execute.
Such marshal or other officer, or the deputies of such
marshal or officer, when engaged in executing such war-
rant without the jurisdiction of the court to which they are
attached, shall have all the powers of a marshal of the
United States so far as such powers are requisite for the
prisoner's safekeeping and the execution of the
warrant. 188
The most straightforward and powerful remedy for an extrale-
gal acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of a criminal defend-
ant is to dismiss the prosecution. It was this remedy that was
rejected in Alverez-Machain. In 1993, however, the English House of
Lords reached a contrary conclusion in Ex parte Bennett,1 9 which
mirrored the New Zealand Court of Appeals conclusion in 1. v.
Hartly.190 The basis for these approaches is the British abuse-of-
process concept, in which a court refuses to allow its power to be
188. Id. § 3042.
189. R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, Exparte Bennett, [1994] 1 App.
Cas. 42 (1993) (holding that trial court had discretion, and perhaps duty, to dis-
miss criminal prosecution against New Zealand citizen accused of false pretenses
in acquisition of helicopter, arrested by South African police and placed on air-
plane to England; United Kingdom had no extradition treaty with South Africa);
see also Andrew L.-T. Choo, Ex parte Bennett: The Demise of the Male Captus, Bene
Detentus Doctrine in England?, 5 CRIM. L.F. 165 (1994) (explaining background and
uncertainties with respect to Ex parte Bennett).
190. [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 199 (C.A. 1977) (suggesting trial court duty to dismiss
prosecution procured by telephone call from New Zealand police to Melbourne,
Australia, police, followed by arrest of defendant by Australian police and place-
ment on airplane to New Zealand; no effort to obtain extradition warrant).
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used to further wrongdoing by the police. 191 The rationale for de-
clining prosecution over an unlawfully arrested defendant is thus
the same as the rationale for excluding unlawfully obtained
evidence.
Although Alverez-Machain says the prosecution could proceed if
one were to be kidnapped and brought to court for a crime in the
forum state, the forum court may prosecute only for acts which are
crimes in the forum. Thus, the court cannot prosecute for a crime
under the law of a foreign country. The same limitation would pre-
vent prosecution by a court in the foreign country. It is illuminat-
ing to compare this criminal law limitation with long arm service of
process in the civil law context. Suppose one were served in coun-
try X for suit in a Virginia court for a Virginia tort or breach of
contract. The Virginia court would have jurisdiction only if there
were purposeful contact with Virginia, and then could apply either
Virginia or country X law, depending on the respective interests of
Virginia in country X The same result would be obtained if the tort
or the breach of contract were committed in country X. The only
difference would be that choice of law would more likely point to
the application of the law of country X and forum non conveniens
doctrines would be more likely to make the transfer infeasible, or
more likely, the dismissal of the suit in the Virginia courts. If the
tort or breach of contract suit were maintained in country X, there
would be no difficulty in applying Virginia or country X law.
H. Criminal Venue
The location of a criminal prosecution is determined by the
location of the crime and physical custody of the person accused of
the crime. A vexing procedural problem arises from the difficulty
in determining where a computer crime was committed. A criminal
defendant is entitled constitutionally and statutorily to be tried in
the place where he allegedly committed the crime. For instance,
Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution guarantees a
defendant a trial in the state where the crimes were committed. 192
The Sixth Amendment entities criminal defendants to a trial in "the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."193
191. Choo, supra note 189, at 174 (concluding that primary purpose is not to
deter police but rather to refuse misuse ofjudicial power).
192. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Trial of crimes committed outside the
country must be at such place or places as Congress directs by statute. Id.
193. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 633
(1961) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)) (finding appropriate venue to lie in jurisdic-
tion where offense was begun).
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 states that "except as other-
wise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution shall be
had in a district in which the offense was committed." 94 These
criminal venue guarantees do not apply to the states' 95 nor to for-
eign countries.' 96
Many federal criminal statutes provide for venue, but when
they do not, the prevailing practice is to apply the "verb test" to
determine the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the
act or acts constituting it. Under this test, the court looks to the
verbs defining the proscribed act and determines where the con-
duct specified by those verbs actually occurred. That is the place of
the crime and the place for prosecution.' 97 As mentioned above,
the United States Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to
prosecution in the state and district in which the crime was commit-
ted. This does not mean, however, that there is a single proper
situs for trial in the case of a crime that affects more than one dis-
trict.' 98 The verb test properly takes into account a number of fac-
tors: "the site of the defendant's acts, the elements and nature of
194. FED. R. CRuM. P. 18; see United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 416 (4th
Cir.) (reviewing "verb rule," but concluding that witness intimidation offense
should be tried by court in which underlying proceeding was pending because it
was that court's authority that was jeopardized by witness intimidation), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1140 (1994); United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1982).
195. Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344, 345 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming denial of
habeas corpus based on inapplicability of Sixth Amendment to state prosecution;
noting that due process does place some limits on trying state defendant in distant
place); Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 325 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming denial of
habeas corpus; extensive review of history and purpose of Sixth Amendment venue
clause shows that it should not be applied to states, despite general applicability of
some jury provisions of Sixth Amendment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981).
196. Not one of the major international human rights documents provides
for a trial in the country where the crime was committed. In addition, only the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights even guarantees the right to be
tried in one's presence. PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
RIGHTS § 22.6.3, cmt. at 295 (1983); see International Covenant of Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, art. 14(2)(3)(d), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) ("In the determination of
any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following mini-
mum guarantees, in full equality: ... To be tried in his presence .... ). Cf African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 7(1), 21 I.L.M. 59, 60 (1982); Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(2), 9 I.L.M. 673, 678 (1970); Council of
Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, art. 6(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1953); American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, art. XXVI, reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 133 (Supp. 1949); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 11(1), reprinted in 43 AM.J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp.
1949).
197. Cofield, 11 F.3d at 417 (reviewing "verb test," but concluding that witness
intimidation prosecution should occur before court in which intimidated witness
would appear).
198. See United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985) (reviewing
constitutional concept of venue).
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the crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the
suitability of each district for accurate factfinding." 199 Usually, the
site of the defendant's acts provides proper venue, but other factors
may give another venue equal standing.200 In particular, the place
where the effects of the crime are felt may be an appropriate
venue.2 01 Unfortunately, the verb test for criminal venue creates as
much ambiguity as the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdic-
tion. For instance, suppose a criminal statute uses the verb "to
send, transmit, or distribute."2 0 2 It is far from certain in Figure 3
above whether any of the actors, the content originator, server. X or
server Y can be said "to send, transmit, or distribute" the item into
jurisdiction B.
V. CHOICE OF LAW
Choice of law, application of foreign criminal law and extrater-
ritorial application of criminal law all are aspects of jurisdiction to
prescribe; 203 the application of a nation's law to a dispute presup-
poses that the nation has jurisdiction to prescribe rules applicable
to that dispute. The term "choice of law" usually is confined to the
universe of civil disputes because of the basic rule that criminal ju-
risdiction to prescribe is local. Actually, however, criminal jurisdic-
tion to prescribe is not strictly local.2 04 It is thus appropriate for
199. Id. at 481 (enumerating factors).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 481-82 (finding that perjury committed in California could be tried
in Southern District of New York because deposition in which perjury occurred was
ancillary to proceeding in Southern District of New York; venue for obstruction of
justice charge also lay in that district).
202. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1994) (child pornography); id. §§ 1460-69
(obscenity by telephone).
203. See Adam W. Wegner, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under International Law:
The Yunis Decision as a Model for the Prosecution of Terrorists in U.S. Courts, 22 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 409 (1991). There are five preconditions for jurisdiction to pre-
scribe with respect to crimes:
(1) territorial jurisdiction, based on the location of the crime;
(2) national jurisdiction, based on the nationality of the offender;
(3) protective jurisdiction, based on whether the "national interest [is]
injured;"
(4) universal jurisdiction, based on the theory that some crimes are so
universally condemned that any forum that obtains physical custody of
the perpetrator may prosecute on behalf of all humanity, and
(5) passive personal jurisdiction, based on the nationality of the victim.
Id. at 416-17 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 402-04, 421, 431 (1987); Harvard Research in International Law,
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM.J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935)).
204. See M. CHERIF BAsSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUB-
LIC ORDER 203-05 (1974) (identifying five theories of jurisdiction recognized by
international law as giving rise to rule-making and rule-enforcing power: (1) terri-
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purposes of this Article to consider choice of law or jurisdiction to
prescribe in a broad sense, as including both civil and criminal mat-
ters. The following sections work through the analytical framework
for choice of law in civil matters and then consider three bases for
applying the substantive criminal law outside the territory in which
the offense actually occurred.
A. Choice of Law in Civil Cases
As explained above, choice of law is related to personal juris-
diction, venue and enforcement of judgments. Nevertheless, it is a
distinct inquiry; a forum may have personal jurisdiction and venue,
and nevertheless be obligated by its choice of law rules, perhaps
reinforced by the Constitution, to apply the substantive law of an-
other jurisdiction. Historically, choice of law was driven by formal
rules such as lex locus contractu, which required the forum to apply
the substantive law of the place of contracting to a contracts dis-
pute, and lex locus delicti, which obligated the forum to apply the
substantive law of the place of the wrong to a tort claim.
Although these rules were applied by American courts virtually
universally, they had their origin in seventeenth and eighteenth
century private international law, which adapted itself well to the
American federal system with the states as independent sover-
eigns.20 5 Joseph Story's 1834 treatise on conflict of laws was the first
effort to synthesize standard rules in this area, and his preface
noted the importance of the subject for trade between foreign
states and between the different states of the American union; he
also noted that much of the learning on the subject was derived
from the work of continental European civil law commentators. 20 6
Despite their unambiguous expression, the traditional rules re-
quired considerable interpretation. For example, the place of con-
tracting might be the place of making a contract, or it might be the
place of performance.2 0 7 The place of wrong in a tort claim might
be the place where the defendant acted or the place where the in-
torial; (2) active personality or nationality, based on nationality of accused; (3)
passive personality, based on nationality of victim; (4) protective, based on na-
tional interest affected; and (5) universality, based on international character of
offense).
205. See ANTON & BEAUMONT, supra note 23, at 12 (noting utility of well-devel-
oped American choice-of-law doctrine as basis for private international law, be-
cause issues are same).
206. STORY, supra note 2, intro.
207. Id. § 233, at 353-55 (explaining differing views on whether place of mak-
ing or place of execution should govern contract).
1996]
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jury occurred.208 By the latter third of the twentieth century, most
courts and commentators agreed on a more flexible "interests anal-
ysis" approach to resolving choice of law questions. In many cases,
the traditional rule produces the same results as the interest
analysis.20 9
The analysis for tort claims-such as a GII defamation claim-
requires determining the state with the most significant relation-
ship to the occurrence and the parties, including consideration of
the place where the injury occurred, the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred, the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and the
place where any relationship between the parties is centered.210
Contract cases are adjudicated according to the law chosen by the
parties or, in the absence of any such chosen law, by the law of the
state which has the most significant relationship to the transactions
and the parties with respect to a particular issue.211 The most sig-
nificant relationship is determined based on the place of con-
tracting, the place of negotiation of the contract, the place of
performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties.2 12 "If the place of negotiating the
contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the
local law of this state will usually be applied .... ,213
There are limitations on a party's choice of law. The general
208. Story put Lex locus delicti this way:
The doctrine of the common law is so fully established on this point, that
it would be useless to do more than to state the universal principle, which
it has promulgated; that is to say, that in regard to the merits and rights
involved in actions, the law of the place where they originated, is to gov-
ern .... But the forms of remedies and the order ofjudicial proceedings
are to be according to the law of the place where the action is instituted,
without any regard to the domicil[e] of the parties, the origin of the
right, or the country of the act.
Id. § 558, at 934.
209. SeeLaxaltv. C.K. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438, 449-51 (D. Nev. 1987) (con-
cluding that Nevada shield law applied both under traditional place of wrong and
under interest analysis because virtually entire distribution occurred in Nevada
and no printing occurred in California); Levine v. CMP Publications, Inc., 738
F.2d 660, 667 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that law of plaintiffs domicile usually gov-
erns defamation actions and that most significant relationship test leads to same
conclusion on facts) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 150(2)
(1971)).
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
211. Id. § 186 (general rule); id. § 187 (law of state chosen by parties); id.
§ 188 (law governing in absence of effective choice by parties).
212. Id. § 188.
213. Id. § 188(3).
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rule is that their choice will govern "if the particular issue is one
which the parties could .have resolved by an explicit provision in
their agreement directed to that issue. 214 In other words, if the
parties could explicitly provide detailed ground rules for determin-
ing whether performance met the requirements of the contract,
they could choose the law of a state to decide whether performance
was sufficient. Even if they could not have explicitly governed the
issue, they can choose a state's law unless the chosen state has no
reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction and there
is no other reasonable basis for the party's choice, or if application
of the law of the chosen state would contravene a fundamental pub-
lic policy of a state which has a materially greater interest in deter-
mination of the particular issue.215 The Restatement of Conflicts of
Laws specifically contemplates the possibility of party choice of the
law of a jurisdiction well known to them even though that state has
no relationship to the contract:
When contracting in countries whose legal systems are
strange to them as well as relatively immature, the parties
should be able to choose a law on the ground that they
know it well and that it is sufficiently developed. For only
in this way can they be sure of knowing accurately the ex-
tent of their rights and duties under the contract.216
The language of the Restatement apparently contemplates that the
only law eligible for choosing is the law of a particular state,21 7 thus
excluding the possibility of the parties choosing general legal prin-
ciples such as UNIDROIT or lex mercatoria.
Constitutional due process requirements constrain choice of
law to some extent, but Supreme Court jurisprudence on the rela-
tionship between due process and choice of law is in an uncertain
state. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,218 five Justices agreed on the
soundness of the doctrine that the Constitution does not bar the
application of a forum state statute of limitations to claims that in
their substance are governed by the law of a different state.21 9 The
Court held that "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not com-
pel 'a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own stat-
214. Id. § 187(1).
215. Id. § 187(2).
216. Id. § 187 cmt. f.
217. Id. § 187(1) (stating "the law of the state chosen by the parties" (empha-
sis added)).
218. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
219. Id. at 722.
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utes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent
to legislate.' "220 The procedural rules of its courts are matters on
which a state is competent to legislate. Thus, a state may apply its
own procedural rules to actions litigated in its courts. A statute of
limitations is procedural for this purpose, and therefore, a state
court may apply its own statute of limitations.221 The issue on
which controversy existed, however, was whether a statute of limita-
tions should be considered procedural for this purpose.222 The
early cases, looking to international law, uniformly held that the
forum statute of limitations governed.223 The majority rejected the
argument that Guaranty Trust v. York, 224 which treated statutes of
limitations as substantive for Erie purposes, should govern because
the words "substantive" and "procedural" do not have precise con-
tent.225 Because of the long-standing tradition under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, a due process challenge similarly must fail.2 26
Justice Brennan reached the same result through interest analysis:
Given the complex of interests underlying statutes of limi-
tations, I conclude that the contact a State has with a claim
simply by virtue of being the forum creates a sufficient
procedural interest to make the application of its limita-
tions period to wholly out-of-state claims consistent with
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This is clearest when the
forum State's limitations period is shorter than that of the
claim State.227
On the other hand, when, as in the case before him, the forum
state's limitation period was longer, the interests of the forum state
were less clear. Because the various choice of law arguments were
fairly balanced and somewhat ambiguous, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the Constitution permitted the choice the forum state
made to apply its own limitations period. 228 The balance of the
case involved disagreement over whether Kansas correctly inter-
220. Id. (quoting Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 722-23.
223. Id. at 724-25.
224. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
225. Sun OA 486 U.S. at 726-27.
226. Id. at 726-27, 729-30.
227. Id. at 737 (Brennan, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 739 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan essentially dis-
agreed with the majority's reliance on long established constitutional tradition. Id.
at 740 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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preted the substantive law of Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana.22 9
Three years earlier, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 230 the
Supreme Court reviewed a case in which the Kansas courts applied
Kansas law to a class action, notwithstanding that over ninety-nine
percent of the gas leases involved in the case and ninety-seven per-
cent of the plaintiffs had no connection with the state of Kansas
except for the lawsuit.231 The Court began by noting that in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague,23 2 a plurality recognized that the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause provide only mod-
est restrictions on the application of forum law: " 'for a State's
substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible man-
ner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggre-
gation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.' "233 Applying
this standard, the Court considered the fact that the defendant
owned property and conducted substantial business in the state,
and the fact that none of the plaintiffs had opted out of the class
too tenuous to support application of Kansas law. Fairness, it held,
depends importantly on the expectations of the parties, and "there
is no indication that when the leases involving land and royalty own-
ers outside of Kansas were executed, the parties had any idea that
Kansas law would control."23 4 It declined the Kansas Supreme
Court's suggestion that more relaxed standards should apply to na-
tionwide class actions. 235 Justice Stevens would have affirmed, how-
ever, because he saw no real conflict among the laws of the various
states having significant contact.236
Because GII transactions frequently permit actor, in-
termediaries and victim to be widely separated geographically, in-
terest analysis requires careful scrutiny of the technology and the
facts of a particular transaction. Consider a hypothetical situation
in which an Internet server in California makes available material
that users in Tennessee find offensive. In a lawsuit filed by the Ten-
229. Compare id. at 730-34 (majority explaining why law of all four states per-
mitted conclusion drawn) with id. at 743-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in material
part) (explaining why Kansas misconstrued laws of other states).
230. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
231. Id. at 815-16 (characterizing contacts).
232. 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (declining to invalidate choice of law on constitu-
tional grounds).
233. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins., 449 U.S. at 312-13).
234. Id. at 822.
235. Id. at 820-21.
236. Id. at 823-24, 834 ("[M] ere misconstruction by the forum of the laws of a
sister state is not a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.").
19961
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nessee users against the California server operator, say for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, the choice of law question
would be whether Tennessee or California law should apply. As-
suming there is a difference between the substantive law of the in-
tentional-infliction tort in the two states, Tennessee may have the
most significant interests. It seeks to protect its residents against
extreme emotional distress intentionally inflicted by others. Cali-
fornia, of course, also has interests, such as in seeing its citizens free
to publish material that would not under California standards be
tortious. But under the Supreme Court's tests outlined above,
there would be sufficient Tennessee interest to allow the applica-
tion of Tennessee law and the refusal of a Tennessee court to apply
California law.
Cases involving defamation claims against interstate publishers
offer some analogies to GII activities.2 37 In these cases, there is a
rule that the most significant interest is where the "sting was felt,"
which usually leads to the domicile of the plaintiff in defamation
cases.238 Many courts apply a nine-factor test in defamation cases
involving more than one state: (1) the state of plaintiffs domicile;
(2) the state of plaintiff's principal activity to which the defamation
relates; (3) the state where plaintiff suffered greatest harm; (4) the
state of publisher's domicile or incorporation; (5) the state where
defendant's main publishing office is located; (6) the state of prin-
cipal circulation; (7) the state of emanation; (8) the state where
237. Jean v. Dugan, 20 F.3d 255, 261 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's
choice of Indiana law; Indiana had most significant contacts to defamation; reputa-
tional injury occurred in Indiana although publication occurred both in Indiana
and Illinois; defamatory article originated in Illinois); Brown v. Hearst Corp., 862
F. Supp. 622, 627 (D. Mass. 1994) (noting Massachusetts had most significant rela-
tionship to defamation claim based on broadcast that originated in Massachusetts
and was shown in Massachusetts and surrounding states; plaintiff apparently lived
in Texas), aff'd, 54 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1995). But see Chevalier v. Animal Rehabilita-
tion Ctr., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1224, 1229 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (concluding that place of
injury is de-emphasized in multi-state defamation cases under RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 cmt. e (1971); party relationship centered in
Texas, Texas was place of injury, many defendants reside in Texas and others in-
jected themselves into Texas activities and most conduct occurred in Texas; there-
fore, Texas has most significant relationships).
238. Buckley v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (W.D. Pa. 1991)
(holding that ordinarily, law of domicile of plaintiff represents most significant
contacts with defamation claim, but stipulation by parties that New York law should
be applied was honored because New York also had interest in dispute), aff'd, 968
F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1992). Privilege is determined by the law of state with the most
significant contacts. See Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Administrators, 2 F.3d 192,
195-96 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that "sting" of defamation was felt in Iowa and
thus Iowa law determined privilege of Illinois defendant).
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libel was first seen; and (9) the state of the forum.23 9 Each factor,
however, does not receive the same weight. For example, in Hoff-
man v. Roberto,240 the plaintiff filed a defamation claim arising from
union officials' statements in telex messages sent to various states
claiming that the plaintiff diverted funds of an employer. Because
of the multiple states of publication, the district court looked to the
place of conduct, the residences or places of business of the parties
and the place where the relationship was centered.2 41 As the first
two of these inquiries were indeterminative, the court concluded
that Michigan law, where the employment relationship was cen-
tered, should be applied.242
Using the preceeding defamation choice of law cases as an
analogy, domicile will likely govern defamation actions arising in
the GII. Invasion of privacy claims, like defamation claims, are cen-
tered where the plaintiff lives and conducts his or her affairs, be-
cause that is where the privacy interest exists.243 The same result is
appropriate for intellectual property infringement actions244 unless
the party arguing for the choice of different law can show that ad-
versely affected markets are located elsewhere. Intellectual prop-
erty claims primarily involve injuries to markets, and the location of
the markets should drive the interest analysis.
B. Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Statutes
International and American law recognize the legitimacy of
giving extraterritorial effect to the criminal laws of a national sover-
eign. The extension of criminal jurisdiction is particularly likely in
two circumstances: when the actor, and potential criminal defend-
ant, is a citizen of the state whose law is to be applied, and when the
"effects test" shows that a non-national has engaged in extraterrito-
rial conduct with the intention or the likelihood that it will have
effects in the country whose law is to be applied.2 45 In addition to
239. See Zerman v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 677 F. Supp. 1316, 1318-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (enumerating nine factors and determining that none of them usually over-
ruled contacts in state of plaintiffs domicile).
240. 578 N.E.2d 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming dismissal of lawsuit by
president of corporation against union).
241. Id. at 705.
242. Id. at 705-06.
243. The same reasoning holds true of emotional distress claims.
244. Of course, choice of law is less important in patent and copyright claims,
because federal law applies. It may be important, however, in trademark, unfair
competition and trade secrets claims.
245. United States v.Juda, 46 F.3d 961 (9th Cir.) (affirming denial of motions
to dismiss and to suppress evidence seized on high seas from boat on which beeper
had been placed by Australian law enforcement authorities), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
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international crimes, international law recognizes, with some dis-
pute, the possibility of passive personal jurisdiction to apply to crim-
inal law. This basis allows a nation to prosecute anyone committing
a crime against one of that nation's citizens, regardless of where the
crime was committed. 46
Both branches of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction have
counterparts in civil personal jurisdiction and choice of law analysis.
The nationality branch of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction cor-
responds to extending personal jurisdiction in a civil case over one
who is domiciled in the forum state. The effects test corresponds to
minimum contacts analysis in civil personal jurisdiction, especially
insofar as it authorizes the assertion of personal jurisdiction in a
civil case over one who acts outside the jurisdiction intending that
contact with the jurisdiction will result from that person's con-
duct.247 The cases reviewed above involving the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction over publications that publish outside the state,
but intending that their publication come into the state, are clear
2632 (1995). The court held that under international law, a nation may generally
assert jurisdiction over its citizens, over stateless vessels and over all individuals
arrested on board a stateless vessel. Id. at 967. More particularly, it found permis-
sible the application of 18 U.S.C. § 81 (1994), criminalizing arson, to a deliberate
fire set aboard the stateless vessel in international waters. "There is no reason for
any other nation to exercise jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction over the ar-
son is not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." Juda, 46 F.3d at 967. It rejected
arguments that the evidence seized from the vessel should be excluded because
the placement of the beeper was impermissible. Id. The court of appeals found
that the foreign search occasioned by placement of the beeper record was not
unreasonable because it conformed to the requirements of Australian law.
A DEA agent was told by a Superintendent with the Drug Operations
Branch, International Division of the Australian Federal Police, that no
warrant was required under Australian law and that an Australian officer
would assist with the installation of the transmitter. The DEA agent rea-
sonably relied on that representation, and accordingly, the good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule applies.
Id. at 968. Independently, the court of appeals rejected the argument that moni-
toring the location of the vessel by listening to transmissions from the beeper was a
search within the Fourth Amendment. "There is no privacy right in one's location
on the high seas." Id. at 968.
Historically, civil law countries had more expansive notions of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction, always recognizing the possibility of prosecuting their own
.nationals for crimes committed outside their territory. Nadelmann, supra note
163, at 833-34 & nn.83-89 (noting instances in which civil law criminal jurisdiction
was extended extraterritorially based on crimes in which nationals were victims).
More recently, the United States has come to recognize this basis for extraterrito-
rial application of its own criminal law. Juda, 46 F.3d at 961.
246. Wegner, supra note 203, at 426-30 (explaining controversy over passive
personal jurisdiction principles but urging its acceptance as one of several bases
for prosecuting international terrorists).
247. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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examples. 248
In general, there is no constitutional bar to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. penal law.2 49 Extraterritoriality is determined by
looking to congressional intent, presuming that Congress does not
want to violate international law.250 Thus, unless Congress explic-
itly directs otherwise, extraterritoriality is valid to the extent permit-
ted by international law.2 51 Additionally, choice of law does not
arise in criminal cases in the same way that it arises in civil cases.
The basic reason for this is that crimes were not traditionally con-
sidered transitory2 52 and thus a court either had jurisdiction or it
did not. When a court had jurisdiction, it applied its own law,25 3
but a wide range of extraterritorial conduct might still be crimi-
nal.254 Therefore, one could be criminally liable in state A for com-
puter-triggered conduct in state B that caused injury in state A as
long as state A expressly prohibited extraterritorial conduct of that
character and the actor knew or should have known of the adverse
effect in state A.255 Extraterritorial application of criminal law by
multiple nations has some advantages, at least when the substantive
248. See generally United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1512 (S.D. Fla.
1990) ("[A] country may regulate the acts of its citizens wherever they occur.").
The United States also has long possessed the ability to attach criminal conse-
quences to acts occurring outside this country which produce effects within the
United States; international law principles have expanded to permit jurisdiction
upon a mere showing of intent to produce effects in this country, without requir-
ing proof of an overt act or effect within the United States. Id. "For example, the
United States would unquestionably have authority to prosecute a person standing
in Canada who fires a bullet across the border which strikes a second person stand-
ing in the United States." Id. at 1512-13.
249. United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming
conviction of Mexican citizen and resident under U.S. statute prohibiting violent
crimes committed in aid of racketeering enterprise).
250. Id. at 839-40.
251. Id. at 840.
252. Transitory causes of action, as distinguished from local causes of action,
were a kind of property that traveled with the plaintiff. The plaintiff could assert
the claim representing this species of property wherever he or she happened to
be-assuming the court in which the plaintiff filed had personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.
253. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 89 (1971) ("[N]t ac-
tion will be entertained on a foreign penal cause of action.").
254. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (1994). The Model Penal Code allows a
conviction "in this state" committed by conduct occurring within the state or con-
duct occurring outside the state sufficient to constitute an attempt, conspiracy, an
extraterritorial omission to perform a legal duty imposed by domestic law with
respect to a person, thing or transaction in the state, or when extraterritorial con-
duct is expressly prohibited by a domestic statute when the conduct bears a reason-
able relation to a legitimate interest of the state and the actor knows or should
know that his or her conduct is likely to affect that interest. Id.
255. Id. § 1.03(1)(f).
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criminal law being applied extraterritorially is more or less the
same. "Concurrent jurisdiction had the considerable virtue of per-
mitting any nation catching an offender to act upon his wrongs-
without resolving the fine points of a theory of exclusive jurisdic-
tion, and without facing the political, moral and legal concerns of
aiding a foreign system of justice."25 6
C. Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Law
As explained above, choice of law does not function in the
criminal arena the way it does in the civil arena. Strict localization
of criminal law25 7 leads to the usual conclusion that the courts of
one jurisdiction may not apply the criminal laws of another. There-
fore, "[a] court in the United States may try a person only for viola-
tion of United States law, not for violation of the penal law of a
foreign state."258 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations notes
that some civil law countries try persons whom they cannot extra-
dite for crimes committed in other countries.2 59 This constitutes a
kind of "transitory" criminal action.
In common law systems, such as at the state level in the United
States, one can argue that a state court would have the power to try
256. Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom ofJonathan Robins, 100 YALE
L.J. 229, 239 (1990) (reviewing controversial instance of extradition of mutineer in
early American history; explaining why piracy was treated as international crime).
Accord Wegner, supra note 203, at 421-24 & nn.71-98 (explaining evolution of uni-
versal jurisdiction, beginning with privacy and now extending to number of differ-
ent crimes, and favoring broad interpretation of universal jurisdiction (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987))).
257. See generally In re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952) (refusing
extradition to Italy of person accused of murder because alleged murder was com-
mitted outside territory effectively controlled by Italy during Second World War).
258. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 256, § 422(1).
See generally United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)(holding that federal courts may not convict for common law crimes, but only for
crimes for which jurisdiction is vested by statute). The rationale in Hudson and
Goodwin was that federal government institutions are institutions of limited juris-
diction and must respect separation of powers. This rationale precludes federal
court jurisdiction over crimes defined by foreign states because that jurisdiction
has not been given to the courts by Congress. Of course, it permits Congress to
define a foreign crime as a U.S. crime within the jurisdiction of a United States
federal court.
259. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 422 reporters' notes 3(1987). Some commentators suggest that civil law countries are more or less will-
ing to prosecute their own nationals for violation of the foreign criminal law as
long as a sort of dual criminality principle is satisfied. Nadelmann, supra note 163,
at 885 (identifying German prosecution of Hungarian national for crimes commit-
ted in Hungary, but contrasting U.S. law; characterizing principle as aut dedere, aut
iudicare).
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an actor for the foreign crime because state courts are not limited
by the separation of powers doctrine of the federal Constitution.
There are at least some states in which common law crimes exist,
albeit mostly in theory. In such a state, the courts are not bound
only to those crimes declared expressly to be so by statute. Further-
more, they would have the power to apply foreign criminal defini-
tions, unless some overriding constitutional privilege would be
infringed by doing so. This would, of course, be a revolutionary
idea; the linkage between territorial sovereigns and substantive
criminal law is very strong.260
Even if the territorial problems described above are overcome,
there still exists the need for an affirmative basis for the criminal
proscription for which the defendant is prosecuted. It surely would
violate procedural due process to prosecute for a crime that was not
defined as such when the defendant acted. 261 Therefore, the prose-
cution would need to establish either a sufficient connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the foreign jurisdiction whose
criminal law is being relied on, or else a basis in international law as
might be the case with piracy or terrorism.262
D. International Crimes263
The concept of international "universal" crimes has been rec-
ognized for over 150 years.2 64 Notwithstanding the dominant prin-
260. See, e.g., United States v. Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549 (11th Cir. 1995) (reversing
district court and extending Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to prosecution under laws of foreign country). Gecas illustrates the depth of sover-
eign-specificity of criminal law, even while recognizing a privilege under the U.S.
Constitution when foreign prosecution is shown to be likely. By requiring the one
asserting the privilege to demonstrate probability of extradition, the doctrine ac-
knowledges the safety from prosecution under the laws of country A of one physi-
cally in country B, absent a possibility of extradition. The court's analysis also
acknowledged the traditional concerns that the criminal law of country A might
offend the policy of country B, and the difficulty of B keeping track of the criminal
laws of all the As in the world. Id. at 1566.
261. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1977) (declining to give
retroactive effect to standards articulated in state supreme court opinion because
that would violate due process by criminalizing conduct not criminal when it
occurred).
262. See United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that district court would have jurisdiction to try national of United States for
committing crime against internationally protected person even if national's acts
occurred outside territory of United States), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1046 (1989).
263. Research and drafting for this section was done by Sean P. Lugg,
Villanova Law School Class of 1996, law clerk to the author.
264. See generally Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (explaining that piracy is so-called "international crime;" pirate is con-
sidered enemy of every state and can be brought to justice anywhere; further, every
state can punish crimes like piracy or slave trade on capture of criminal, whatever
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ciple that criminal law is a strictly national proposition, there have
long existed a few crimes that are characterized as international or
universal, and thus punishable in any jurisdiction obtaining custody
of the actor. Piracy was one such crime.265 In this century, air
piracy and certain other acts of terrorism have been added to the
list, albeit by treaty, as much as by the extension of customary inter-
national law. Quite recently, the move toward an international
criminal court has focused attention on enumerating additional
international crimes.2 66 The American Journal of International Law
notes:
[T]here is little or no international criminal law in the
real sense of the term. There is some legislation and some
rules regarding the competence of courts in respect to cer-
tain extra-territorial crimes, but aside from a few acts, such
as piracy ... [and] the circulation of obscene publication...
there is no international criminal legislation, nor is there
as yet any international judicial or police machinery of
repression.2 67
Additionally, the German code addressing the issue of international
crimes provides: " '[I] nternational interests that trigger German ju-
risdiction' include crimes involving atomic energy, explosives and
radiation; attacks on air traffic; unauthorized dealings in narcotics;
dissemination of pornography; encouraging prostitution; counterfeiting
and economic subsidy fraud."268 Moreover, "the German Constitu-
tion provides that any international law is by definition part of Ger-
man law."'269
International crimes are defined by treaties and by customary
his or her nationality), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the
Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HAav. L. Rv. 334, 335 (1925) (stating that piracy has
"long been regarded" as both international and municipal law crime); Surena et
al., supra note 167, at 383; Wegner, supra note 203, at 421-24 (embracing universal
criminal jurisdiction as good framework for punishing terrorists). For a further
discussion of international computer terrorism, see appendix, infra notes 536-82
and accompanying text.
265. The wording of the U.S. piracy statute makes it clear that international
law is being applied: "Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the
United States, shall be imprisoned for life." 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994).
266. For a further discussion of the proposed International Criminal Court,
see infra notes 522-23 and accompanying text.
267. Surena et al., supra note 167, at 385 (citing James W. Garner, Book Re-
view, 16 AM.J. INT'L L. 493 (1922) (reviewing H. DONNEDIEU DE VAnnzS, INTRODUc-
TION A L'ETUDE DU DRorr PANAL INTERNATIONAL (1922))) (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 386 (quoting German Criminal Code) (emphasis added).
269. Id.
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law. Customary law, though, is criticized as being vague, and in
many respects archaic. There is no standardized codification of in-
ternational offenses; rather, enforcement is generally left to extradi-
tion treaties. "For example, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842
between the United States and Great Britain covered.., murder,
piracy, arson, robbery, forgery and the utterance of forged paper as
extraditable offenses." 270 Moreover, the United States presently
maintains over 100 foreign extradition treaties, more than forty of
which are dual criminality extradition treaties. 271 Additionally, one
respected international law scholar found twenty-two categories of








racial discrimination and apartheid









international traffic in obscene publications
destruction and/or theft of national treasures
environmental protection
unlawful use of the mails
interference with submarine cables
falsification and counterfeiting
bribery of a foreign public official
theft of nuclear materials.272
270. Id. at 384. This treaty was expanded in 1889. Id.
271. Id. at 383-84. Under the principle of dual criminality, a defendant is
extraditable if the offense committed is "punishable by a specified minimum sen-
tence, usually one year, in both countries." Id. at 384.
272. BARBARA M. YARNOLD, INTERNATIONAL FUGITivEs: A NEW ROLE FOR THE
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The "obscene publications" and "interference with submarine
cables" items above are interesting in the GII context, the one be-
cause of concern with obscene traffic on the Internet, the other
because it exemplifies the legitimacy of internationalizing crimes
against the communications infrastructure. There have been re-
cent efforts to develop a code (a multilateral treaty) of interna-
tional crimes in conjunction with the effort, considered below, to
develop an international criminal court. The code could, of
course, be effective even without an international criminal court be-
cause it would harmonize the bases of universal criminal jurisdic-
tion for application by national courts.
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
Enforcement of civil judgments is accomplished by executing
against property owned by the judgment debtor. Enforcement of
criminal judgments ordinarily requires obtaining custody of the de-
fendant so he or she may be incarcerated, thus implicating the
same concepts as extradition and extralegal methods of obtaining
custody reviewed above in connection with criminal personal juris-
diction. In addition, some criminal judgments can be enforced by
the forfeiture of property. This possibility, combined with injunc-
tion enforcement in the civil context, creates an area of overlap
between criminal and civil judgment enforcement, and is discussed
below.
A. Enforcement of Civil Judgments
Section III above explained that personal jurisdiction, venue,
choice of law and judgment-enforcement are interrelated. Thus,
one should consider the analysis of judgment enforcement in this
section along with the analyses of these related issues. The GII pro-
duces few interesting problems when a dispute and a resulting civil
judgment are entirely local; the victor-the judgment creditor-
simply gets a writ of execution under local procedure and has the
sheriff levy on such personal or real property of the judgment
debtor as can be found.2 73 The problems of turning a judgment
INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE (1991) (citing generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A
DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFr STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987)). For a further discussion of international computer
terrorism, see appendix, infra notes 536-82 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., FED. K Civ. P. 69 (incorporating state judgment execution pro-
cedure); ILL. CODE OF CIV. P. art. 12 (West 1995) (enforcing judgments); IOWA R.
Civ. P. Div. X (West 1995) (same); KAN. R. Crv. P. art. 24 (West 1994) (explaining
procedures for executions and orders of sale).
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into liquid assets become more difficult when the judgment comes
from another state or from another country. Thus, a plaintiff may
have obtained ajudgment against an Internet service provider in an
Alabama circuit court, but find assets worthy of executing against
only in Virginia. Execution therefore must be sought in a Virginia
court based on the "foreign judgment" from Alabama. Alterna-
tively, an author in Sweden may obtain a judgment in a Swedish
court for copyright infringement resulting from an act by the oper-
ator of an Internet server in Massachusetts. In order to obtain mon-
etary relief, the victim must enforce the Swedish judgment against
assets held by the server operator in Massachusetts.2 74
In both of these cases, the first step conceptually is to obtain
recognition of the judgment. When the foreign judgment is from
another American state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution obligates the enforcing state to recog-
nize it. When the foreign judgment is from another country, either
state statutory law (such as the Uniform Recognition Act, enacted
in about half the states275 ) or comity276 prescribe the criteria for
recognition. Basically, courts must recognize foreign judgments
unless the party opposing recognition can show violations of proce-
dural due process or lack of personal jurisdiction by the rendering
court,277 or in rare instances, if the opposing party can demonstrate
that enforcement of the judgment would violate public policy in
the recognition state.278
Comity is a doctrine developed over several centuries. These
basic international law principles are expressed in the Restatement
provisions dealing with the enforcement of foreign judgments, 279
274. A new concept, worth developing in greater depth, would proceed from
the model of in rem jurisdiction, and conclude that a judgment supported by per-
sonal jurisdiction in the form of electronic presence could be enforced only
against the electronic persona, either against assets in the jurisdiction or by exclud-
ing that person from electronic contact with that jurisdiction. The author appreci-
ates this suggestion from his friend David R. Johnson.
275. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.LA. 261
(1962) [hereinafter UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACT].
276. Seede la Mata v. American Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Del. 1991)
(discussing comity).
277. STORY, supra note 2, § 586, at 978 (concluding that it is universally ac-
cepted that foreign judgment not supported by jurisdiction is treated as mere nul-
lity, entitled to no respect). The procedural due process standard is essentially
American in character.
278. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1995) (declining to
recognize or to enforce British libel judgment under Maryland's Uniform Recogni-
tion Act because British libel law lacked constitutional protections applied in
United States).
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 81, 82 (1982).
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summarizing the doctrine of comity:28 0 "A valid judgment ren-
dered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding
will be recognized in the United States so far as the immediate par-
ties and the underlying cause of action are concerned."281 When
the conditions are met, the effect to be accorded foreign judgments
is the same as is required under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.282
Qualifring foreign judgments may be enforced.283 Equitable de-
crees from foreign courts also generally are enforceable in the
United States as long as they meet the basic requirements set forth
in section 98 of the Restatement.2 a4
Overlaid on the comity doctrine are positive law enactments,
such as the above-mentioned Uniform Recognition Act, adopted in
about half of the states. This legislation provides a framework for
U.S. recognition of judgments from foreign countries, performing
essentially the same function-though under slightly different cri-
teria-that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution performs with respect to judgments from sister
states.2 85 Within the European Community, the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions2 86 rationalize recognition of judgments
among members of the European Union and the European Free
Trade Area. There is no truly international civil judgment enforce-
ment convention to which the United States is a party.
The Uniform Recognition Act applies to "any foreign judg-
ment that is final and conclusive287 and enforceable where ren-
280. See also de la Mata, 771 F. Supp. at 1380 (explaining doctrine of comity);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREirN RELATIONS, supra note 256, § 481 & cmt. c (ex-
plaining effect of foreign judgment).
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971).
282. Id. § 98 cmt. b.
283. Id. § 100 cmt. d.
284. Id. § 102 cmt. g.
285. Full faith and credit requires that, absent a violation of due process,
states must respect judgments from sister states as if they were their own. See Par-
sons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986) (construing Full Faith
and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (same); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (same).
286. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1968 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1413 (1990) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]; Lugano Convention on Ju-
risdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept.
16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) [hereinafter Lugano
Convention).
287. Cerezo v. Babson Bros. Co., No. 91 C 7622, 1992 WL 18875 (N.D. Ill.Jan.
24, 1992) (holding that prejudgment attachment issued by Spanish court not enti-
tled to recognition under Illinois Uniform Recognition Act because not final and
conclusive, and no notice to defendant).
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dered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject
to appeal."288 Foreign judgment is defined as "any judgment of a for-
eign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other
than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment
for support in matrimonial or family matters."28 9 Foreign state is de-
fined as any governmental unit other than the federal government,
a state or a U.S. possession.2 90 The heart of the Act grants full faith
and credit status to a foreign judgment "to the extent that it grants
or denies recovery of a sum of money,"2 91 subject to certain excep-
tions. The judgment is deprived of its status as a judgment if:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures com-
patible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter.2 92
Other exceptions support discretionary nonrecognition:
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court
did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient
time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action or a claim for relief] on which the
judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of
this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclu-
sive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an
agreement between the parties under which the dis-
pute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal ser-
vice, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient fo-
rum for the trial of the action2 3
Ground (5) above permits nonrecognition of a judgment resulting
288. UNIFORM RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 275, § 2.
289. Id. § 1(2) (emphasis added).
290. Id. § 1(1).
291. Id. § 3.
292. Id. § 4(a).
293. Id. § 4(b).
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from litigation evading an agreement to arbitrate. With the excep-
tion of that ground, the bases for nonrecognition under the Uni-
form Recognition Act are essentially the same as the bases for
nonrecognition under the doctrine of comity.2 94
The European Community, which lacks an explicit full faith
and credit clause in its constitutional documents, does have the
Brussels Convention,2 5 a multilateral European treaty that "in ef-
fect, combines a long-arm statute with a full faith and credit clause
... [while suppressing] the use of such exorbitant national idiosyn-
crasies as British and Irish tag practices and the asset-based jurisdic-
tion of various other countries against Common Market
domiciliaries." 296 The Brussels Convention, like the Lugano Con-
vention, provides for recognition without any special procedures
such as the Deibazione in Italy, or the Exequatur in France,
Belgium and Luxembourg. A judgment supported by personal ju-
risdiction is entitled to recognition, which means it has the same
authority and effect as in the state of origin. Moreover, it is entitled
to resjudicata effect.297 The enforcement procedure involves regis-
tering the judgment and is intended to be expeditious and of an ex
parte nature. 298
The United States has found it difficult to negotiate judgment
recognition treaties with other countries. Such efforts so far have
failed with the United Kingdom because of British reluctance to
enforce large American jury verdicts in products liability and anti-
trust cases and the difficulty of accommodating international prac-
tice to the particulars of American constitutional personal
jurisdiction limitations.2 99 Nevertheless, the Organization of Amer-
ican States succeeded in negotiating a treaty covering enforcement
of support obligations.300 Efforts continue, in particular within the
294. Guiness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 884 (4th Cir. 1992).
295. See Brussels Convention, supra note 286.
296. FriedreichJuenger, AmericanJurisdiction: A Stoy of Comparative Neglect, 65
U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (1993) (citing Brussels Convention, supra note 286).
The Brussels Convention concepts were extended to EFTA countries (Austria, Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) in the Lugano Convention. Id. at
19 (citing Lugano Convention, supra note 286).
297. PAUL R. BEAUMONT, CIVIL JURISDICTION IN SCOTLAND: BRUSSELS AND
LUGANO CONVENTIONS §§ 8.9-8.10, at 183-84 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing recognition
rules (citing Case 42/76, DeWolf v. Cox, [1976] E.C.R. 1759)).
298. Id. § 8.44, at 202.
299. Juenger, supra note 296, at 21-22 & n.158 (describing difficulties and
citing Peter Hay & RobertJ. Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention
Between the United States and the United Kingdom, 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 421, 452-59
(1976) (providing text of proposed draft)).
300. Id. at 22 n.159 (citing Fourth Inter-American Specialized Conference on
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Hague Conference on Private International Law, to work out a mul-
tilateral treaty on jurisdiction and judgment recognition.3 01
Regardless of the path to recognition, the effect and scope of a
judgment afforded recognition is determined by concepts of pre-
clusion under the law of the rendering state. Thus, discrete deci-
sions on issues of fact or law may have collateral estoppel effect,
depending on the rules of issue preclusion of the rendering state.
Transactionally related claims that might have been brought in the
foreign lawsuit may be foreclosed by resjudicata, depending on the
claim preclusion rules of the rendering state.3 02
If the foreign judgment is recognized, then it must be enforced
as a procedural matter. This occurs either under a state statute like
the Uniform Enforcement Act or by bringing a new lawsuit in the
state of enforcement on the debt represented by the recognized
foreign judgment.30 3 The Uniform Enforcement Act allows the
judgment creditor simply to file the foreign judgment with the
clerk and to obtain a writ of execution. The new lawsuit approach
results in a new judgment that supports a writ of execution. The
Brussels Convention, binding members of the European Union,
provides for summary enforcement of covered foreign judgments
under procedures similar to those of the Uniform Enforcement
Act.30 4 Note, however, that recognition and enforcement are not
two separate proceedings. Rather, recognition is a substantive deci-
sion within the enforcement proceeding.30 5
Another interesting judgment execution question in the GII
Private International Law in Montevideo, July 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 73 (1990); Carol
S. Bruch, The 1989 Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, 40 AM. J. COMP.
L. 817 (1993)).
301. Id. at 21 & nn.152-53 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 54,439 (1992); ABA Endorses
50-Hour Pro Bono Minimum, Opposes Statutory Removal of U.S. Judges, 61 U.S.L.W.
2482 (Feb. 16, 1993)).
302. Authority for collateral estoppel and res judicata effect of recognized
judgment is determined by the preclusion law of rendering state.
303. In such a lawsuit, the plaintiff should be entitled to summary judgment
based on recognition of the foreign judgment.
304. ANTON & BEAUMONT, supra note 57, §§ 1.28-1.30, at 14-16 (1995)
(describing Convention's summary enforcement procedures). All of the sources
of law for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments exclude injunctions and
penal or criminal judgments.
305. See Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enters., Ltd., 794 S.W.2d 760,
760 (Tex. 1990) (finding constitutional entitlement to challenge recognition
within judgment enforcement process and that Texas version of Uniform Recogni-
tion Act met due process requirements). If a new lawsuit is brought on the debt
represented by a foreign judgment, the recognition issue would arise in the adjudi-
cation of the plaintiff's summary judgment motion. If recognition is denied, of
course, the plaintiff would have to retry the merits.
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context is what assets are subject to execution. Clearly, hardware
and computer programs are subject to execution. But what about
software as to which the judgment debtor has only a license? And
what about obligations owing to the judgment creditor? How feasi-
ble is garnishment when these obligations run from persons all over
the world? When ajudgment debtor has a license on software, exe-
cution could include obtaining rights to any income from the li-
cense or possibly transferring the license from the judgment
debtor. Garnishment of obligations from persons around the world
may not be feasible because the garnishee is not within the physical
reach of execution process, and foreign garnishment would be too
time consuming. Writs of garnishment against local debtors of the
judgment debtor, however, would be attractive and entirely practi-
cable. While technology simplifies the process, it is still extremely
time consuming and expensive.
Property subject to attachment includes debts.30 6 Once ajudg-
ment has been obtained, the plaintiff can enforce the judgment
against such property held by third parties as well. In the usual
circumstance in which the only property within the jurisdiction is
obligations under a service contract, the value of executing against
such property may still be worth something to the plaintiff. For
example, if the plaintiff can establish the proposition that the obli-
gation by an Internet service provider or router to handle messages
or packets sent by the defendant and judgment debtor constitutes
property subject to garnishment, then the plaintiff effectively can
shut off the defendant's access to the domestic market by executing
against that obligation.
B. Geographic Scope of Injunctions
The ineffectiveness of territorial limitations on the law of elec-
tronic communications invites consideration of the geographic
scope of an injunction. Suppose a court in jurisdiction A issues a
valid injunction against C1, prohibiting certain exchanges of files
through the Internet. As long as C remains within the jurisdiction,
its noncompliance may be punished by contempt.30 7 But suppose
306. Attaching property of the defendant held by a third person usually is
called "garnishment."
307. The steps in civil contempt are the service of a notice of contempt, a
hearing in which the court makes a factual determination whether contempt is
occurring, issuance of a contempt order in which sanctions for further noncompli-
ance are specified and reduction of the sanctions to judgment if further noncom-
pliance occurs. The steps in criminal contempt are the issuance of a notice, the
opportunity for bail if arrest occurs, a hearing at which criminal standards of proof
apply and a conviction or acquittal.
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C1 leaves the jurisdiction and violates the terms of the order else-
where? Or suppose C who has never been inside the jurisdiction
cooperates with Cj to violate the order? What power does the court
issuing the injunction then have to punish either C1 or C? The
answers are clear concerning CI, at least when a federal court has
issued the injunction. By being served with process and participat-
ing in the lawsuit giving rise to the injunction, Ci is subject to the
enforcement jurisdiction of the issuing court wherever C1 goes, any-
where in the world.308
The second question is whether C can be punished: can a
nonparty to the original proceeding who remains outside the dis-
trict in which the injunction is issued nevertheless be punished by
contempt for aiding and abetting a named party in violating the
injunction? The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit answered this question in the affirmative in Waffenschmidt v.
MacKay,309 a securities fraud case. The district court issued a TRO
and a preliminary injunction against MacKay, ordering him not to
transfer the proceeds of an alleged security fraud.310 MacKay never-
theless transferred money to three persons in Texas.311 MacKay, as
well as the court issuing the injunction, were located in the north-
ern district of Mississippi.312 When the Texas actors were con-
fronted with contempt orders, they challenged the jurisdiction of
the district court.313
The district court held, and the 'court of appeals agreed, that
the mandate of an injunction issued by a federal court runs nation-
308. Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932) (revers-
ing court of appeals and reinstating contempt order of district court against de-
fendant in patent infringement suit who violated Massachusetts injunction in
Michigan after participating in lawsuit in Massachusetts). "The decree ... bound
the respondent personally. It was a decree which operated continuously and per-
petually upon the respondent in relation to the prohibited conduct. The decree
was binding upon the respondent, not simply within the District of Massachusetts,
but throughout the United States." Id. at 451; see also Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S.
298, 308 (1878) (stating that when "necessary parties are before a court of equity,
it is immaterial that res of the controversy.., is beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the tribunal"); French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 231 (1874) (holding that court
with in personam jurisdiction has power to require defendants to act outside limits
of territorial jurisdiction); ErnestJ. Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity over
Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Temtorial Limits of the State, 14 MINN. L.
REv. 494, 514-29 (1930) (citing cases and other authority). But see People v. Cen-
tral R.R., 42 N.Y. 283 (1870) (holding that New York court lacks jurisdiction to
order abatement of nuisance in New Jersey).
309. 763 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
310. Id. at 714.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 715.
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wide,3 14 and that enforcement through a contempt proceeding
must occur in the issuing jurisdiction "because contempt is an af-
front to the court issuing the order."3 15 The issuing court may
"therefore hold an enjoined party in contempt, regardless of the
state in which the person violates the court's orders."31 6 Further,
the court concluded that an injunction binds not only the parties
named therein but also nonparties who act with the enjoined
party,3 17 and therefore, "[t]he nationwide scope of an injunction
carries with it the concomitant [nationwide] power of the court to
reach out to nonparties who knowingly violate its orders."318 The
court of appeals thought defendant MacKay's actions a paradigm of
how a named defendant can enlist the assistance of out of state per-
sons to frustrate an injunction.31 9 The court also found no prob-
lem with personal jurisdiction, concluding first that the acts of
aiding and abetting placed the actors within the personal jurisdic-
tion of the district court.32 0 The due process requirements of Inter-
national Shoe321 were not violated because a district court has
inherent power to enforce its orders, and the purposeful contacts
requirements of International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen322 were
satisfied by the intentional assistance given the named enjoined
party.3 23
That left the problem of service with process under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4, as it then existed. Because former Rules
4(e) and 4(f) allowed extraterritorial service of process when per-
mitted by state law, and Mississippi allowed service on nonresidents
committing acts outside the state with foreseeable effects resulting
within the state, service of the injunction on the Texas actors was
permissible.32 4 Subsequently, the Federal Rules were amended to
add Rule 4.1:
An order of civil commitment of a person held to be in
314. Id. at 716.
315. Id.
316. Id. (citing Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 454
(1932)). This is the circumstance of defendant C in the textual hypothetical
above.
317. Id. at 717; see FEi- R. Civ. P. 65(d).
318. Waffenschmidt, 763 F.2d at 717 (citing Ex parte Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 555
(1897); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930)).
319. Id. at 717-18.
320. Id. at 718.
321. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
322. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
323. Waffenschmidt, 763 F.2d at 722-23.
324. Id. at 720.
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contempt of a decree or injunction issued to enforce the
laws of the United States may be served and -enforced in
any district. Other orders in civil contempt proceedings
shall be served in the state in which the court issuing the
order to be enforced is located, or elsewhere within the
United States if not more than 100 miles from the place at
which the order to be enforced was issued.3 25
The Advisory Committee notes make it clear that nationwide ser-
vice of contempt papers is contemplated only when the injunction
enforces federal law.32 6 For injunctions that enforce state law, the
more limited 100 mile rule applies.3 27 Rule 4.1 was intended to
conform civil contempt service to the service permissible for crimi-
nal contempt because 28 U.S.C. § 3041 permits criminal contempt
enforcement against a contemnor wherever the contemnor may be
found.328 Thus, service of contempt papers from federal court no
longer depends on state service of process rules unless it is state law
that is being enforced.
It is important to recognize, however, that the rationale of Waf-
fenschmidt extends only to nonparties who knowingly aid and abet a
named enjoined party. The court of appeals extensively reviewed
the evidence supporting knowledge and complicity on the part of
the Texas actors.3 29 Moreover, a federal court lacks the power to
enforce an injunction against an out-of-district person who is not
subjected to the personal jurisdiction of the court. Thus, a plaintiff
in Massachusetts could not enforce an injunction against someone
in Sweden simply by naming the Swedish party in a complaint and
the injunction without ever bothering to obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over the Swedish party. An issuing court does not automati-
cally acquire personal jurisdiction over anyone who may be helpful
to the enforcement of the injunction.
For example, in Lynch v. Rank,330 the district court distin-
guished Waffenschmidt and held that it did not have personal juris-
diction over an Oregon welfare official sufficient to hold him in
contempt for failing to effectuate an injunction issued in a nation-
wide class action relating to Social Security benefits.331 The district
325. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.1(b).
326. FED. R Civ. P. 4.1 advisory committee's notes.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See Waffenschmidt, 763 F.2d at 723-27.
330. 639 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
331. Id. at 74-76.
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court quoted Judge Learned Hand for the general rule: "[N]o
court can make a decree which will bind any one but a party; a
court of equity is as much so limited as a court of law; it cannot
lawfully enjoin the world at large, no matter how broadly it words its
decree."332 The district court found the Oregon official outside its
personal jurisdiction based on the minimum contacts framework of
International Shoe because the Oregon official lacked the commonal-
ity of incentives and motivations with the named defendants neces-
sary to find that they were acting in concert or participating with
each other.333 It thought the facts of Waffenschmidt, showing a com-
mon scheme to launder illegally obtained proceeds, entirely
distinct.3 3 4
Another district court aligned itself with Waffenschmidt and dis-
tinguished Lynch, finding that a bank in Luxembourg could be held
in contempt for releasing funds within the scope of an earlier-is-
sued injunction.33 5 The court noted that "[t]he basis of personal
jurisdiction, if it exists, evolves out of the allegations that make out
the contempt."33 6 The court of appeals reversed.33 7 It accepted the
district court's analytical framework, applying the specific jurisdic-
tion branch of the International Shoe tests for personal jurisdic-
tion.338 It found, however, that the district court's reliance on
Waffenschmidt was misplaced, because Waffenschmidt logically built
on the nationwide jurisdiction of federal courts.33 9 It thought that
the analysis "begins to crumble when a district court seeks to reach
out across the Atlantic in an attempt to impose conflicting duties
on another country's nationals within its own borders."34° Because
the TRO had not been registered in Luxembourg-apparently be-
cause the Luxembourg courts thought that it did not qualify as a
judgment or as a claim that was certain and due-it was not an
enforceable order in Luxembourg. 341 Thus, conduct by the Lux-
332. Id. at 72 (quoting Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
1930)).
333. Id. at 71-72.
334. Id. at 74 (distinguishing facts of Waffenschmidt, 763 F.2d at 711).
335. Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 827 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Cal. 1993),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 276 (1995).
336. Id. at 624 n.l.
337. Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 276 (1995).
338. Id. at 1391-92.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1392 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 441(1)(a) (1987)).
341. Id.
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embourg Bank inconsistent with the terms of the order could not
be contempt. Because it had not engaged in contempt, it could not
be said that it purposefully directed its activities toward the United
States. 42 From a policy perspective, the court of appeals reasoned,
"we do not agree that when a national of a foreign country follows
the law of that country in that country it can be dragged half way
around the world to answer contempt charges arising out of a for-
eign court's ineffective order."3 43
. The reasoning of Waffenschmidt remains intact for enforcement
of injunctions throughout the United States: conscious aiding and
abetting can constitute the purposeful contact with the forum state
necessary to satisfy the requirements of International Shoe. The
Ninth Circuit, Reebok opinion also leaves open the possibility that if
an American injunction is appropriately registered in a foreign
country or otherwise attains legal status in that country, violation of
that injunction might create personal jurisdiction in the American
court issuing the injunction under the theory of Waffenschmidt. The
problem in Reebok was that the injunction never attained that status
in the foreign country. On the other hand, when persons are al-
ready parties, when TROs are issued ex parte, or when persons are
expected to act in concert with parties, what counts is notice and
not the formalities of service. 344
In the international context, the same principles apply. A per-
son originally within the personal jurisdiction of the issuing court is
bound by an injunction wherever in the world he or she may go. A
person not originally within the personal jurisdiction of the court
or not named as a party and served with process may fall within the
342. Id. at 1394.
343. Id. at 1393.
344. See United States v. Hochschild, 977 F.2d 208, 212 (6th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that actual notice avoids need for formal service of process for civil contempt,
acknowledging I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Wakefield Indus., Inc., 699 F.2d 1254,
1260 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (mail service of contempt motion on nonparty insuffi-
cient)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1067, (1993); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v.
Current Fin. Serv., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 802, 806 n.11 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that
notice to parties is presumed; however, notice, but not formal service, on nonpar-
ties must be proven). Contra FED. R. Civ. P. 4.1 advisory committee's notes (service
of process not required to notify party of decree, injunction or show cause order
for contempt); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 485 F.2d 780, 784 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (nonparties with actual notice bound by temporary restraining order
even though not formally served); Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito Am., Inc., 852
F. Supp. 740, 778-80 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (reviewing Reebok and other earlier cases and
holding that nonparty may be subjected to contempt as aider or abettor only when
that party has notice of injunction and notice that acting in concert with certain
persons would subject party to contempt proceedings, but need not have formal
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personal jurisdiction of a court issuing an injunction by aiding and
abetting a named party's violation of an injunction. The difficulty
in both of these situations would be the practical enforcement of
the injunction extraterritorially. Judgment recognition statutes
generally exclude equitable remedies,3 45 and thus, it is unlikely that
a foreign jurisdiction would make its courts and judicial officers
available to enforce an American injunction. Thus, incarceration is
not likely to be available as a contempt penalty. Nevertheless, mon-
etary penalties could be enforced against assets of the contemnor
located in the United States. In addition, civil contempt penalties
could be reduced to judgment in the United States. Then, the re-
sulting money judgment could be subject to recognition and en-
forcement in other countries that recognize American money
judgments, although the moving party likely would be confronted
with an argument that such a judgment represents a penal sanc-
tion, and thus, is outside the scope of both treaty-based and comity-
based international judgment recognition.
The scope of electronic networks potentially increases the ef-
fect of injunctions. For example, suppose one participant in a net-
work was ordered by a court to disclose everything in the network,
as might occur in a discovery order to compel, with respect to a
network used for trial preparation purposes. As long as the person
subject to the order had access to the covered information, the en-
tire network contents would be subject to the court's order, even
though the court had jurisdiction over only a small part of the net-
work. On the other hand, if the network administrator, beyond the
personal jurisdiction of the court, were to cut off the person subject
to the order, there would be little the court could do to enforce its
order.
C. Post-Conviction Extradition
As discussed above, a civil judgment entered by a court with
long arm jurisdiction is of little practical value unless it is recog-
nized by a foreign jurisdiction or unless the defendant has assets in
the judgment-rendering state. Likewise, a criminal judgment is of
little value unless the defendant has property in the rendering state
subject to forfeiture or unless the person of the defendant can be
apprehended.
Post-conviction extradition is the criminal equivalent of trans-
national enforcement of a civil judgment. The legal framework for
345. For a further discussion of foreign judgment recognition, see supra notes
287-94 and accompanying text.
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post-conviction extradition is essentially the same as that for pre-
trial extradition, 3 6 except that the issue of probable cause is virtu-
ally always satisfied by proof of the conviction in the requesting
state. Other policy-based defenses to extradition, such as the pros-
pect of mistreatment in the requesting state, are potentially at issue
in connection with the conditions of incarceration, corresponding
to the possibility of pre-trial mistreatment or mistreatment at trial in
the pre-trial context.347 On the other hand, the Nevada Supreme
Court has suggested that an allegation that a defendant was con-
victed in absentia is not necessarily enough to vitiate extradition.Ms
D. Forfeiture as Criminal Penalty
Civil forfeiture is a potential penalty for criminal conduct.349
In the absence of other procedural instructions, federal law pro-
vides for enforcement of a forfeiture in an in rem civil action. 350
Other statutes authorize judges to forfeit property in a summary
manner upon criminal conviction of the owner of the property.351
Under this statutory scheme, forfeiture is summarily imposed by the
court as a penalty following ajury verdict of guilt in a criminal case.
Such summary proceedings should be limited to situations in which
it is obvious that the target property is owned by the defendant and
that the jury's guilty verdict negates any possible defense to the for-
346. For a further discussion of pre-trial extradition, see supra notes 164-78
and accompanying text.
347. See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 720 (9th Cir.
1995) (explaining terms of treaty amendment with Great Britain); Beukes v. Pizzi,
888 F. Supp. 465, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that question in post-conviction
extradition is only " 'whether the appellant's alleged offense fell within the terms
of an extradition treaty and whether an official with jurisdiction was presented with
sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that there was a reasonable ground to be-
lieve that the appellate was guilty' " and that probable cause can be established by
adjudication of guilt by court in requesting country (quoting Ahmad v. Wigen, 910
F.2d 1063, 1064 (2d Cir. 1990))).
348. See Castriotta v. State, 888 P.2d 927, 929 (Nev.) (indicating that, in gen-
eral, constitutional defenses must be considered by requesting state, not by re-
quested state, in reviewing request for writ of extradition), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 54
(1995).
349. But cf Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (civil forfeiture for
drug offense subject to Eighth Amendment excessive fines limitation); Alexander
v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993) (holding that forfeiture of assets used in
entertainment business did not violate First Amendment and that lower court
should have determined whether forfeiture was "excessive fine" in violation of
Eighth Amendment); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111 (1993)
(interpreting forfeiture provision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a), (b) (1988) and limiting forfeiture of property
owned by one other than criminal defendant).
350. 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (1994).
351. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994).
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feiture as a matter of logic. 352 Generally, property can be forfeited
only if it constitutes the contraband "per se," such as heroin, co-
caine or marijuana, or if it constitutes "derivative contraband"-ar-
tides used in connection with the violation of a statute that
provides for their forfeiture.353 Typically, derivative forfeiture is
limited to property that "facilitates" the commission of a crime.35 4
In the GII context, these statutes potentially are sources of au-
thority for forfeiture of facilities used in digital communications
supporting crimes.5 55 While it is tempting to compare criminal for-
feiture with in remjurisdiction in civil procedure, there is an impor-
tant difference. A fully effective civil judgment can be obtained
based on in rem jurisdiction, with or without service of process
under long arm statutes. Conversely, criminal forfeiture is not per-
missible without a valid conviction, and one may not be convicted
of a crime in absentia.
VII. DIsCOVERY
Important aspects of pre-trial investigation in both the civil and
criminal contexts involve the assertion of judicial power. Civil dis-
covery obligates parties to civil litigation to disclose documents and
352. ASSET FORFErrURE OFFICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AS-
SET FORFErrURE: COMPILATION OF CIVIL STATUTES 4-5 (1987) [hereinafter DOJ
Compilation] (citing 16 U.S.C. § 690(e) (1982)).
353. Id. at 7-11 (citing King v. United States, 364 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1966)
(concluding Kennedy assassination rifle not forfeitable)).
354. See id. at 13-19 (discussing meaning of "facilitate").
355. See 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) (forfeiture of property transported in interstate
commerce subject to conspiracy violating Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994));
17 U.S.C. §§ 506(b), 509(a) (1994) (forfeiture of implements, devices or equip-
ment used in manufacture of copies or phonorecords that infringe copyright); 17
U.S.C. § 603(c) (1994) (forfeiture of imported items infringing copyright); 18
U.S.C. § 492 (1994) (forfeiture of any article, device or other thing used for for-
gery and counterfeiting); 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1994) (forfeiture of "merchandise" im-
ported without compliance with custom's laws); 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1994)
(forfeiture of proceeds of money laundering); 18 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1)-(2) (1994)
(forfeiture of material or equipment used in producing, reproducing, transport-
ing, shipping or receiving any child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2318(d) (1994)
(forfeiture of articles to which counterfeit labels are affixed); 18 U.S.C. § 2513
(1994) (forfeiture of devices used to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994) (prohibiting
wiretapping)); 19 U.S.C. § 1526(b) (1994) (forfeiture of merchandise of foreign
manufacture with infringing trademark); 19 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (1994) (allowing law
enforcement officials to seek warrant to search for and to seize property subject to
forfeiture); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1994) (forfeiture of controlled substances and
equipment, materials or property used for production or conveyance of controlled
substances); 22 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1994) (forfeiture of "vessel, vehicle or aircraft"
used to effect illegal exportation of munitions); 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c) (1994) (forfei-
ture of proceeds of illegal monetary imports and exports); 47 U.S.C. § 510 (1994)
(forfeiture of device or component used for radio transmissions without compli-
ance with FCC requirements).
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to permit access to their facilities, and obligates anyone, party or
not, to submit to sworn depositions. Criminal search and seizure
obligates the subjects of criminal investigations as well as third par-
ties to submit to governmental search and seizure. There are im-
portant territorial limitations, on the reach of both investigatory
techniques. Because the likelihood that the evidence will be lo-
cated in a state or country different from where a matter is being
litigated, and the GII controversies that will follow, an appreciation
of these territorial limits on investigation is important.
A. Civil Discovery
One of the most important differences between American and
foreign law relates to the methods of obtaining evidence. The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure permit broad discovery generally
under the control of the parties. 356 While few foreign civil proce-
dure systems, even those in the civil law tradition, deny discovery
altogether, they often permit it only under the direct supervision of
a judicial officer.3 57 "[T] he taking of evidence in a civil law coun-
try," under the Federal Rules, "may constitute the performance of a
public judicial act by an unauthorized foreign person."358 The Fed-
eral Rules approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the inquisi-
torial character of the civil law system under which "the judge
normally questions the witness and prepares a written summary of
the evidence."3 59
When discovery is limited,- pleadings are much more elaborate,
including evidence and legal theories and logic or evidence sup-
356. FED. R. Crv. P. 26.
357. Civil law views discovery as an integral part of the trial process to be su-
pervised by a judicial officer. Discovery at the initiative and under the control of
counsel for private litigants is antithetical. Also, verbatim transcripts are an Ameri-
can tradition, not a civil law one. Even in England, clearly a common-law country,
interrogatories are limited, depositions are relatively rare, and discovery of non-
parties is difficult. See Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States
Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 561 n.18 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (describing differences in procedure) (citing S. SEIDEL, EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL DIscovERY IN INTERNATIONAL LrrIGATION 24 (1984)); DAVID McCLEAN,
INTERNATIONALJUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 60 (1992) (commenting that English discovery
is limited to those who are parties); id. at 61 (stating that English discovery is lim-
ited to discovery of documents; interrogatories are little used and there is no
equivalent of depositions). But see Hans Smit, Dispute Resolution in Europe: A Com-
parative Context for the Resolution of Disputes Between Americans and Canadians, 17 CAN-
ADA-U.S. L.J. 281, 288 (1991) (explaining certain European methods of discovery
and arguing that they are effective).
358. Airospatiale, 482 U.S. at 557 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
359. Id. at 560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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porting denials.3 60 Additionally, the absence of discovery is usually
offset by some other method; in France, for example, the courts use
an expertise, a report by an expert on the case, based on information
drawn from any relevant source.3 61
Historically, U.S. litigants sought discovery abroad either under
the Federal Rules against persons who were subject to personal ju-
risdiction of the court or through letters rogatory. The Inter-Amer-
ican Convention on Letters Rogatory3 62 provides that letters
rogatory shall be executed in accordance.with the laws and proce-
dural rules of the state of destination.3 63 Federal Rule 28(b) specifi-
cally provides for the taking of depositions in foreign countries
either before a person authorized to administer oaths under for-
eign law or under American law, before a person commissioned by
the court or pursuant to a letter rogatory.3 64 Thus, a corporate
party with practical control over materials owned by one of its cor-
porate affiliates may be compelled to produce them, even though
the materials are located in a foreign country.3 65
In the past, the letters rogatory procedure was disfavored be-
cause foreign courts were under no obligation to execute them.
Today, discovery in foreign countries is facilitated by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedures66 and the Hague Convention on the Tak-
ing of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (the
"Hague Evidence Convention").367 The Hague Evidence Conven-
360. Smit, supra note 357, at 288.
361. Id. at 289.
362. Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, Jan. 30, 1975, art. 5, 14
I.L.M. 339, 340.
363. The Inter-American Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad is similar in
most respects to the Hague Evidence Convention. See Karl Schwappach, The Inter-
American Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad: A Functional Comparison with the
Hague Convention, 4 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 69 (1991) (comparing six dimensions of two
conventions by one of drafters).
364. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) (2)-(4).
365. General Envtl. Science Corp. v. Horsfall, 136 F.R.D. 130, 133-34 (N.D.
Ohio 1991) (ordering corporate party to produce documents held by nonparty
Swiss corporation alleged to be sham created to evade discovery).
366. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) (1993) (providing for taking of depositions in for-
eign countries); FED. R. Crv. P. 28 advisory committee's notes (1993 amendment)
(explaining revision intended to make effective use of Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters); see also FED. R. Cirv. P.
28 advisory committee's notes (1963 amendment) (noting hostility of some for-
eign countries to depositions pursuant to private request).
367. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, opened for signature, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S.
231 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The states that are currently parties to the
Hague Convention include: Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Cyprus, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak
[Vol. 41: p. I
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tion was developed at U.S. initiative and adopted in 1972.368 The
Convention responded to the practice of some countries of insist-
ing on "the exclusive use of the complicated, dilatory and expensive
system of letters rogatory or letters of request.3 69 Others refused
judicial assistance because of the absence of a treaty or conven-
tion.370 The most typical practice was for civil law countries to use
"commissioned rogatories," resulting in "a resume of the evidence
prepared by an executing judge and signed by the witness, while
the common law technique results normally in a verbatim transcript
of the witnesses' testimony certified by the reporter."371
The Convention was intended: (1) to make letters of request
the principal means of obtaining evidence abroad, (2) to increase
the powers of consuls while limiting the use of a Commissioner, (3)
to provide for securing evidence in the form needed by the court
hearing the action and (4) to preserve more favorable practices
arising from internal law.37 2 The advantage offered by the Conven-
tion's letter of request procedure was that it offered a "mechanism
for compelling discovery from reluctant witnesses."3 73 The Conven-
tion also obligates member states to fulfill properly completed let-
ters of request.374 Under the Convention, practices have changed
Republic, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. MARTINDALE-HuB-
BELL INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST IC-18 (1995). The Hague Convention has not
been adopted by Canada. Smit, supra note 357, at 286.
368. Soci&t Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court,
482 U.S. 522, 530 (1987) (citing 118 CONG. REc. 20,623 (1972)).
369. Id. at 531 (quoting Secretary of State's letter of submittal of Hague Con-
vention to President).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 531-32.
372. Id. at 532.
373. Gary B. Born & Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-A4rospa-
tiale Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 INT'L LAw. 393, 397 (1990)
(citing Hague Convention, supra note 367) (referring to article 10 requirement of
Hague Convention that requested state apply appropriate measures of compulsion
to same extent that internal law provides). The Convention's letter of request pro-
cedure is superior to the letter rogatory procedure in three ways:
First, the Evidence Convention requires signatories to designate a Central
Authority to receive requests; this simplifies determining to whom the
request should be addressed and shortens execution time. Second, the
Letter of Request is mandatory in a ratifying state, except where it would
threaten the state's sovereignty or security .... Finally, the requesting
court may specify procedures compatible with its own law not otherwise
available in the executing state.
Thomas J. Tallerico & Jan L. Harrick, Discovery of Witnesses and Documents Located
Abroad, 69 MIcH. BJ. 664, 666 (1990) (citing Hague Convention, supra note 367,
arts. 2, 12 & 9).
374. Born & Hoing, supra note 373, at 397.
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to facilitate discovery,375 although enactment of "blocking statutes"
mitigates the improvements. 376
In Sociitd Nationale Industrielle Airospatiale v. United States District
Court,377 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Hague
Evidence Convention is the exclusive procedure for discovery on
foreign soil,378 prompting the recent revisions in the Federal Rules.
A 1990 survey of lower court applications of Arospatiale concluded
that "lower courts have found the A6rospatiale comity analysis cum-
bersome and unhelpful and have almost uniformly refused to order
extraterritorial discovery pursuant to the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion."3 7 9 This conclusion was based on the review of ten published
decisions.380 The review identified four aspects that are trouble-
some: first, the lack of workable guidelines; second, the imposition
of the burden of proof on the proponent of Convention use; third,
the refusal to require first resort to the Convention; and fourth, the
virtual unavailability of appellate review because of the broad dis-
cretion enjoyed by district judges.38' In addition, lower federal
courts generally have not required use of the Convention proce-
dures, even when the discovery sought relates to the establishment
of personal jurisdiction.A8 2 Typically, state courts also have followed
the Aospatiale formula.383
375. The Hague Convention itself requires the availability of methods to com-
pel attendance of witnesses, oaths, verbatim transcripts and examination by coun-
sel for both sides. Akrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). France,
among other nations, has enacted legislation making these procedures available.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing N.C.P.C., arts. 736-48 (76th ed. Dalloz
1984)).
376. See id. at 526 (noting that French "blocking statute" prevented party from
responding to discovery requests that did not comply with Hague Convention). A
blocking statute forbids discovery and imposes penalties for permitting it. The
French blocking statute provides:
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and
regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in
writing, orally or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial
or technical documents or information leading to the constitution of evi-
dence with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in
connection therewith.
Id. at 526 n.6 (quoting French Penal Code, C. PEN., No. 80-538, art. IA).
377. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
378. Id. at 529.
379. Born & Hoing, supra note 373, at 394.
380. Id. at 401.
381. Id. at 401-03.
382. Id. at 405-06 (citing Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guince, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1274 (D.C. Cir.
1987); In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1215 (1983); Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 258-60 (M.D.N.C. 1988)).
383. Id. at 406 n.71 (citing Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531 N.Y.S.2d 188,
[Vol. 41: p. I
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The 1993 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
28(b) require treaty or convention procedures to be used if feasible
for the taking of a deposition.38 4 This requirement would apply
even if a verbatim transcript is not available, or testimony cannot be
taken under oath.3 85 The Manual for Complex Litigation86 suggests
that formal discovery be taken abroad only with prior approval by
the court 87 and suggests that the procedures of the Hague Conven-
tion be utilized if available; additionally, discovery should be limited
to that actually needed for trial and not be investigatory in charac-
ter or open-ended.388 In addition, the Manual suggests that the
court's findings "specifying what is permitted and why it is needed,
[and] should be incorporated into a separate order that can be
presented to foreign authorities, even if 'letters rogatory' are not
being issued."38 9 It also suggests a court appointed expert as a
translator3 90 and, if necessary, the appointment of a special master
to supervise the deposition personally, if that is permitted by for-
eign law.39 1
Sometimes, the tables are turned, and a foreign party seeks dis-
190 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Sandsend Fin. Consultants v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988)); see also David Westin & Gary B. Born, Applying the A6rospatiale Decision
in State Court Proceedings, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 297 (1988) (indicating that
U.S. Supreme Court in Arospatiale did not directly address how decision affects
state rules of discovery).
384. FED. R. Clv. P. 28(b).
385. See FED. R. Civ. P. 28 advisory committee's notes (1993 amendments)
(stating purpose of section (b)).
386. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LTIGATION (SECOND) (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed.,
1985) [hereinafter MANUAL].
387. Id. §§ 21.485, 33.64.
388. Id. § 21.485.
389. Id. (suggesting compliance with latest edition of RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FoRE GN RELATIONS LAw § 437 (1965)).
390. Id. § 33.64.
391. Id. § 21.485.
19961
77
Perritt: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
covery of an American entity.3 92 In re Letters Rogatoiy"39 involved an
Argentine court's issuance of letters rogatory seeking to obtain dis-
covery of documents located in Pennsylvania and within the custody
of Aydin Corporation.3 94 One of Aydin's bases for resisting the re-
quested discovery was that it would force the disclosure of trade
secrets.395 The district court granted a subpoena, pursuant to let-
ters rogatory compelling the Pennsylvania non-party to make avail-
able certain documents and materials requested by the Argentine
court.39 6 Aydin was required to deliver the requested documents to
a special examiner within the Eastem District of Pennsylvania.3 97
In response, Aydin filed a motion to quash or to modify the sub-
poena.3 98 The court considered the text and legislative history of
28 U.S.C. § 1782 which authorizes district courts to respond to let-
ters rogatory, and concluded that it had broad discretion to decide
whether to honor the Argentine request.3 99 Because the trade
secrets claims were based in significant part on the need for confi-
dentiality of the documents to protect Argentine national security,
the court refused to deny discovery of the material altogether.400
392. The district courts are authorized to order persons within their districts
to give testimony and to produce documents pursuant to letters rogatory. 28
U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1994). In addition to the letters rogatory procedure under sec-
tion 1782(a), a letter of request may be transmitted through the State Department
or through the Justice Department as Central Authority under the Hague Evi-
dence Convention. The Rules of Civil Procedure are available for such requests.
Id. Reciprocity is not a prerequisite for discovery. Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under
28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and International Proceedings, 30 VA.J. INT'L L. 597, 608-
09 (1990) (comparingJohn Deere, Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir.
1985) (rejecting contention that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 requires reciprocity before dis-
covery order is granted) with In reLo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir.
1988) (denying discovery on reciprocity grounds)). The U.S. Supreme Court has
also held that there is no reciprocity requirement. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle
Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 529-30 (1987).
393. 144 F.R.D. 272 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
394. Id. at 273. "Aydin Corporation is a non-party to the foreign action, but
the holder of the requested documents." Id.
395. Id. at 276. The Argentine litigation involved a stock fraud claim by a
citizen of Argentina against directors of an Argentine company. Id. at 273-74. The
basis for the claim was that the Argentine defendants had concealed their impend-
ing agreement with Aydin, which was located in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania. Id.
396. Id. at 274.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. (citing In re Request for Assistance, 848 F.2d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir.
1988)); see also Malev Hungarian Airlines v. United Technologies Int'l, Inc., 964
F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court and concluding that foreign liti-
gants entitled to U.S. discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 without first seeking discov-
ery through foreign tribunal in which case was pending), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 861
(1992).
400. In re Letters Rogototy, 144 F.R.D. at 276.
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Rather, it imposed a protective order and found that the Argentine
court was the appropriate tribunal to consider risks to Argentine
national security.40 1
Of more general significance, the court also found that the fact
that the documents were available in Argentina was not a sufficient
basis for quashing the subpoena under the letters rogatory.402 Be-
cause the requesting party was obligated to compensate the pro-
ducer of the documents for its expense, whether the party chose to
pursue discovery abroad or in the United States was that party's liti-
gation decision. 403 The resulting advantage is that it keeps U.S.
courts out of having to interpret foreign discovery procedures in
order to decide whether material would be available in the foreign
jurisdiction. 40 4
There is a general choice of law rule that forum procedure is
always applied, even if foreign substantive law is applied. There-
fore, the discovery rules of the forum would significantly impact on
the investigative techniques made available. Indeed, the expansive
nature of American discovery may be one reason that litigation is
drawn to American courts should plaintiffs have that option.
B. Searches and Seizures of Electronic Materials
An important part of the criminal justice process is investiga-
tion through searches and seizures. Searches and seizures of elec-
tronic materials, especially in the GII context, implicate
jurisdictional issues because of the likelihood, as in all of the exam-
ples considered in this Article, that evidence of a crime would be
located in a different jurisdiction from the one in which criminal
prosecution occurs. 405
Search and seizure powers relating to foreign instrumentalities
are especially important. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (FISA) 406 regulates electronic surveillance of foreign pow-
ers and agents. FISA sets up a special court comprised of seven
401. Id. ("Further, should Aydin or the Argentine Air Force conclude that the
contents of the Letters Rogatory present a threat to Argentina's national security,
they should present such evidence to the Argentine Court for a modification of
that court's discovery order.").
402. Id. at 277.
403. Id.
404. Id. (citing In re Request for Judicial Assistance, 555 F.2d 720, 723 (9th
Cir. 1977)).
405. There are fewer legal obstacles to securing fugitives from abroad than
for collecting evidence located abroad. See Nadelmann, supra note 163, at 814
(discussing legal obstacles to obtaining fugitives).
406. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-08 (1994).
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district judges who hear and determine applications for electronic
surveillance warrants4° 7 under the Act.408 The statute allows war-
rantless electronic acquisition of communications exclusively be-
tween foreign powers not involving a substantial likelihood that the
surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to
which a "United States person" is a party. Further, it permits the
acquisition of technical intelligence other than the spoken commu-
nications of individuals from property or premises under the open
and exclusive control of a foreign power.40 9 "United States person"
is defined to include United States citizens, resident aliens, unin-
corporated associations involving substantial U.S. membership and
corporations incorporated in the United States, but excludes corpo-
rations controlled by foreign governments.4 10
These types of surveillance are permitted only upon certifica-
tion by the Attorney General, which must be filed under seal with
the special court established by the Act.4 11 Further, these surveil-
lances may not exceed one year in duration. 412 FISA court orders
are available only on application by a federal officer supported by
an Attorney General finding of compliance with the criteria of the
Act.4 13 This application must disclose the facts and circumstances
justifying the applicant's belief that the target is a foreign power or
agent of a foreign power, that the facilities or places at which the
surveillance is directed is being used or is about to be used by a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and must include a de-
scription of the nature of the information sought and the type of
communications or activities to be subjected to the surveillance.414
407. Although the statute uses the term "court order" instead of "warrant,"
the two terms are synonymous. See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180,
1190 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (concluding that FISA order is warrant within meaning of
Fourth Amendment), affld mem., 729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983).
408. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (1994). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (FISA) also establishes a court of review, comprised of three United States
district judges or circuit judges who have jurisdiction to review denial of any appli-
cation made to the seven-judge court, with the possibility of certiorari review by the
Supreme Court. Id. § 1803(b).
409. Id. § 1802(a) (1)(A) (ii), (a)(1)(B).
410. Id. § 1801(i).
411. Id. § 1802(a) (certification by Attorney General); id. § 1802(a) (3) (filing
requirement).
412. Id. § 1802(a)(1).
413. Id. § 1804(a); see United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1194-95
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing-FISA requirements and procedures satisfied by surveil-
lance order for home telephone).
414. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a) (4), (6) (1994); see United States v. Cavanagh, 807
F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that nature of foreign intelligence informa-
tion makes it impossible to provide detailed description of nature of information
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In addition, the application must include a certification by the As-
sistant to the President for National Security Affairs or another ex-
ecutive branch official designated by the President supporting the
application, including a certification that the information sought
"cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative tech-
niques" 415 and a statement of the proposed "minimization proce-
dures."416 A judge of the special report is required to issue an ex
parte order upon finding that the application requirements have
been satisfied. 41 7
In emergency situations, the Attorney General may authorize
the commencement of surveillance followed by an application for a
court order within twenty-four hours.418 When information ob-
tained under the Act is to be used as evidence in any judicial or
administrative proceeding, the government must notify the person
against whom it is to be used, and that person may move to sup-
press the evidence on the grounds that it was unlawfully acquired or
that the surveillance producing it did not conform with an order
under the statute.419
The scope of the statute is determined by its definition of "elec-
tronic surveillance,"420 which includes the nonconsensual acquisi-
tion of the contents of any wire communication within the United
States by means of an electronic, mechanical or other surveillance
device, 421 and the intentional acquisition by the same means "of
any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be re-
ceived by a particular, known United States person who is in the
United States" if that person is targeted and "has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law en-
forcement purposes." 422 Radio communications are included when
both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the
United States, a reasonable expectation of privacy exists and a war-
sought and holding that there is no Fourth Amendment violation from absence of
detailed description of targeted information).
415. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (7) (C) (1994).
416. Id. § 1804(a)(5). "Minimization procedures" are defined to mean spe-
cific procedures minimizing the acquisition, retention and dissemination of non-
ublic information concerning nonconsenting United States persons. Id.
1801(h) (1); see Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1195 (approving minimization).
417. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (1994).
418. Id. § 1805(e).
419. Id. § 1806(c)-(e); cf. United States v. Thomson, 752 F. Supp. 75, 76
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying motion for disclosure of FISA information that govern-
ment did not intend to use).
420. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(0 (1994).
421. Id. § 1801(0 (2).
422. Id. § 1801(0(1).
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rant would be required for law enforcement purposes.423 Monitor-
ing by the same means "to acquire information, other than from a
wire or radio communication," is covered under circumstances in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a war-
rant would be required for law enforcement purposes. 424 This part
of the definition is broad enough to include stored electronic com-
munications and electronic communication streams as they are de-
fined in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).425
The nature of the information targeted by a FISA warrant must
relate to foreign intelligence and not to criminal conduct, but this
subject matter requirement has been construed broadly to include
almost any basic information about the nature of contacts between
United States citizens and foreign powers or agents. 426 Thus, there
is some overlap between FISA and domestic warrants and ECPA or-
ders, particularly for terrorist activities. 427 Additionally, it is in the
nature of FISA information that an FISA warrant cannot be sup-
ported solely by probable cause of criminal activity, but the absence
of this element does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 428 In gen-
eral, the probable cause necessary to justify national security surveil-
lance is different from that necessary for criminal investigations.429
C. Foreign Searches for Criminal Evidence
One of the most common electronic search and seizure
problems is the one presented in the recent book, The Cuckoo's
Egg.430 A computer system operator in California, victimized by an
intruder, obtained from a California state court a search warrant
authorizing a tap by the telephone company. The tracing of the
423. Id. § 1801(f) (3).
424. Id. § 1801(f) (4).
425. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
426. See United States v. Thomson, 752 F. Supp. 75, 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (re-
jecting argument that FISA requirements had not been met because information
could not have related directly to terrorism, foreign defense or diplomatic
matters).
427. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
wiretap connected with investigation of international terrorism in United States
properly sought under FISA rather than Title III even though activities were crimi-
nal offenses punishable under federal law).
428. United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
argument to suppress fruits of FISA warrant because of Fourth Amendment viola-
tion due to absence of likelihood of uncovering evidence of crime).
429. Id. at 790 (characterizing United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407
U.S. 297, 322 (1972)).
430. CLIFFORD STOLL, THE CUCKOO'S EGG: TRACKING A Spy THROUGH THE
MAZE OF COMPUTER ESPIONAGE (1989).
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data communication, however, led to Virginia, and the C&P Tele-
phone Company in Virginia declined to disclose the necessary in-
formation to trace the call further, based on the California warrant.
A warrant could not be obtained in Virginia because no crime had
been committed in Virginia. Thus, the investigation of the intru-
sion was effectively blocked. The same problem occurred when the
trail led to Germany. No crime had been committed in Germany,
and the German courts would not issue compulsory process com-
pelling the searches necessary to further the investigation. Eventu-
ally, requests under legal assistance agreements between the United
States and Germany allowed the investigation to proceed.
The issue of foreign searches involving GII material is likely to
grow in importance and difficulty. It is therefore appropriate to
identify some alternative ways of dealing with the problem. Tradi-
tionally, coercive power to obtain evidence was purely territorial.
As this Article has consistently explained, traditional American and
European procedure began with the principle that criminal juris-
diction is territorial and that exercise of power by one state on the
territory of another is prohibited.431 Therefore, the procedure for
obtaining evidence in a foreign country involved letters rogatory,
which encompassed search warrants and requests for seizure. 43 2
The letter rogatory procedure, however, rarely is satisfactory for
criminal investigations because it is slow and usually provides for
advance notice and participation by opposing parties. Criminal jus-
tice authorities almost always prefer ex parte procedures contem-
plated by American search warrants, subpoenas and warrantless
searches.
Currently, U.S. law enforcement authorities obtain evidence lo-
cated in foreign countries pursuant to a variety of informal and for-
mal techniques. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual identifies several ways
of obtaining evidence located in foreign countries, including for-
431. See Dionysios D. Spinellis, A European Perspective, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw: PROCEDURE 351 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986) (noting general
principles of international law that prohibit exercise of judicial authority beyond
jurisdiction and imposition of state's power over another state).
432. Id. at 366 (noting that European Convention provides for search and
seizure in Article 5); see European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, concluded Apr. 20, 1959, art. 5, 472 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter European
Convention] (reservation of right to make execution of letters rogatory for search
or seizure of property dependent upon condition that offense motivating letter
rogatory is punishable under both law of requesting party and law of requested
party). The Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on April 20,
1959. On March 17, 1978, the Council adopted the Additional Protocol to the
European Convention on Mutual Assitance in Criminal Matters, Europ. T.S. 99.
William A. Schabas, Book Review, 5 CRIM. L.F. 137, 140 & n.14 (1994).
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mal requests under mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs), letters
rogatory in the absence of a treaty or executive agreement, and sub-
poenas directed to U.S. citizens and permanent residents of the
United States located abroad. 433 The United States currently has
MLATs with approximately seventeen countries, including Belgium,
Canada, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and the
United Kingdom.434 In the absence of any MLAT, a U.S. law-en-
forcement official would resort to letters rogatory.43 5 As mentioned
above, though, letters rogatory have serious limitations as a means
of criminal investigation and discovery. Civil law systems typically
will not accept letters rogatory from prosecutors because of the tra-
dition in those systems that judges, called examining magistrates,
conduct criminal investigation and discovery. Thus, letters rogatory
are of little use when the requesting state is a common lawjurisdic-
tion, in which the prosecutor is in charge of investigation rather
than a judicial official, and when the requested state is a civil law
jurisdiction, which works in reverse. 43 6
MLATs are therefore of greater value. Each treaty to which the
U.S. is a party "contains a provision obligating a requested country
to conduct searches and seizures on behalf of a requesting country
if the request includes information justifying such action under the
laws of the requested country."43 7 Although the treaties require
433. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-13.521,
9-13.522, 9-13.525 (1988) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL].
434. Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking
Searches and Seizures Abroad After Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 329,
369 nn.169-70 (1994). See Consular Conventions, Extradition Treaties, and Treaties Re-
lating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLATS): Hearing Before the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 102d Cong. 5 (1992) [hereinafter
Senate Hearing] (testimony of Allen J. Kreczko) (enumerating mutual legal assist-
ance treaties); id. at 10-11 (prepared statement of Robert S. Mueller, III) (support-
ing eight law enforcement treaties); id. at 38 (reporting questions and answers
regarding status of mutual legal assistance treaties). In 1991, the Department of
Justice handled about 1500 requests under the treaties, some 780 from other coun-
tries. Id. at 11-13 (prepared statement of Robert S. Mueller, III).
435. See Bentley, supra note 434, at 367-68 & n.160 (citing U.S. ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL, supra note 433, § 9-13.500).
436. Senate Hearing, supra note 434, at 12 (prepared statement of Robert S.
Mueller, III).
437. MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RISTAu, 3 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSIST-
ANCE: CRIMINAL § 12-4-4(7), at 114 (1990); see Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, June 12 - Aug. 18, 1987, U.S.-Bah., art. 1, para. 2(c), S. TREATY
Doc. No. 100-17, 100th Cong. 1 (1988) (requiring assistance in "executing request
for searches and seizures"); id. art. 1, para. 4 (declaring that requests under treaty
shall be executed in accordance with law of requested state). The scope of the
treaty is determined by the definition of "offense," which includes conduct punish-
able as a crime under the laws of both jurisdictions, and under the laws only of the
requesting state when they involve illegal narcotics or drug activity, theft, crime of
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that allegations of treaty violation be presented only to the execu-
tive authority of the requesting country and not to its courts, per-
sons adversely affected by warrant equivalents or subpoenas do have
recourse to the courts of the requested country to the extent that
those courts are involved in obtaining the information. 438 Because
many other treaty partners lack a process equivalent to a subpoena
duces tecum, the standards applicable to warrants are used for such
countries. 43 9
There are other extralegal ways to obtain evidence internation-
ally. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
violence, fraud, or currency or financial transactions and are punishable by one
year imprisonment or more. Id. art. 2, para. 1. A requested state may deny compli-
ance if "the request has not established that there are reasonable grounds for
believing: (i) that the criminal offense specified in the request has been commit-
ted; and (ii) that the information sought relates to the offense and is located in the
territory of the requested state." Id. art. 3, para. 1 (e). Further, a request for
search, seizure and delivery of any article "shall be executed if it includes the infor-
mation justifying such action under the laws of the requested state." Id. art. 15,
para. 1; accord, Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 28,
1988, U.S.-Belg., art. 7, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-16, 100th Cong. 3 (1988) (execut-
ing request for search and seizure); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Can., art. XVI, para. 1, S. TREATYDoc. No. 100-14,
100th Cong. 6 (1988) (requiring search and seizure request to be executed in
accordance with requirements of law of requested state); Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex., art. 12, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-13, 100th Cong., 6
(1988) (declaring that request for search, seizure and delivery of any object shall
be executed if it includes information justifying such action under laws of re-
quested party).
The treaty with the Netherlands is especially instructive. See Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 12, 1981, U.S.-Neth., art. 6, T.I.A.S. No.
10,734 (agreeing that requested states shall execute request for search and seizure
in accordance with its laws and practices if subject defense is punishable under
laws of both parties by deprivation of liberty for period exceeding one year). If the
law is specified in an annex,
[the] offense shall be deemed punishable under the laws of the re-
quested state if the acts or omissions alleged, occurring in similar circum-
stances in the requested state, would constitute a criminal offense under
the laws of that state. For purposes of this paragraph, purely jurisdic-
tional elements of United States federal offenses, such as the use of the
mails or interstate commerce, shall not be considered as essential ele-
ments of these offense.
Id. Further, the treaty provides:
A request to the United States for a search and seizure shall be accompa-
nied by a statement made under oath before, or by a judge in the King-
dom of the Netherlands, which shall establish good cause to believe that
an offense has taken place or is about to take place and that evidence of
the offense is to be found on the persons or the premise to be searched,
and shall provide a precise description of the person or premises to be
searched. Such a statement shall be considered in the United States in
lieu of an affidavit sworn before a United States judicial officer.
Id.
438. ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 437, § 12-4-7(1), at 135.
439. Id. § 12-2-2(3), at 28.
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has, at most, limited application to foreign searches conducted by
either foreign or U.S. officials." 0 It long has been recognized that
the Fourth Amendment is a limitation only on official conduct by
federal officers or, pursuant to its incorporation into the Four-
teenth Amendment, state officers. It thus has no application to
searches or seizures conducted by officers of foreign states. For
Fourth Amendment purposes, they are like private citizens whose
searches and seizures are not constrained by the Fourth Amend-
ment (although they may be subject to common law damages ac-
tions). Until 1990, the major unresolved transnational Fourth
Amendment question was whether the Amendment covered
searches by U.S. officers outside the territorial limits of the United
States.
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,44 1 the United States
Supreme Court decided that the Fourth Amendment does not ap-
ply to search and seizures by United States agents of property
owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.442
It distinguished earlier cases involving the constitutional rights of
American citizens subjected to adverse treatment abroad.4 43 The
case arose after defendant Verdugo-Urquidez was apprehended by
Mexican police in Mexico, transported to a United States Border
Patrol station, and there arrested by United States marshals. 444 Af-
ter the arrest, agents of the American Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) searched the defendant's Mexican residences for evidence
of narcotics trafficking and involvement in the kidnapping and tor-
ture murder of a DEA special agent.445 The director general of the
Mexican federal judicial police authorized the search, which then
440. Even though the assertion of official U.S. law enforcement power in a
foreign country may offend the sovereignty of that foreign country, the foreign
country may be unable to prevent an affront to its sovereignty, as a practical
matter.
441. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
442. Id. at 266 (stating that Framers "never suggested that the [Fourth
Amendment] was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government
against aliens outside of the United States territory"); cf. United States v. Barona,
56 F.3d 1087, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding Fourth Amendment inapplicable
to wiretap of U.S. citizen obtained by cooperation between U.S. and foreign law
enforcement officials, based on reasonableness of good faith belief of U.S. officers
that tap complied with foreign law), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 814 (1996).
443. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270 (distinguishing Reid v. Covert, 345 U.S. 1
(1957)) (holding that wives of American servicemen could not be tried by court
marshall because certain constitutional privileges apply outside territorial limits of
United States). The Court found Reid distinguishable because Verdugo-Urquidez,
unlike the wives in Reid, was not a United States citizen. Id.
444. Id. at 262.
445. Id.
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was carried out by DEA agents working together with Mexican fed-
eral judicial police officers. 446
The Supreme Court majority reasoned that nonresident aliens
are not within the class protected by the Fourth Amendment 447 and
that Fourth Amendment protections generally were not intended
to apply beyond the borders of the United States.448 Justice Ken-
nedy, writing separately, noted that it would be impracticable to ap-
ply the Fourth Amendment abroad because of "[t]he absence of
local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants, the differing
and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and
privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign
officials... .-449 Justice Stevens thought the reasonableness clause
of the Fourth Amendment applied, but not the Warrant clause. 450
Justice Brennan, however, concluded that the Fourth Amendment
protections should have as much reach as the authority of federal
law enforcement officials.451 Justice Blackmun, like Justice Bren-
nan, argued that the Fourth Amendment applied, except that he
felt that the Warrant clause was inapplicable because an American
magistrate would lack the power to authorize a search abroad. 452
Regardless of whether the Fourth Amendment applies at all to
foreign searches, however, it remains true that a foreign search by
U.S. officers potentially offends the sovereignty of the foreign state
in which it occurred, thus potentially subjecting the United States
and its citizens to retaliation, and the officials performing the
search and seizure to punishment by the foreign country. Accord-
ingly, the normal practice contemplates some formal legal channel
for-authorizing the foreign search.
When no MLAT is in effect, one might be tempted to suppose
that the appropriate way to conduct a foreign search is simply for
judicial process to authorize U.S. officers to conduct a search or to
compel a third party to produce the desired evidence. There are
two conceptual problems, however, with this approach: the affront
446. Id.
447. Id. at 265-66.
448. Id. at 266-68. Justice Brennan characterized the majority conclusion as
turning only on the identity of the defendant and not on territoriality. Id. at 288
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he focus of the Fourth Amendment is
on what the Government can and cannot do... not on against whom these actions
may be taken").
449. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
450. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
451. Id. at 284-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
452. Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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to foreign sovereignty45a and the likelihood that U.S. judicial power
stops at the borders. Otherwise, the fact that criminal activity oc-
curred within the district of the court issuing the process would sup-
port its issuance. There is a limited set of circumstances under
which foreign subpoenas are authorized: when the person subject
to the subpoena is a'U.S. citizen or resident alien, and when there is.
some means of enforcing the subpoena within the United States. 454
The foreign sovereignty problem is avoided when the local law
of the foreign jurisdiction authorizes the search and seizure or
otherwise compels the production of the desired evidence. In
many cases, the standards for issuance of such foreign process are
different from and lower than American standards for search war-
rants and subpoenas. 45 5 Conversely, in the absence of a treaty com-
mitment, foreign courts and agencies may be unwilling to authorize
or to compel obtaining evidence to support a U.S. criminal investi-
gation. Because no local crime can be established in the foreign
country, foreign law may not authorize a search or compulsory pro-
cess. This is the converse of the proposition in some American ju-
risdictions that local searches can occur only with respect to local
crimes.
When local law of the foreign jurisdiction authorizes the
search or seizure, there is little doubt that any Fourth Amendment
reasonableness concerns are satisfied. 456 Efforts in the United
States to suppress evidence obtained in foreign countries uniformly
453. See Buenrostro v. Collazo, 973 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding
that warrantless home arrest and search in Virgin Islands could not be legitimated
by New York law enforcement request, which was not equivalent to warrant); State
v. Mathews, No. 20154, 1994 WL 376131, at *4 (Idaho, July 18, 1994) (reversing
denial of suppression and concluding that state search warrant executed within
Indian reservation was invalid because it invaded Indian national sovereignty).
454. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (1994) (authorizing subpoena of national or resi-
dent of United States who is in foreign country); see also id. § 1784(a), (b) (1994)
(authorizing contempt proceeding to enforce subpoena served in foreign country
and authorizing seizure of property within United States pursuant to such con-
tempt finding).
455. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78
CAL. L. REv. 539, 574-81 (1990) (stating that French law does not require warrants
or probable cause, but does permit rogatory commissions to be executed only by
federal police official or judge, and residential searches must be witnessed by resi-
dent or by two independent persons).
456. See United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 656 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)) (rejecting argument that
evidence seized by Swiss police incident to Swiss arrest should be suppressed in
U.S. prosecution for extortion); United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774, 782-83
(N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 46 F.3d 961 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2632 (1995)
(holding that Fourth Amendment applied to placement of beeper on sea-going
vessel in Australia because American citizen was involved, but no Fourth Amend-
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have been unsuccessful on the rationale that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule would not be served by excluding evidence based
on the purported conduct of foreign law enforcement officers.45 7
Problems also arise with suspected criminal activity or with a
potential criminal prosecution in a foreign country leading to a de-
sire to search for and seize evidence in the United States. Except
when treaty commitments, already reviewed in connection with for-
eign searches incident to U.S. crimes, obligate the United States to
conduct searches on behalf of a foreign authority, the legal author-
ity for such U.S. searches is uncertain. Explicit federal authority is
not very helpful, because it is limited to depositions,458 is more or
less based on the letters rogatory concept, and provides for appoint-
ment of commissioners to conduct examinations. 45 9
There is less certain authority for a state or federal magistrate
to issue a search warrant based on a foreign request. If a U.S. war-
rant can be obtained based on a foreign request for evidence, how-
ever, the problem is solved from the perspective of foreign law
enforcement authorities. Any sovereignty and power concerns are
averted because state and federal magistrates uniformly have the
power to authorize searches and seizures within their districts, as
long as the criteria for warrants are satisfied. The problem is that
the absence of a local crime may defeat probable cause.
There is general agreement for the proposition that probable
cause for a search warrant necessitates the existence of two ele-
ments: the commission of a crime and property related to the
crime being located in the district of the issuing magistrate. 460 As-
suming the property to be searched or seized is located within the
ditrict, the question is whether the crime, the commission of which
must be established, must be local as well. There is some authority
suggesting that a local crime must be established. 461 On the other
hand, informal conversations with state magistrates in Pennsylvania
ment violation because American authorities relied in good faith on advice from
Australian officials that no warrant was required under Australian law).
457. United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594, 599-600 (5th Cir. 1980); ABBELL &
RiSTAU, supra note 437, § 12-2-1(3), at 26-28 (citing Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634
(D.C. Cir. 1966)).
458. U.S. ArroRNEys' MANUAL, supra note 433, § 9-13.540.
459. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1994) (allowing district court to appoint person to
take testimony or statement).
460. See, e.g., United States v. Rakowski, 714 F. Supp. 1324, 1330 (D. Vt. 1987)
(citing United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983)) (finding that
probable cause for search warrant must be based on two propositions: (1) crime
was committed; and (2) evidence of such crime is at location to be searched).
461. Commonwealth v. Nation, 598 A.2d 306, 310-11 (Pa. Super. 1991) (vacat-
ing conviction and concluding that being fugitive does not constitute crime in
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lead to the conclusion that search warrants regularly are issued
based on affidavits by law enforcement officers from other states
saying that the warrant is needed in connection with investigation
of a crime committed in the other state. 462
Unless the issuance of a search warrant based on a foreign
crime is mandated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution, which ordinarily has only limited crimi-
nal law application and would have no application to a foreign re-
quest, this practice, if legal, suggests that evidence of a crime in a
foreign country also would support the issuance of a search warrant
by a federal or state magistrate. Alternatively, a foreign warrant or
subpoena would have no effect in the United States for the same
reasons discussed earlier that a U.S. warrant or subpoena would
have no effect in a foreign country. 463
D. Excluding Wrongfully Obtained Evidence
There are a number of possible consequences of a foreign
search or seizure not being authorized by U.S. law, including situa-
tions in which the Fourth Amendment or other legal standards lim-
iting searches and seizures apply, but have not been complied with,
and circumstances in which raw power has been used. There are
three pertinent consequences: (1) the exclusion, in any subse-
quent criminal prosecution under the "exclusionary rule," of the
evidence illegally seized; (2) the criminal prosecution of, or a pri-
vate damages action against, the searching and seizing officials; and
(3) a simple refusal by the person holding custody of the desired
property to allow the search and seizure. -
Verdugo-Urquidez established the proposition that evidence
seized in a foreign country is not subject to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule in a federal criminal prosecution. 464 Whether evi-
dence seized in the United States would be excluded in a foreign
Pennsylvania and therefore could not serve as basis for search warrant), appeal de-
nied, 607 A.2d 252 (Pa. 1992).
462. See United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 488 (2d Cir. 1962) (revers-
ing conviction on illegally obtained evidence and suggesting that letter from out-
of-state law enforcement authorities might have been sufficient basis to obtain
search warrant).
463. The earlier discussion did explain that a foreign subpoena might be ef-
fective against a foreign citizen in the United States at least to the extent it could
be enforced against property located in the issuing jurisdiction. Many foreign na-
tions object to this practice, however.
464. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-68 (1990). For
further discussion of the Court's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, see supra notes 441-
52 and accompanying text.
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prosecution depends on whether the foreign country has an exclu-
sionary rule. That leaves open the possibility that evidence seized
in a foreign country might be excluded from a U.S. prosecution for
some reason other than the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment, such as a synthesis of more general U.S., foreign and interna-
tional legal concepts. 465 There is some authority in the Verdugo-
Urquidez opinion and in some state decisions making the exclusion
of evidence turn on the reasonableness of a foreign search, mea-
sured by its compliance with the law of the location in which the
search occurred.466 Gaps could be filled by the Human Rights Con-
vention, even though the United States is not yet a party. 467
On the other hand, the central purposes of the exclusionary
rule may not be implicated by searches not conducted by U.S. offi-
cials in their official capacities. The rationale articulated by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. MoIlica468 is instructive. In
Mollica, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that constitutional
limitations of one sovereign apply only to activities of that sover-
eign's officers. 469 The court determined that its own constitutional
search and seizure protections did not limit the activities of the fed-
eral agents who obtained telephone toll records in a manner com-
plying with federal requirements but not complying with New Jersey
requirements. 470 It found the federal-state question analogous to
the treatment accorded officers of a foreign country, "who, in the
exercise of their own government's authority, are not subject to the
federal constitution." 471 State constitutional limitations that are not
applied to private citizens are not applied to officers of a foreign
465. Bentley, supra note 434, at 335-60, 387-97 (1994) (evaluating competing
approaches from opinions in Verdugo-Urquidez and suggesting new "international
Fourth Amendment" based on combination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard and article 17 and 9(1) of International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
466. See Dillon v. State, 844 S.W.2d 139, 143-44 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that
search and seizure conducted by federal agents in Florida was valid so long as
agents conformed with federal law) (citing State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315 (N.J.
1989)), cert. denied, Dillon v. Tennessee, 507 U.S. 988 (1995).
467. See Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 800 (D. Kan. 1980) (basing
resolution of habeas corpus petition in part upon international norms of human
rights, and, consequently, limiting arbitrary detention).
468. 554 A.2d 1315 (N.J. 1989).
469. Id. at 1324.
470. Id. at 1328.
471. Id. at 1325 (citing United States v. Calloway, 446 F.2d 753, 755 (3d Cir.
1971) (upholding admission of evidence obtained by Canadian police even
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jurisdiction.472 The "silver platter" doctrine, used to implicate
American constitutional standards when foreign agents seize infor-
mation abroad under the direction of American authorities, is
based on the presence of agency between officers of the two sover-
eigns.473 The court stated:
In determining the validity of a search and seizure
conducted by officers of another jurisdiction, the critical
assumption that obviates the application of the state con-
stitution is that the state's constitutional goals will not
thereby be compromised ....
None of these constitutional values, however, is genu-
inely threatened by a search and seizure of evidence, con-
ducted by the officers of another jurisdiction under the
authority and in conformity with the law of their own juris-
diction, that is totally independent of our own govern-
ment officers. Thus, in that context, no purpose of
deterrence relating to the conduct of state officials is frus-
trated, because it is only the conduct of another jurisdic-
tion's officials that is involved. Judicial integrity is not
imperiled because there has been no misuse or perversion
ofjudicial process. 474 The NewJersey court did find some
cases, however, suggesting the application of choice of law
factors in deciding whether the forum state should apply
the other state's search and seizure law. 475
Regardless of whether evidence obtained from an unofficial
search and seizure outside U.S. territory would be excluded in a
U.S. criminal prosecution, a U.S. officer could be prosecuted-bya
foreign country for conducting an unauthorized search and seizure
there, based on the criminal law of that country. Whether a foreign
private damages action could succeed against the U.S. officer de-
pends on the civil or common law of that country. It also is conceiv-
able that the foreign person harmed by such a search could
472. Id.
473. Id. at 1326 (citing People v. Touhy, 197 N.E. 849, 857 (Ill. 1935) (deny-
ing suppression of evidence seized by Wisconsin police)); see also Young v. Com-
monwealth, 313 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Ky. 1958) (citing Kaufman v. State, 225 S.W.2d
75 (Tenn. 1949) (admitting evidence in Kentucky seized by Missouri officers even
though seizure contravened both Kentucky and Missouri constitutions)).
474. Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1328 (citations omitted).
475. Id. at 1326 n.6 (citing People v. Orlosky, 115 Cal. Rptr. 598, 601 (Ct.
App. 1974); People v. Saiken, 275 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ill. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1066 (1972); Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 934 (1969)).
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successfully maintain an action against the U.S. officer brought in
an American court.476 Whether such an action could succeed de-
pends on whether a federal right can be shown to have been vio-
lated, and whether the foreign person would have standing in a
section 1983 action. Both propositions are questionable under
Verdugo-Urquidez, which undercuts the two elements of a section
1983 action by eliminating the Fourth Amendment protection in
such a situation.
Whether an American common law action for damages-tres-
pass or conversion, and possibly invasion of privacy-could be
maintained depends on personal jurisdiction and choice of law,
under the rules reviewed earlier. If the search were conducted in a
foreign country by a U.S. officer, the person victimized by the
search should have little difficulty filing suit in a U.S. court, and the
U.S. court should have little difficulty obtaining personal jurisdic-
tion over the U.S. officer conducting the search. On the other
hand, it might be quite difficult for a U.S. citizen victimized by a
foreign search to obtain personal jurisdiction in a U.S. court over
the foreign officers conducting the search. Additionally, sovereign
immunity should not be a problem because the assumption is that
the search was unauthorized and thus outside the scope of any sov-
ereign immunity.477
Assuming personal jurisdiction could be obtained, whether an
American common law damages doctrine would apply depends on
choice of law rules. All of the pertinent legal theories for damages
here would be tort theories, and the traditional choice of law rule
for torts is lex locus delicti. Application of this traditional rule would
mean that the law of the place where the search occurred would be
applied. That means U.S. law in the case of the U.S. search, but
foreign law in the case of a foreign search. Modem choice of law
rules, however, engage a more flexible interests analysis. Interest
analysis is likely to focus on the law of the place where the search
occurred, significantly mitigated by the interest of the other juris-
diction in successfully prosecuting crimes committed there.
VIII. NEW LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
New public and private legal institutions are likely to be cre-
ated, or at least considered, to respond to the jurisdictional chal-
lenges of the GII. Private institutional development, particularly
476. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
477. Of course a good faith exception might extend the immunity beyond the
scope of actual authority.
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arbitration, is probably the best response for civil disputes, but pub-
lic institutional development may be necessary for criminal matters.
These options are outlined below.
A. Arbitration
The best means for reducing uncertainty with respect to per-
sonal jurisdiction, choice of law and venue in civil cases is to use
international arbitration. Arbitration is a dispute resolution pro-
cess in which a binding decision is made by one or more private
individuals under an agreement entered into by the disputants.
The availability of arbitration thus depends upon the existence of
an arbitration agreement, either entered into in advance for a class
of disputes, or entered into after a particular dispute has arisen,
limited to that dispute.
The legal position of arbitration depends on the willingness of
regular courts to channel disputes to the arbitration forum when
one of the parties tries to present them to another forum, and on
the willingness of the regular courts to enforce an arbitration
award. The first type of relationship between arbitration and the
regular courts is frequently referred to as enforcement of the arbi-
tration agreement or "compelling arbitration."478 The criteria for
compelling arbitration and for enforcing arbitration awards are
similar, because award enforcement is a subset of arbitration agree-
ment enforcement; when one enters into an arbitration agreement,
one agrees either expressly or impliedly to comply with the award.
Because the power of an arbitrator is contractual, parties are
obligated to arbitrate and to obey arbitration awards, but only when
the dispute is within the scope of a valid agreement.479 Deciding
whether a dispute is within a valid arbitration agreement presents
the question of substantive arbitrability. 480 Conceptually, there is
no doubt that the question of substantive arbitrability is ultimately
for a traditional court to decide,481 although courts must defer to
478. See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lauer, 49 F.3d
323, 327 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that party cannot seek to narrow arbitration by
suing in district other than district where arbitration is occurring and applying § 4
of Federal Arbitration Act and generally reviewing law under which one sues to
compel arbitration).
479. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic Network
Communities, 38 VILL. L. REv. 349 (1993) (exploring difficulty of designing private
governance mechanisms that encompass disputes involving third parties, not signa-
tory to contracts defining mechanism).
480. Alternatively, procedural arbitrability is the question whether appropri-
ate procedures have been followed in presenting the dispute to the arbitrator.
481. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649
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arbitral decisions on questions of substantive arbitrability when the
agreement contemplates arbitrator decisions on those questions.482
If a dispute is substantively arbitrable, the parties to the arbitra-
tion agreement are obligated to use the arbitration process and
through that agreement are considered to have waived any legal
power to present the dispute to a regular court instead of arbitra-
tion.483 Once disputes have been arbitrated and the arbitrator has
issued an award, that award is enforceable, either in a breach of
contract action seeking specific performance of the arbitration
agreement or in a summary proceeding under an arbitration award
enforcement statute.48 4 The basic legal framework for arbitration is
the same regardless of whether the arbitration is purely domestic or
whether it is international. 485 Until recently, certain statutory
(1986) (stating that courts have ultimate say on whether dispute is substantively
arbitrable).
482. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1995)
(holding that court "should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator" when par-
ties agreed "to submit the arbitratibility question itself to arbitration").
483. See9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (stating when federal court has power to compel
arbitration); UNIFORM ARBITRATION AcT (UAA) § 2, 7 U.LA. 68 (1985) (granting
same power to state courts to order parties to continue arbitration); Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10, 1958,
art. II, para. 3, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter New York Arbi-
tration Convention] (requiring courts of contracting states to refer arbitrable
agreement to arbitration as long as they find arbitration agreements to be valid);
see also Howard Fields & Assocs. v. Grand Wailea Co., 848 F. Supp. 890, 892-95, 899
(D. Haw. 1993) (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468
(1989)) (staying federal court litigation pending arbitration; explaining relation-
ship between Federal Arbitration Act and state arbitration law, acknowledging that
Volt allows choice of law provision in arbitration agreement to apply state arbitra-
tion law rather than federal arbitration agreement law).
484. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10 (1994) (authorizing federal court enforcement of
award if parties have so provided in their agreement and requiring enforcement
unless it can be shown that: (1) award was procured by corruption, fraud or un-
due means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in arbitrators; (3)
where arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone hearing or in
refusing to hear pertinent evidence; or (4) where arbitrators exceeded their
power); UAA, supra note 483, §§ 8, 12 (similar power and criteria for state courts);
New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 483, art. III (providing for enforce-
ment of arbitration awards); id. art. V, para. 1 (allowing for refusal of enforcement
of arbitration award only if: (1) agreement was invalid; (2) party seeking to avoid
enforcement was not given appropriate notice; (3) award is outside scope of arbi-
tration agreement; (4) composition of arbitral body was in violation of agreement
or law of country where arbitration took place; or (5) award has not yet become
binding or has been set aside by competent authority where award was made); id.
art. V, para. 2 (allowing for refusal of enforcement if law of country where enforce-
ment is sought does not allow that type of dispute to be arbitrated because enforce-
ment would be contrary to public policy of that country).
485. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1994) (providing for enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards under New York Convention in accordance with criteria
and procedures generally applicable to domestic arbitration); accord, Jain v. de
Wr6, 51 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir.) (ordering arbitration between non-citizens
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claims were not arbitrable as a matter of public policy in the United
States, but the Supreme Court has significantly relaxed this doc-
trine. Now, it is reasonable tO presume that almost any subject mat-
ter can be arbitrable, at least if the arbitration agreement clearly
manifests an intent to make it arbitrable. 486
Assuming that there are no artificial limitations on the types of
claims that may be arbitrated, arbitration offers important advan-
tages in the GII context. One advantage is that arbitrators can be
selected,4 7 and arbitration procedures and choice of law can be
specified in the arbitration agreement to suit the nature of claims
arising in the GII better than regular judicial procedure and gener-
alistjudges. A second advantage, given the transnational character
of many GII transactions, is that the New York Arbitration Conven-
tion provides greater certainty as to the enforceability of interna-
tional arbitration awards than is available with respect to the
enforceability of the judgments of regular courts under an MLAT.
Arbitration facially implicates decisionmaker expertise, choice of
law and decision enforcement advantages. Additionally, signing a
forum-selection clause leading to arbitration waives objections both
to personal jurisdiction and to venue. 488 Finally, arbitrators usually
can be given authority to award a variety of remedies, including pu-
nitive damages.489
under agreement providing for application of French law), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
300 (1995).
486. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1991)
(allowing arbitration of age discrimination claims under individual employment
agreement); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 625 (1985) (rejecting presumption against arbitration of statutory claims and
finding antitrust disputes to be arbitrable); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506 (1974) (concluding that international arbitration agreement may provide for
binding arbitration of statutory securities law claim). But seeWolf v. Gruntal & Co.,
45 F.3d 524, 529 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that arbitrator lacked jurisdiction over
federal securities law claim because not explicitly submitted in writing and there-
fore award had no res judicata effect in subsequent court litigation).
487. One distinguished commentator, recognizing the advantages of institu-
tional arbitration, as under the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber
of Commerce in Paris, suggests the establishment of a single world-wide institu-
tion, privately created and administered that would improve institutional interna-
tional arbitration. Smit, supra note 357, at 9.
488. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1972) (stat-
ing that freely negotiated forum-selection clauses should be given full effect, re-
gardless of jurisdictional or venue objections, because such clauses are
"indispensible" to international contracting and represent manifestation of par-
ties' intent).
489. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212,
1217-19 (1995) (determining that contract allowed arbitrator of dispute between
securities brokerage and customers to award punitive damages). According to the
Court, the choice of law provision pointing to New York law did not require appli-
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Realizing the advantages of arbitration requires the parties to
understand and to specify, where appropriate, the choice of proce-
dure and choice of substantive law for their arbitrations. In gen-
eral, arbitration procedure is entirely a creature of the arbitration
agreement. Thus, whether discovery is permitted, or whether fact
or notice pleading is to be utilized, and the applicability of different
rules of evidence, all are matters to be defined by the parties in
their arbitration agreement. They may incorporate by reference
rules of procedure issued by various bodies sponsoring arbitration
such as the American Arbitration Association, the International
Chamber of Commerce or the UN Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 490
Choice of substantive, law historically has been a bit trickier,
although there is early authority for party autonomy, meaning the
notion that the party should be entirely free to choose the substan-
tive law to be applied. 491 Indeed, there is a growing trend to allow
arbitrators to refer to general commercial law without the necessity
of finding any roots in the issuances of national legal institutions.
This amounts to an endorsement of lex mercatoria in the arbitration
context.492 The only reason that an express reference to lex mer-
catoria or any other source of private law should not be permissible
is a positivist theory of law, which denies the efficacy of any source
of law other than a conventional legislature or court.
Private dispute resolution offers significant advantages for deal-
ing with disputes that arise in cyberspace. Through private dispute
resolution arrangements such as contractual arbitration, disputants
cation of the New York doctrine against punitive damages by arbitrator because
that was procedural and conflicted with the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. For an in-
depth analysis of punitive damages in arbitration cases, see John Y. Gotanda,
Awarding Punitive Damages in International Commercial Arbitrations in Wake of Mas-
trobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming
1996).
490. See American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules, art.
20 (1995) (evidence); id. art. 24 (1995) (default provision); UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules, art. 24-25 (1976) (evidence and hearings); id. art. 28 (1976) (default);
International Chamber of Commerce, art. 24 (1975) (finality and enforceability of
award).
491. See generally OEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 107-08 (1994). But see Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. Unus
Shipping Co., [1939] App. Cas. 277, 290 (holding that choice of law may be disre-
garded if choice is not bona fide where there is public policy ground for avoiding
it).
492. See Hutton v. Warren 150 Eng. Rep. 517 (M &W 1838) (endorsing use of
extrinsic evidence of custom and usage in disputes over commercial transactions);
CHUKWUMERIJE, supra note 491, at 110-17 (discussing sources of law within lex mer-
catoria, including those of UNCITRAL and International Institute for the Unifica-
tion of International Private Law (UNIDROIT)).
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can provide in advance a channel for submission and resolution of
a defined class of disputes. They can agree on specialized deci-
sionmakers, as in labor, complex commercial, construction and in-
ternational arbitration, selected from panels of pre-screened
individuals. They can specify the procedure to be used, including
the details of pleading; the possibility of summary resolution on the
pleadings or before a hearing; how discovery, if any, will work; how
cases are to be presented to the decisionmaker; what the deci-
sionmaker may consider; limitations on how long the process can
take; the form of the decision; and remedies. Additionally, they can
allocate costs, providing for prepayment of all or some of the cost
by one or both parties. They can, to some degree, also allocate
decisionmaking responsibility between the private decisionmaker
and an enforcing or reviewing court as to the scope (subject matter
jurisdiction) of the private forum.
Private dispute resolution such as arbitration offers advantages
over traditional government-sponsored dispute resolution because
private institutional arrangement can employ whatever modes of
communication and recordkeeping the parties wish. For example,
there is no legal impediment to writing an arbitration agreement
providing that everything, including the hearing itself, be con-
ducted remotely through computer networks. Domestically, under
the Federal Arbitration Act,49 3 and under the Uniform Arbitration
Act, federal and state courts are obligated to enforce arbitration
decisions reached without corruption and within the scope of the
arbitration agreement without inquiry into the merits of the under-
lying dispute. 494
Arbitration also offers significant advantages in the interna-
tional context. The United States is not a signatory to any treaty
that provides for enforcement of civil money judgments across in-
ternational boundaries. While the common law doctrine of comity
and the enactment of the Uniform Recognition Act 495 by about half
the states, provide a vehicle for enforcing foreign judgments in
some circumstances, the prospect of obtaining practical relief
through a civil judgment in an international dispute is uncertain.
On the other hand, the United States and most other developed
493. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
494. The Uniform Arbitration Act allows a court to vacate an arbitration deci-
sion only in rare circumstances. Id. § 10 (listing grounds for order vacating deci-
sion: fraud, corruption, arbitrator misconduct and instances where arbitrator
exceeded his or her power).
495. See UNIFoml REcoGNrrIoN AcT, supra note 275, at 263.
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countries are parties to the New York Convention. 496 Under this
convention, the courts of the signatories are obligated to enforce
international arbitration awards with only the most limited grounds
for declining enforcement. Thus, parties to international cyber-
space transactions can greatly increase the certainty of dispute reso-
lution by entering into an international arbitration agreement.
Of course, private dispute resolution, as described in this pa-
per, is a contractual matter. A third party, for instance in a tort
context, cannot be obligated to arbitrate under an agreement be-
tween two others. Nevertheless, this limitation may be more appar-
ent than real in cyberspace. For one thing, the purported third
party actually may be a party to contract terms specified in advance
by service providers, much as the America Online terms of service
constitute the contents of the contract between America Online
and a subscriber. There is no reason that the same idea cannot
work in a less commercial context, as when a World Wide Web
server specifies "terms of service" on a Web page and makes it clear
that a user of that page agrees to be bound by those terms of ser-
vice. Such terms of service can provide for arbitration. While a
consumer might seek to avoid the conclusion that she is a party to
the contract on the grounds that she had no bargaining power or
did not have actual knowledge of the announced terms, existing
case law-both substantive contract and forum selection law-dis-
favors such arguments. Moreover, even if a third party were not
bound to submit a dispute to arbitration, the arbitration arrange-
ment could include a mechanism for making the arbitration forum
available on a voluntary basis to the third party. If the arbitration
alternative were perceived as fair, cheap and quick, many third par-
ties would resort to it instead of going to court.
It is appropriate for those interested in the healthy develop-
ment of cyberspace to begin putting some of these ideas into prac-
tice. In particular, it is practical to define a class of intellectual
property, personal privacy and consumer protection (and possibly
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress or inten-
tional interference with contract) disputes that would be within the
scope of a particular arbitration mechanism. Also, interested per-
sons can begin drafting a master or model arbitration agreement,
defining how the procedure would work, including all of those pro-
cedural elements identified above. In particular, the drafters can
. 496. MJ. BoWMAN & DJ. HARIs, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CUR-
RENT STATUS 230-31 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (indicating 95 parties to New York Con-
vention, including U.S., France, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany and Canada).
1996]
99
Perritt: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
explain in some detail how these procedural elements would be ac-
commodated through electronic networking.
A comprehensive arbitration' agreement for cyberspace dis-
putes should include prominent notice to third parties with clear
procedures for allowing them to opt into the arbitration mecha-
nism. In so doing, the best features of Magnuson-Moss 497 con-
sumer arbitration could be used, and the worst features avoided.498
B. United States Court for Cyberspace
To solve the third party problem inherent in arbitration, most
mechanisms rely on finding some kind of contractual obligation to
participate in arbitration. Of course, this can arise after the third
party is involved in a dispute under the incentives discussed above.
Alternatively, a person appearing to be a third party actually may be
a second party in the sense that he or she may have consented to
arbitrate by the mere act of entering cyberspace. Both of these the-
ories for dealing with tort claims, however, are limited. The former
is limited by the willingness of the disputant to submit to arbitra-
tion. The second is limited by the persuasiveness of the implied
contract formation against a reluctant disputant, and by the exis-
tance of a "notice of consent to arbritrate" on the Internet.
Another, admittedly more speculative, possibility is for the U.S.
Congress to reinvigorate the idea of extraterritorial domicile, used
most notably in the operation of the United States Court for
China.499 The Congress could enact legislation setting up a
"United States District Court for the District of Cyberspace," which
would have jurisdiction for all claims arising in cyberspace over any-
one entering cyberspace. There are at least three problems with
this approach, however. First, the jurisdiction of the United States
Court for China was based on U.S. citizenship rather than on mere
physical presence in China.500 Second, to the extent that cyber-
497. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1994) (providing consumers with option to re-
sort to informal dispute settlement procedures for consumer complaints).
498. Craig v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., No. 94-5372, 1995 WL 380072, at *3
(E.D. Pa. June 26, 1995) (awarding attorney's fees for successful arbitration under
Magnuson-Moss Act); Lipham v. General Motors Corp., 665 So.2d 190, 192 (Ala.
1995) (filing lawsuit after nonbinding Magnuson-Moss arbitration failed).
499. See David J. Bederman, Extraterritorial Domicile and the Constitution, 28 VA.
J. Irrr'L L. 451, 460-70 (1988) (discussing United States Court for China). The
author appreciates the suggestion from David Straite, Villanova Law School Class
of 1996, which led to this analysis.
500. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, §§ 2, 4, 34 Stat. 814; see also Bederman,
supra note 499, at 462 & n.50 (noting that "the Court for China operated like any
other federal district court in the United States," except that its jurisdiction was
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space extends far beyond U.S. borders, the U.S. Congress lacks ju-
risdiction to prescribe under international law.501 Third, entry into
cyberspace is an amorphous concept, and no doubt would engen-
der innumerable disputes as to whether venue is appropriate in the
new cyberspace court or in a regular district or state court.
Implementation of a United States Court for Cyberspace would
differ somewhat depending on whether its jurisdiction was strictly
national. If the court had only national jurisdiction, it would be
available for claims, for example, by citizens of Vermont against citi-
zens of Florida involving Internet communication moving through
servers in Virginia, Missouri and Oregon. Absent some new forum,
priviate or statutory, such a dispute might be litigated in state or
federal court in Vermont, Florida or any of the states involved, with
the attendant uncertainty and inconvenience. To reduce such
problems, the Congress could establish a new Article III court50 2
with removal jurisdiction over any claims arising in cyberspace.
The Seventh Amendment entitlement to jury trial in civil
cases 503 is a potentially serious problem, but at least for initial con-
sideration, juries should be allowed and they could be "cyber-ju-
ries."50 4 The new court would have its own procedure that would
be entirely electronic. Obviously, this would necessitate develop-
ment of an entirely new set of procedural rules, although the basic
attributes of procedure familiar under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure could be adapted reasonably easily to the electronic con-
text, including electronic filing, electronic service, with an e-mail
return receipt used for proof of service, electronic interrogatories,
production of documents, and requests for admission, electronic
pre-trial orders, electronic hearings and electronic judgments. The
only procedural features not easily accommodated by current
modes of Internet communication are oral depositions and live
limited to "civil cases against American citizens residing in China .. .and ...
crimes committed by its citizens residing there").
501. But cf. Dainese v. Hale, 91 U.S. 13, 15 (1875) (holding consular jurisdic-
tion constitutional in "Pagan and Mahometan countries" provided that such juris-
diction is created pursuant to treaty and U.S. law); see also Bederman, supra note
499, at 461 (noting that extraterritorial judicial authority was found
constitutional).
502. An Article I court also could be established, but would be less useful
because it could not be given jurisdiction over private disputes such as defamation
and invasion of privacy likely to arise in cyberspace. See Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
503. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, .. . the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved ....").
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presentations of witnesses. While these could be done by video con-
ferencing, a procedure limited to currently available applications
on the Internet simply could dispense with them. 50 5
In effect, then, the United States Court for Cyberspace would
be a new alternative forum that could be elected by either party to a
cyberspace dispute and would substitute electronic procedure for a
conventional procedure. No doubt, privately developed processes
are superior, and a statute establishing the new court could contain
placatory language encouraging parties to submit to privately devel-
oped arbitration following the Virtual Magistrate model. Indeed, a
new version of Rule 12 could emphasize party consideration of such
alternatives.
In the international context, the notion of a congressionally
established cyber-court becomes more difficult and much more
controversial. These paragraphs sketch the most ambitious possibil-
ity as a starting point for further analysis and discussion. The Con-
gress would enact a statute establishing a United States Court for
Cyberspace having jurisdiction over all disputes arising in cyber-
space in which one of the parties is a U.S. citizen or in which either
party elects to litigate in the new court. Of course, merely because
Congress gives a new tribunal jurisdiction does not necessarily oust
foreign courts of jurisdiction, and one could expect continuing
controversy over whether judgments of the cyber-court would be
recognized by foreign courts.
The international acceptability of the new court could be in-
creased by appointing foreign judges to it, rather like the constitu-
tional court of Bosnia. If the new court is to have Article III powers
as a matter of American constitutional law, all of its judges must
have life tenure and be subject to Senate confirmation.50 6 On the
other hand, there is nothing on the face of Article III that fore-
closes appointment of foreign citizens to judicial positions.50 7
What superficially appears to be an extraordinary extraterrito-
rial assertion of U.S. power could be made more acceptable by em-
phasizing that the new court is meant simply to fill the gap left by
the inability of international arbitration to bind third parties, and
505. Whether there would be procedural due process or Seventh Amend-
ment problems presents interesting questions for further analysis.
506. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and infer-
ior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... Courts considered
to be territorial courts (or "legislative courts"), however, have as their source of
authority Article IV, § 3, not Article III, and the judges would not have life tenure.
United States v. Starling, 171 F. Supp. 47, 49, 54 (D. Alaska 1959).
507. Obviously, this matter deserves further analysis and consideration.
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the absence of other international mechanisms. The Congress
could commit itself to abolish the new court at such time as interna-
tional machinery is established under U.N. auspices or otherwise.
Of course, if the court were to be abolished, the foreign judges still
would enjoy the right to receive their salaries, assuming the court is
an Article III court. While the questions ofjudicial tenure, interna-
tional acceptability and jury accommodation are certainly seri-
ous, 508 a U.S. Court for Cyberspace, tailored to the realities of the
GII, almost completely vitiates the personal jurisdiction problems
discussed above. This advantage, combined with the benefit of hav-
ing at least some judges who would acquire a sophisticated under-
standing of the nature of cyberspace disputes, makes a cyber-court,
especially domestically, an interesting possibility worth pursuing
further.
C. Development and Application of Private Rules for the GII
Choice of law includes more possibilities than just the law of
different states or nations; increasingly, contracting parties, litigants
and courts recognize that private bodies of law are worthy of consid-
eration in choice of law analysis. This is particularly true in interna-
tional arbitration. Legal disputes arising in the GII almost certainly
will involve specialized substantive legal principles. There are a va-
riety of ways in which these principles can be brought to bear in
cases decided by arbitrators and judges, but perhaps the most gen-
eral way is through lex mercatoria.50 9 The principle of lex mercatoria
has its roots in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Europe,
and represents the customary law of the trade fair. In recent years,
after a period of diminished legitimacy,510 lex mercatoria has again
become attractive as a body of general commercial law to be ap-
plied to international disputes, especially in disputes heard by
508. Additionally, choice of law becomes increasingly difficult under the ru-
bric of Erie because cyberspace does not lie in any particular state from which sub-
stantive law can be drawn.
509. See CHUKWUMERIJE, supra note 491, at 110-14 (discussing evolution of lex
mercatoria from Middle Ages to present).
510. There are both English and American cases which limit lex mercatoria. See
National Metro. Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945) (holding that
federal statutes supersede law of merchant); President & Directors of Manhattan
Co. v. Morgan, 150 N.E. 594, 598 (N.Y. 1926) (holding that applicable statutes for
negotiable instruments override law of merchants); Pan Ad. Ins. Co. v. Pine Top
Ins. Co., 3 All E.R. 581, 582-83 (1994) (stating that 1906 statute supplants law of
merchants); Container Transp. Int'l Inc. v. Oceanus Mut. Underwriting Ass'n,
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arbitrators. 511
Despite the lower probability that lex mercatoria explicitly would
be applied by an American court hearing a purely domestic dispute
or by an arbitrator hearing a purely domestic dispute, the doctrine
illustrates generally the variety of sources of customary law that are
available. Other concrete possibilities include treaties, at least
when they have been ratified by most nations; model statutes, at
least when they have been widely adopted by legislatures; and stan-
dards of good practice adopted by trade bodies.512 Beyond that,
expert testimony can flesh out generally accepted custom. Thus, ex
mercatoria is not conceptually all that different from the use of trade
custom to interpret contract provisions. Indeed, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code specifically allows the use of trade custom and the law
merchant to interpret commercial contracts.513 Lex mercatoria also
is recognized as a source of commercial law transcending narrower
national concepts. 514 It is well recognized that almost any legal text
requires some interpretation when it is being applied, and that ex-
trinsic evidence is useful in the interpretation process.
Cyberspace needs an appropriate set of substantive doctrines
to be applied by arbitrators or others under the lex mercatoria um-
brella. For those interested in developing specialized rules for the
GII, much can be done by getting interested persons together and
writing model statutes and codes of good practice. Existing mecha-
nisms like the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws can be used,
or ad hoc forums can be assembled. Such efforts, however, must
manage a variety of tensions successfully if they are to influence
dispute resolution. First, the broader the scope of the group that
agrees to a set of rules or principles, the more influential the rules
511. CHUKWUMERIJE, supra note 491, at 114-15.
512. Id. at 112-13 (explaining sources of customs, usages and uniform law of
international trade).
513. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995) (indicating that law merchant will be used to sup-
plement U.C.C. provisions unless specific U.C.C. provision controls).
514. One of the best examples is Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 982 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1992), in which the court of appeals explained the
concept of a letter of credit and its origins in the lex mercatoria as internalized into
English common law by Lord Mansfield. Id. at 816. The relations between the
beneficiary and issuer of letters of credit are to be determined largely by lex mer-
catoria as expressed in the uniform customs and practices for documentary credits
(UCP) even though it is not "law." Id.; see also Pribus v. Bush, 173 Cal. Rptr. 747,
749 & n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (relying on lex mercatoria to fill in gaps in U.C.C. as
to whether endorsement of promissory note effectuated on separate piece of paper
was effective to negotiate note and reviewing history of lex mercatoria, or common
law of merchants); Mirabile v. Udoh, 399 N.Y.S.2d 869, 870-71 (Civ. Ct. 1977) (re-
lying on lex mercatoria to enforce payment of money order by issuing bank even
though payment had been stopped and maker's money refunded).
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or principles are likely to be. But the broader the group, the more
difficult forming consensus will be. Second, the more specific the
rules or policies, the more likely they will be outcome determina-
tive. Yet increased specificity creates the likelihood that a particular
dispute will be outside the scope of the rules, and forming a con-
sensus will be more difficult. Nevertheless, struggling with these
tensions is something that legislators and mediators do all the time,
and thus the effort may be worthwhile if there is widespread con-
cern about the inappropriateness of existing legal doctrine or
about uncertainty because existing legal doctrines are very general.
The same initial drafting efforts can serve a number of differ-
ent purposes. They can conclude with a private code of good prac-
tice to be applied by arbitrators. As another possibility, they may
serve as the initial stages of an effort to write an international code
of computer crimes. Or, they can provide the initial stages of an
effort to write a model statute covering civil and criminal wrongs, to
be adopted by national jurisdictions. Such a preliminary private
drafting effort need not distinguish at the outset between civil and
criminal liability. Instead, the drafters should concentrate on iden-
tifying subject matter within the scope of the code, identifying spe-
cific rights, duties and privileges, and deciding only at the end of
the process where criminal, as opposed to civil, liability is
appropriate.
Harmonization in some substantive areas will be easier than in
others. There should be little difficulty in agreeing to define as
wrongful515 conduct covered in the Federal Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act 51 6 because few legitimate interests are adversely affected
by civil actions or criminal prosecutions for such conduct. Com-
puter terrorism 517 and large-scale international computer financial
fraud would fall within the subjects defined by this Act. The area
that would probably be next in order of difficulty is intellectual
property infringement, not because the controversies over interme-
diary liability are insubstantial, but because substahtial harmoniza-
tion has already occurred through the GATT Uruguay Round
negotiations. Next may be access and disclosure violative of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).58 -Here, the diffi-
culty will be not with unauthorized access, which significantly over-
515. "Wrongful" in the sense used in the text includes both crimes and civil
wrongs such as torts and breaches of contract.
516. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
517. For a further discussion of international computer terrorism, see appen-
dix, infra notes 536-82 and accompanying text.
518. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 2701-11 (1994).
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laps the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, but with disclosure by
service providers. Nevertheless, because ECPA allows substantial
room for a private contract, it may be feasible to agree on a frame-
work like ECPA. Defamation, on the other hand, may not be a
source of difficultly because the basic principles for defamation are
widely accepted. The standards for intermediary liability, of course,
will be much more difficult, as they are even within the United
States. Finally, database privacy will be complicated, because of the
significant differences between the European Union Directive and
U.S. law.519 Nevertheless, the need for some degree of harmoniza-
tion to facilitate trade between the European Union and other
countries may make this not entirely beyond reach.
D. International Courts
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is actually an arbitra-
tion body, whose jurisdiction is limited to disputes between nation-
als. Some scholars have suggested initiatives to improve its
institutional framework for dealing with a broader range of interna-
tional legal disputes. 520 Moreover, at least one commentator has
suggested giving the ICJ jurisdiction over international crimes and
over state crimes where fugitives have crossed state borders.521
Currently, an International Criminal Court is being discussed
under U.N. auspices.52 2 The world could deal with criminal con-
519. For a discussion of the European Union Directive, see Rosario Imperiali
d'Afflitto, European Union Directive on Personal Privacy Rights and Computerized Infor-
mation, 41 VILL. L. REv. 305 (1996); Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated
Effectively on a National Level? Thoughts on the Possible Need for International Privacy
Rules, 41 VILL. L. REv. 129 (1996); Charles R. McManis, Taking TRIPS on the Infor-
mation Superhighway: International Intellectual Property Protection for Emerging Computer
Technology, 41 VILL. L. REv. 207 (1996). Additionally, I foresee harmonization of
obscenity law being just as difficult, if not more so.
520. SeeJohn H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for
a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 547, 560 (1993). Barton and Carter suggest the follow-
ing: the consideration of a GATT Antitrust Code; binding arbitration in NAFrA;
making the judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) enforceable in
domestic courts as are arbitration awards under the New York Convention; more
flexible procedures for the ICJ; further elaboration of an international common
law; acceptance by the United States that rights recognized by the U.S. Constitu-
tion or International Human Rights Convention govern the U.S. government
when it acts abroad; and the acceptance by the United States that international
treaties and executive agreements can be enforced by U.S. domestic courts. Id. at
550, 560-61.
521. See BARBARA M. YARNOLD, INTERNATIONAL FUGrrIvEs: A NEW ROLE FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 105 (1991).
522. See Madeleine K. Albright, International Law Approaches the Twenty-First
Century: A U.S. Perspective on Enforcement, 18 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1595, 1605 (1995)
(reporting Clinton administration interest in International Criminal Court propo-
sal); American Bar Association, American Bar Association Task Force on an Interna-
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duct in the GII by bringing certain types of electronic piracy and
computer crimes within the jurisdiction of the court. In addition,
problems of international search and seizure, as when the evidence
pertinent to a crime in one country is contained on a network
server located in another country, can be addressed by broader
adoption of legal assistance treaties on the model suggested by the
U.N. draft treaty. Extradition treaties need to be modernized as
well to include computer crimes within enumerated extraditable
offenses. 523
For this to be a practicable solution, however, computer crimes
must be perceived as sufficiently serious to warrant their inclusion
in international documents and institutional jurisdictions which
heretofore focused primarily on war crimes and terrorism. Certain
computer crimes, such as terrorism by means of computer,52 4 or
crimes involving computerized financial transactions, might be an
appropriate starting point. Moreover, there is a need for further
harmonization of substantive criminal law concepts pertaining to
computer crimes, both to make transnational jurisdiction over com-
puter crimes acceptable for new international bodies, and to satisfy
the dual criminality requirements of both extradition and legal
assistance treaties.
Politics is important in determining which alternative will be
selected. It is, therefore, useful to assess the likely positions of dif-
ferent groups interested in the development of the GIl. In-
tional Criminal Court Final Report, 28 INT'L LAw. 475 (1994) (reporting on annual
meeting of ABA which adopted recommendation on International Criminal
Court); James Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court,
89 AM.J. INT'L L. 404 (1995) (reporting on basic parameters for draft statute devel-
oped by International Law Commission); Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders:
The Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
73 (1995) (criticizing analyses of objections to recommendation of permanent in-
ternational criminal court); Virginia Morris & M.-Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas,
The Work of the Sixth Committee at the Forty-Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly, 89
Am. J. INT'L L. 607, 613-14 (1995) (reporting on discussions of recommendation
for international criminal court and suggesting that concept might be ripe now for
negotiation of treaty establishing such court); Jelena Pejic, The International Crimi-
nal Court: Issues of Law and Political Will, 18 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1762, 1762 (1995)
(suggesting that international conference of plenipotentiaries may be convened to
draft convention on establishing international criminal court in late 1995).
523. But see Senate Hearings, supra note 434, at 4 (prepared statement of Allen
J. Kreczko) (noting advantages of dual criminality instead of enumerated-crimes
approach and specifically mentioning that dual criminality approach obviates need
to renegotiate treaties to include new offenses such as computer-related crimes).
524. Information technology might be the instrument of a terrorist threat
aimed at conventional property or person, or a computer system might be the
target, for example, if a terrorist threatened to disable or corrupt a system for
managing financial transactions. For a further discussion of the criminal arena,
see appendix, infra notes 536-82 and accompanying text.
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termediaries, frequently known as "system operators" or "sysops," in
the United States, almost always prefer to minimize the legal con-
trol of their activities. It is likely that they would oppose any new
initiative to develop new international or other machinery to en-
force legal obligations against participants in cyberspace. While
their real interest might be served by harmonizing and internation-
alizing the legal machinery, especially if it is done through private
mechanisms, it may be difficult to get them to understand their self
interests in this regard.
The proponents of new laws to restrict indecent material are
likely to oppose the loss of sovereignty they perceive to be associ-
ated with international machinery and are most likely to focus their
efforts to enact new legislation and to enlist the national prosecu-
tors at the local, state or (at most) national levels. Indeed, the only
group with significant political power likely to favor the establish-
ment of new machinery are content originators interested in reduc-
ing the incidence of intellectual property infringement. They
insisted on the inclusion of the Trade Related Intellectual Property
appendix in the Uruguay Round of GATT (TRIPS Agreement) ,525
and already have proposed stronger .international machinery to en-
force intellectual property rights. While they might support the
idea of international institutions with broad jurisdiction, they are
more likely to concentrate their efforts on specialized copyright en-
forcement machinery. Involving them in discussions over the pro-
posed international criminal court would be a useful step. Also,
broader support for internationalization of computer crimes might
be enlisted for initiatives involving financial computer crimes.
E. Harmonizing International Search and Seizure Law
The most obvious way to harmonize search and seizure law,
thus avoiding the kinds of problems described in The Cuckoo's
Egg,526 is to negotiate additional treaties, along the lines of the judi-
cial assistance treaties reviewed earlier in this Article, to countries
not presently covered by them, and making sure that computer
crimes are covered.52 7 This alternative would provide the greatest
certainty and the clearest channels for exercise of search and
seizure authority. On the other hand, the international treaty ne-
525. For a discussion of the TRIPS agreement, see McManis, supra note 519,
at 207.
526. CLIFFORD STOLL, THE CucKoo's EGO: TRACKING A Spy THROUGH THE
MAZE OF COMPUTER ESPIONAGE (1989). For a further discussion of The Cuckoo's Egg,
see supra note 430 and accompanying text.
527. Present U.S. policy is to expand mutual legal assistance treaties.
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gotiation process is slow and, because of differing positions of for-
eign countries, likely to have spotty effect. 528
An alternative, though far more controversial, approach would
be to exert raw power abroad. When U.S. authorities need evi-
dence from computer facilities located outside the United States,
they simply would go and get it. Under Verdugo-Urquidez, the exclu-
sionary rule would be inapplicable as long as the target of the
search was not a U.S. citizen or resident alien, and therefore the
evidence seized could be used in an American prosecution. 52 9 This
alternative is conceivable theoretically, 530 but represents bad for-
eign policy and allows law enforcement authorities to decide what
searches are appropriate. Nevertheless, brute force search and
seizure in the GIl context is not necessarily as intrusive or as expen-
sive as the brute force search and seizure in Verdugo-Urquidez and
some other notorious cases. It may be feasible in many instances
for computer evidence located abroad to be accessed remotely by
law enforcement authority. In some instances, the accessibility
would vitiate privacy concerns and thus remove the material from
search and seizure law all together. In other instances, some sub-
terfuge or circumvention of security measures might be involved
that arguably would be tantamount to a search if conducted under
domestic law. It is, therefore, appropriate to understand the legal
implications of a brute force search and seizure.
IX. RESPECTIVE ROLES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAw
Differing levels of effectiveness of criminal and civil justice in-
528. See Senate Hearings, supra note 434, at 7 (prepared statement of Allen J.
Kreczko) (explaining how some MLATs, such as ones in affect with Argentina,
Spain and Uruguay, provide very broad assistance because they do not have dual
criminality standards). On the other hand, the treaty with Jamaica contains a re-
quirement that a request make a minimum showing that a criminal offense has
been or is likely to be committed in any case in which criminal proceedings have
not been instituted, in order to discourage fishing expeditions and to conform
international assistance with Jamaican practice. Id.
529. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). For a discus-
sion of the Verdugo-Urquidez opinion, see supra notes 441-52 and accompanying
text.
530. While this approach might seem absurd, the Supreme Court has vali-
dated kidnapping of suspects in foreign territory, which represents a comparable
extension of U.S. power into the borders of a foreign sovereign. See generally Eliza-
beth McJimsey, Note, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: International Governmental
Abductions, 41 U. KAN. L. REv. 119 (1993) (discussing governmental abductions of
criminal suspects in Canada and Mexico, and reviewing implications of United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), which held that district court had
jurisdiction to try Mexican national who was kidnapped and brought to United
States and that extradition treaty did not provide exclusive procedure).
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stitutions call into question the location of the boundary between
civil and criminal law. Identifying matters that should fall within
the scope of international criminal law requires application of the
same policy considerations that influence national legislatures in
deciding to criminalize conduct that theretofore had been purely a
matter of contract, tort or private property. Ultimately, of course,
criminalization of conduct is an intensely political matter and polit-
ical decisionmaking is not always rational in the analytical sense.
Nevertheless, it is useful to identify the factors that suggest criminal-
ization. At the very least, they represent a framework within which
political debate can proceed. Conduct should be criminalized
when the costs of enforcing private rights infringed by that conduct
are so high that persons injured by the conduct will not, as a practi-
cal matter, pursue legal remedies. Additionally, criminalization is
appropriate when conductjeopardizes the security of political insti-
tutions or economic infrastructures.
The first criterion, the high cost of enforcing private rights,
can be subdivided into three elements: causation difficulties per-
sonal jurisdiction difficulties and difficulties enforcing judgments
against assets. Thus, vandalism to a worldwide financial network
would likely go unremedied if victims would have difficulty (1) es-
tablishing a causal link between their injury and the vandal's con-
duct, (2) establishing personal jurisdiction in courts convenient to
them and (3) enforcing civil judgments against assets belonging to
a vandal. In such a scenario, a strong case would exist for criminal-
izing the vandal's conduct.
The second criterion, risk to national or economic security, is
most controversial and difficult to define. Conduct infringing the
security of state institutions can be defined so broadly as to include
simple political criticism. Moreover, conduct that threatens the in-
stitutions of one state may advance the interests of another state.
Nevertheless, it is inevitable that nations will define as criminal cer-
tain conduct satisfying the first branch of this criterion, and thus
the criterion cannot be ignored in developing a list of international
crimes. The second branch of this criterion may engender less con-
troversy but is imprecise in its boundaries. The traditional interna-
tional crime of piracy warranted criminalization because it
threatened the economic infrastructure of maritime commerce. In-
ternational financial terrorism and large scale international finan-
cial fraud qualifies for criminalization on similar grounds. Beyond
that, conduct that threatens the digital communications infrastruc-
ture should qualify for criminalization. This includes damaging
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routing tables or flooding the Internet with packets so as to prevent
or to impede the movement of legitimate traffic. Moreover, such
conduct also satisfies the first criterion because the probable diffi-
culty of establishing causation with respect to individualized injury
and of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the actor represents
large transaction costs for enforcing private rights.
The vagueness of the criteria for criminalization substantially
mirrors the vagueness of the empirical dividing line between crimes
and civil wrongs.53' A pragmatic distinction between civil and crim-
inal justice is the most appropriate one for defining new interna-
tional crimes-and for explaining current definitions. Criminal
justice involves the expenditure of public resources on detection,
investigation, apprehension and prosecution; civil justice relies on
private resources for the same purposes. Criminal justice involves
incarceration as a potential remedy and justifies significant interfer-
ence with the liberty of the accused, pending trial; civil justice relies
upon economic sanctions. Criminal justice imposes penalties with-
out regard to proof of loss occasioned by the wrongful conduct;
civil justice (except for punitive damages) imposes economic sanc-
tions only to the extent necessary to compensate victims for proven
loss.
There is another alternative for responding to the dispute
characteristics that otherwise would justify criminalization: estab-
lish an administrative agency with enforcement power. Consider
consumer fraud, for example. It may be the case that someone
would fraudulently offer services or products through the GII. The
small amounts of money involved might make any particular de-
frauded consumer an unlikely plaintiff in a breach of contract or
fraudulent misrepresentation action, and the prospects of such a
civil action would be even less likely as the costs of litigation go up,
as they surely would given the personal jurisdiction, service of pro-
cess and choice of law problems discussed above. Practically speak-
ing, no rational actor would retain foreign counsel and sue in a
foreign court over a twenty-dollar fraud. Applicable class action
rules also may make it difficult or impossible to aggregate victims
into a feasible plaintiff class.
At the same time, however, criminalization may be unlikely, be-
cause the problem is not serious enough to warrant the attention of
policymakers in a wide variety of countries or because the details of
531. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct.
2552, 2557 (1994) (discussing ambiguous distinction between criminal and civil
contempt penalties for violating injunctions).
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the universal crime are difficult to agree on. In this situation, the
most appropriate institutional solution may be the establishment of
a specialized investigatory and enforcement institution authorized
to seek relief for victims or to seek sanctions against the wrongdoer,
or both. Such an institution could be public or private, national or
international. While one is tempted to think in terms of a federal
agency such as the Federal Trade Commission or a state agency
such as the consumer-fraud unit of a state attorney general's office,
many other possibilities exist. Just as private organizations modeled
on ASCAP and BMI can be useful to enforce copyright in cyber-
space,532 so also may such a private mechanism be appropriate to
police consumer fraud. Nor need such an institution be strictly na-
tional in character. It could be international, established under the
auspices of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (if
GATT is expanded to encompass consumer fraud in the services
area) or some entirely new arrangement.
The institution's functions could include suing on behalf of
one or more victims, 533 or it could have the authority to enforce
new duties established by statute.534 The institution could investi-
gate apparent wrongdoing through the tools available in civil proce-
dure, or it could exercise new investigatory powers granted by
statute. It would make appropriate contacts with foreign govern-
ments and courts to arrange for service of process and generally
prosecute the civil action. It similarly would undertake appropriate
action to enforce any judgment. If arbitration were available as a
forum, the institution could utilize arbitration just as it could utilize
litigation in the courts where the defendant or plaintiff is located.
Obviously, the point of such an arrangement is not to extend juris-
diction beyond what it otherwise would be or to tilt the criminaliza-
tion question one way or another. Rather, the purpose would be to
deal with the transaction costs of enforcement so as to create a real-
istic prospect of legal response to the wrongdoing.
X. CONCLUSION
The availability of new Internet technology does not automati-
cally change legal doctrine. It may, however, change the incidence
532. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property in Cyberspace, - U. Cm. LEGAL F.
(forthcoming 1996).
533. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 260.8 (West 1992) (granting Penn-
sylvania Secretary of Labor authority to institute prosecutions and actions for al-
leged violations of Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law).
534. New statutory duties obviously would require a higher level of interna-
tional agreement among governments.
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of cases falling on one side or the other of the lines drawn by legal
doctrine. This may, in turn, lead to changes in the law. Clearly,
World Wide Web technologies make it easier for someone to stay
outside a jurisdiction and do harm inside the jurisdiction. At the
same time, they also make it easier for the actor to remain relatively
passive and to rely on someone else, perhaps in the same jurisdic-
tion as the victim, to be the real cause of the victim's harm.
The technology does not change the likelihood that in-forum
assets will exist, although by facilitating remote action, it may actu-
ally decrease the percentage of controversies in which in-forum as-
sets exist. If one distributes a print publication, it is more likely that
one will have a warehouse or other facility for inventory and copies
in various jurisdictions than if one publishes by the World Wide
Web server. Further, the GII does not impact the likelihood that a
defendant will be physically present in the jurisdiction, except that
by facilitating remote action, it increases the percentage of cases in
which a defendant need not come to ajurisdiction or be nearby to
act so as to cause harm. Finally, the technology makes communica-
tion tantamount to service of process in remote places much easier,
although the law of service of process is adapting slowly to recog-
nize electronic methods as good service. Absent revolutionary
changes in property concepts, technology makes no difference in
the susceptibility of its hardware to execution or forfeiture. 535
Realizing the potential of the GII requires evolution of private
and public international institutions so that the rules for allocating
responsibility can be enforced effectively even against harmful
transactions that cannot be localized to any particular state. Much
uncertainty with respect to civil dispute resolution can be resolved
by working out international arbitration agreements that not only
would obligate suppliers of information and information infrastruc-
ture to arbitrate their disputes, but also would make the arbitration
mechanism available to the third parties claiming injury from GII
activities. Such an arbitration mechanism should include clear
choice of law rules obligating arbitrators to apply trade custom and
codes of good practice developed by industry bodies.
535. It would be interesting to speculate, however, about how plausibly mod-
est changes in concepts of intangible property, for example intellectual property,
might make it easier to execute against property interests of wrongdoers outside
the jurisdiction. For example, one obtaining a judgment against A, a citizen of
country X might be entitled to execute against the intellectual property of A lo-
cated in Virginia. In effect, execution of the judgment would extinguish access
copyright and transfer it to the judgment creditor. This would be, in some sense,
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The criminal arena is more difficult to deal with because pri-
vate arbitration cannot supplant criminal law, and criminal jurisdic-
tion is even more localized than civil jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
broadened concepts of extraterritorial application of national crim-
inal law, accompanied by formal and informal efforts to harmonize
substantive law of computer crimes, may be used to insure against
significant criminal activity involving the GII falling through the
cracks. Over the longer run, it is appropriate to consider defining
certain serious types of GII crimes, such as those involving com-
puter terrorism, intellectual property infringement and large scale
financial fraud or sabotage, as international crimes and granting
jurisdiction over them to the proposed International Criminal
Court.
This Article concludes that for cyberspace disputes, fewer
changes are needed in civil jurisdiction than in criminal jurisdic-
tion. Because international arbitration awards are nearly univer-
sally enforceable under the New York Convention, parties
interested in providing a framework for meaningful relief in cyber-
space can begin working on a comprehensive arbitration agree-
ment to cover the most likely types of international disputes in
cyberspace. As a part of that private framework, the parties can pro-
vide for the application of a specialized body of rules; these rules
can also be developed through private institutions. There remain
two problems, however, with this proposal. First, the existance of
potential claimants who are not parties to the arbitration agree-
ment, and second, potential wrongdoers who deliberately place
themselves in jurisdictions not obligated to enforce arbitration
awards. The third-party problem can be handled to some degree by
making arbitration fair, well known and available on a consensual
basis to third parties. Another solution is a U.S. Court for Cyber-
space, an idea deserving of further examination. The second prob-
lem can be solved to some degree by recognizing the utility of
enforcing judgments, including arbitration awards against obliga-
tions and including service obligations owed by persons within the
reach of a sovereign obligated to enforce the judgment or arbitra-
tion award.
Finally, in the criminal arena, the need for physical presence of
one subject to criminal trial, the lack of universal status for com-
puter crimes and the unevenness of the extradition framework
present several problems. These problems can best be addressed by
making sure that at least some of the more serious computer crimes
are brought within the jurisdiction of the proposed International
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Criminal Court now under discussion in the U.N. and supported by
the American Bar Association. The greater difficulty of solving
criminal jurisdiction problems, compared with civil jurisdiction
problems, might actually militate in favor of the practical
decriminalization of some harmful activities.
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XI. APPENDIX: INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER TERRORISM AND THE
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
53 6
A. The Lure of Technology and the Willingness to Use It
Extremist groups resort to political violence when they lack the
power to achieve political objectives through nonviolent legal
means. In an effort to attract the attention of the public, terrorists
perpetrate their acts with the media at the forefront of their strat-
egy, a calculus based on the assumption that access to the commu-
nication structure is directly related to power.53 7 The Global
Information Infrastructure (GII) has the potential to be more per-
vasive than any other existing media or communications network;
its value to the publicity-seeker is obvious. The GII, however, will
also support financial and commercial transfers for consumers,
businesses and countries, private and commercial information
transfers (including research and academic pools), civil and re-
gional infrastructure control and support, and governmental opera-
tions. These functions of the GII would make ideal targets for
disrupting commercial transactions, upsetting social order and in-
citing fear; as it is integrated into larger global information designs,
the value of the GII as a political target grows exponentially.
Considering that computers have become ubiquitous in mod-
em society, it is not surprising that terrorists have occasionally
targeted computer systems. For instance, a computer virus found at
Hebrew University in Israel is thought to have been developed by
the PLO.5 38 In Japan, groups have attacked the computerized con-
trol systems for commuter trains, paralyzing one major city for
hours. 539 Indeed, the Italian Red Brigade's manifesto specifies the
destruction of computer systems and installations as an objective for
"striking at the heart of the state."540 Terrorism is a rapidly evolving
and responsive phenomenon: effective terrorist technology and
tactics are sensitive to their target political cultures and have
536. This section was written by Neal A. Pollard, National Security Analyst,
Strategic Assessment Center of Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC); BA. (Political Science), B.S. (Mathematics), 1993, Oklahoma University;
M.Litt. (International Security Studies), 1995, St. Andrews University, Scotland;
Ph.D. candidate (International Relations), Georgetown University.
537. SeeALEx P. SCHMID &JANNY DE GRAA, VIOLENCE AS COMMUNICATION: IN-
SURGENT TERRORISM AND THE WESTERN NEWS MEDIA 9 (1982) ("[T]errorism and
mass communication are linked .... Without communication there can be no
terrorism.").
538. PHILLIP FITES ET AL., THE COMPUTER VIRUS CRISIS 63 (1992).
539. Id.
540. Id.
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evolved at a pace commensurate with dominant military, commer-
cial and social technologies.5 41
It stands to reason that as technology becomes more cost-effec-
tive to terrorists-that is, its availability and potential for disruptive
effects rise while its financial and other costs go down-terrorists
will become more technologically oriented in tactics and strategies.
Twenty years ago, terrorist experts recognized that increasing socie-
tal reliance upon technology changes the nature of the threat
posed by terrorists:
Commercial aircraft, natural gas pipelines, the electric
power grid, offshore oil rigs, and computers storing gov-
ernment and corporate records are examples of sabotage-
prone targets whose destruction would have derivative ef-
fects of far higher intensity than their primary losses would
suggest.... Thirty years ago terrorists could not have ob-
tained extraordinary leverage. Today, however, the foci of
communications, production, and distribution are rela-
tively small in number and highly vulnerable.542
International organized crime syndicates, particularly Asian
syndicates, already use a spectrum of computer crimes, networks
and fraud to support their activities. 543 The Japanese Yakuza, Chi-
nese secret societies and Vietnamese gangs operating in immigrant
communities throughout the world incorporate computer technol-
ogy as they collaborate with Latin American drug cartels (and in
turn teach the new Central Asian and Transcaucasus gangs) on a
wide range of efforts, even including launching their own satellite
to ensure more secure communications. 544 Computer crime could
541. For perspectives on how terrorist strategies are sensitive to evolving social
and media cultures, see TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA (David Paletz & Alex Schmid
eds., 1992); see also BRUCE HOFFMAN, RESPONDING TO TERRORISM ACROSS THE TECH-
NOLOGICAL SPECTRUM 30 (1994) (implying that "amateurization" of terrorism, re-
surgence of ethno-religious terrorism and evolution of "professional" terrorism
have evolved fairly commensurately with diffusion or diminishing of centralized
power in regions experiencing terrorism, and progressive accessibility of technol-
ogy (both information technology as well as military technology) to general
public).
The incorporation of information technology into the military-industrial com-
plex, as well as the design of information warfare strategies, increases the attrac-
tiveness of computer technology to the terrorist. In the final days of the Cold War,
NATO allies took seriously the premise that as warfare grows more electronic and
dependent upon information technology, the vulnerabilities and risks of sabotage
grow. Gerald Segal, Asians in Cyberia, WASH. Q., Summer 1995, at 13.
542. GRANT WARDLAW, POLrrICA. TERRORISM 26 (1989) (quotation omitted).
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well be the nexus that solidifies effective cooperation between inter-
national terrorism and global organized crime, particularly as crimi-
nal syndicates begin to operate in areas that are rife with political
violence campaigns, such as in the former Soviet Union. Such ar-
eas of political instability provide an anarchical "order vacuum"
which inhibits effective law enforcement.545
Computer technology offers new opportunities to terrorists
with the above strategic concerns: in pursuing this modus operandi, a
terrorist organization can reap low-risk, highly visible payoffs by at-
tacking computer systems. Electronic vulnerabilities are often
harder to guard than "traditional" vulnerabilities to terrorist attack,
and countering governmental computer counter-terrorist measures
would likely result in less loss of life. Unfortunately, Information
Technology (I.T.) does not offer the same utility to states as it does
to terrorists. Although the Soviet Union and other Communist au-
thoritarian states believed in the Orwellian power of information
technology to manage citizenry, there is much evidence suggesting
that fundamentally, information technology empowers individuals
and groups, threatening large centers of power. 546 Therefore, the
GII becomes the ideal tool for a terrorist campaign of propaganda
and social destabilization, as "the small bands of extremists and ir-
reconcilables that have always existed may become an increasingly
potent force."547
B. Defining Computer Terrorism: Tools and Targets
Political terrorism is the systematic, deliberate use of actual or
threatened physical violence toward non-military, non-governmen-
tal or internationally protected persons, in order to incite public
fear and to destabilize society, and thus to intimidate or to coerce a
population or policy toward a preconceived political objective.
Computer terrorism is the nexus between criminal computer fraud
545. For a discussion of political instability and its effect on law enforcement,
see Scott Anderson, Making a Killing: The High Cost of Peace in Northern Ireland,
HARPER'S, Feb. 1994, at 45-54 and Scott Anderson, Looking for Mr. Yaponchik: The
Rise and Fall of a Russian Mobster in America, HARPER'S, Dec. 1995, at 40-51.
546. Segal, supra note 541, at 5. It is important to note that democratic socie-
ties and free markets find uses for Information Technology (I.T.) which are de-
centralized in structure and application. Indeed, one reason I.T. flourishes in
free-market democracies is because of its tendency to decentralize power. It will be
interesting to observe what role I.T. plays when nations such as China reconcile
free-market capitalism with totalitarianism.
547. Brian Michael Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, in
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURITY 13, 28 (D. Carlton & C. Schaerf
eds., 1975).
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or abuse, and the physical violence of political terrorism. Particu-
larly in a legal sense, however, computer terrorism can be the inten-
tional abuse of a computer system, network or component toward
an end that supports or facilitates a terrorist campaign or action; in
this case, the computer abuse would not necessarily result in direct
violence against humans, although it may still incite fear.
Most terrorism scholars, when defining "political terrorism,"
would include physical violence as a necessary component; thus,
many acts of criminal computer abuse would not be considered ter-
rorist, if they do not result in direct physical violence. Adequately
defining "political terrorism," however, is the Holy Grail of political
violence scholarship. The semantic vacuum of a universally ac-
cepted comprehensive definition leaves room for considering com-
puter abuse as a possible new facet of terrorist activity, provided
that such abuse (1) is perpetrated to create a general climate of
fear among a population; (2) contributes toward or facilitates physi-
cal violence against civilians, whether real or implied; (3) is in pur-
suit of a preconceived political objective; and (4) is intended for a
wider audience. 548 Indeed, to ignore computer abuse as a political
crime, simply for the sake of academic purity, is impractical and
dangerous.
In a computer society, there are two general methods by which
a terrorist might employ a computer: when the computer is a tar-
get itself, or when it is the tool of a larger operation. The first
method implies that a terrorist would target a computer system for
sabotage, either electronic or physical, thus destroying or dis-
rupting the system itself and any systems (computer or otherwise)
dependent upon the targeted computer, and denying system availa-
bility. The second method, using the computer as a tool rather
than as a target, implies that a terrorist would manipulate and ex-
ploit a computer system, alter or steal data, or force the computer
to perform a function for which it was not meant, denying system
integrity or confidentiality.
Societies and corporations are increasingly embedding com-
puter information and communication systems within their infra-
structures, presenting more numerous and diverse vulnerabilities to
terrorists and criminals. Although it lacks the doomsday shadow of
bio-chemical terrorism or the cataclysmic roar of nuclear terrorism,
our increasingly computer-based society promises to be a fertile
548. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE 141 (1993) (enumerating similar characteristics).
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ground for terrorist tactical operations, 549 perhaps more dangerous
because of the little attention it receives in computer security analy-
ses.550 Nevertheless, the lives and physical security of citizens are
becoming increasingly dependent upon mission-critical computer
systems, such as those that operate mass transit systems, air traffic
control systems, nuclear facilities, emergency telecommunications,
electric power, hospitals and water supplies.551 The destruction or
temporary denial of computer system control over these essential
services would have tragic effects, compounded by the fear and
panic incited by a terrorist attack.
The presence of computer systems in society also presents the
danger of exploitation. The replacement of cash by credit and elec-
tronic funds transfer will open new oportunities for extortion. 552
Furthermore, computer fraud, in the scale that large banks cur-
rently report monthly in their "losses to computer error or abuse"
column, could fund a terrorist campaign without the money trail
that leads back to a sponsor who would otherwise incur interna-
tional sanctions or retaliation.553  Electronic funds transferred
through a network of international banks makes money laundering
easier than ever before. 554 Terrorists can take advantage of the free
flow of information in formulating their propaganda, tactics and
strategies against a system, influential corporation or society, in pur-
suit of economic or political objectives, and societies with freedom
of expression are particularly vulnerable to a systematic propa-
ganda campaign embedded within public multimedia broadcasts.
Data terrorism is even more subtle. This involves pursuing
549. RICHARD CHARLES CLARK, TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM 145 (1980).
550. This lack of attention is perhaps due to the fact that most computer
crimes are committed for monetary gain or pleasure, rather than for political
objectives. See Bengt Angerfelt, Computer Crimes: A Study of Different Types of Offenses
and Offenders, in IT SECURrrY: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (Pro-
ceedings of the Eighth IFIP International Conference, May, 1992) 463, 465-73
(Guy Gable & William J. Caelli eds., 1993).
551. CLARK, supra note 549, at 146.
552. RICHARD CLUTTERBUCK, TERRORISM, DRUGS, & CRIME IN EUROPE AFTER
1992 114-16 (1990).
553. In one case of computer fraud in Singapore, $1.2 million was un-
traceably lost in 49 seconds. Chew Teck Soon, ASEAN- Computer Crime and Correc-
tive Action: A Status Report, in IT SECURITY- THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL
COOPERAAION, supra note 550, at 23, 27. This is merely one instance. There are no
valid statistics on losses to computer crime; annual losses have been reported rang-
ing from $143 million to $41 billion. Donn B. Parker, Seventeen Information Security
Myths Debunked, in COMPUTER SEcuRrrY AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY (Proceedings
of the Sixth IFIP International Conference, May, 1990) 363, 363 (Klaus Dittrich et
al., eds., 1991).
554. CLuTrERBUC, supra note 552, at 182.
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political goals by manipulating public behavior under specific cir-
cumstances, causing public misinterpretation of data through selec-
tively falsified information.555 Computer-controlled manifests for
arms shipments or nuclear consignments could quietly-and quite
untraceably-be rerouted through the efforts of a single person.55 6
Additionally, some government systems are no safer electronically
than commercial systems. 557 The possibilities of espionage or ac-
cess to police, intelligence and operations files are a significant
threat. One of the more spectacular cases of illegal access was a
sixteen year-old British "hacker" with the Internet name "Data-
stream," who acquired certain of South Korea's nuclear secrets
through the Griffith Air Force Base in New York.558 He also ob-
tained information on North Korea's missile firing sites, aircraft de-
sign and U.S. agents in North Korea. In the end, over one million
government passwords were compromised.559 Activities such as this
can do more than support terrorism or contribute to social instabil-
ity; they can affect regional balances of power.
C. Terrorist Strategy and Political Character
Digital globalization and the GII may endow global computer
and telecommunications systems with elements of political author-
ity as well as with the ability to influence cultures,560 which could
present such systems as potential "strategic" targets, rather than
simply the "tactical" targets mentioned above. Global corporations
are integrating the planet in the course of doing international busi-
ness, and the extraordinary digital machine has embedded itself
into our cities, societies and commerce. No political ideology or
economic theory, however, has yet evolved to explain or to explore
its implications. 561 Digital technology continues to outpace polit-
ical and economic policy and may perhaps even contribute to an
erosion of state sovereignty as leaders cannot make policy regarding
555. F. Bertil Fortrie, IT Crime: An Intelligence Report, in IT SECURITY: THE
NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 550, at 325, 329.
556. Richard Hackworth, Contingency Planning: Managing the External Impacts
of System Security Failures, in COMPUTER SECURITY AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY, supra
note 553, at 181, 183.
557. CLUTrERBUCK, supra note 552, at 115.
558. Segal, supra note 541, at 12.
559. Id.
560. This thesis is explored in SLAVKO SPLicHAL ET AL., INFORMATION SOCIETY
AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1994).
561. For a cross-section of social, political, economic and technical perspec-
tives of digital globalization, see JOSHUA MEYRowrrz, No SENSE OF PLACE (1985),
DARRELL DELAMAIDE, THE NEW SUPERREGIONS OF EUROPE (1994) and RCHARD BAR-
NET &JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS (1994).
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the activity of "foreign" corporations when those corporations have
already easily and fluidly permeated national borders.562
As state sovereignty is transformed, huge urban centers rise in
international importance, and various non-governmental organiza-
tions and multi-national corporations gain degrees of political influ-
ence, computer information transfer systems will acquire more
direct roles in political and economic dynamics. Political malcon-
tents then will form strategies against institutions that have political
character. Digital information systems are the infrastructures that
support the globalization efforts of non-governmental organiza-
tions, multi-national corporations and other international institu-
tions. Thus, it stands to reason that extremist groups opposed to
such efforts would target these systems for the political targets they
represent, the organizations whose critical day-to-day workings they
support, and the direct and indirect effects that disrupting such sys-
tems would have on regional policy, commerce, civil security and
order, and social infrastructures.
D. Target Value
People will always be the most effective targets for terrorists.
Yet a terrorist usually would rather scare-and thus influence-
people than kill them. This is most efficiently accomplished by at-
tacking targets that affect the largest number of people, thus at-
tracting publicity. An example of such an attack is the April 10,
1992, IRA bombing in the Square Mile of London:5 63 The attack
killed three people, but its intent was not to kill. It was an attack at
the financial center of Europe, causing a severe effect-electronic,
financial and psychological-on the world's business community.
If the terrorist views political violence as a form of mass com-
munication, attacking an information infrastructure may eliminate
the need to incorporate the "traditional" media industry as an inter-
mediary in the terrorist strategy. Systems within the GII make ideal
targets for generating publicity for a number of reasons. First, the
GII acquires its political character precisely because of the number
of humans it can touch: in theory either bringing them together,
or alienating them and even provoking political instability. Second,
digital communication's pervasiveness in industrial society makes it
easily accessible. Finally, our increasing social and commercial reli-
ance upon digital technology casts its accessibility as a vulnerability
562. BARNET & CAVANAGH, supra note 561, at 19.
563. Alan Reed, Computer Disasters: The Impact on Business in the 1990s, in IT
SECURITY: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 550, at 13, 17.
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to personal security and civil order. When one considers the im-
portance of the social and commercial functions that are supported
by interconnected computer systems, our reliance upon such sys-
tems means the damage done in disrupting a networked system
would far outweigh the effort spent in disruption. Additionally, due
to the ease of access, little risk is posed to the perpetrator.
In addition to these advantages of targeting computer systems,
there is the psychological impact on users. The "user" of the com-
puter is rarely familiar with security aspects, but represents the vast
majority of those directly interacting with the computer. Indeed,
the competition in the computer industry to build faster, more
"user-friendly" systems usually places effective but slow and complex
security measures at a disadvantage, especially when they do not
produce immediate returns on investment.5 64 Even those who do
implement extensive computer security systems often fail to close
the gap between security theory and security practice. System man-
agers who religiously follow the most advanced electronic security
programs occasionally fail to account for the human factor and are
thus prone to a dangerous Maginot Line mentality.565
E. Policy and Legislation: European Lessons in
International Cooperation
International computer crime involves issues that the law is
barely equipped to grasp.5 66 Internationally, law has had an equally
difficult history in confronting political crimes.567 With the possi-
bility of computer terrorists seeking political objectives, legal re-
gimes must be formulated that effectively deal, on an international
scale, with politically motivated computer abuse, destruction or the
physical violence of computer terrorism. Regulatory measures that
seek to counter computer terrorism should address the value of in-
formation as a coveted product, as well as detection and investiga-
tion of such crimes. More importantly, however, such measures
564. Donald Davies, Information Security-Theory and Practice, in INFORMATION SE-
cuRrrv (Proceedings of the Seventh IFIP International Conference, May, 1991)
462 (D.T. Lindsay & W.L. Price eds., 1992).
565. An example is in the British House of Commons: one system there car-
ries a program which regularly prompts the user to change his or her password.
Users were instructed simply to add a "1" onto the end of their passwords each
time, thus eliminating the pesky need to memorize yet another password.
566. M.R. Jones, Dealing with Computer Abuse-The Need for an International Ap-
proach, in IT SECURrrY. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note
550, at 475.
567. Abraham Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, FOREIGN A., Summer 1986, at
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must be constructed mindful of the international nature of both
computer crime and political terrorism. Although such interna-
tional treaties and regimes result from national efforts,5 6 8 such ef-
forts can be modeled on existing international structures, with the
intent to integrate and to evolve within international cooperative
arrangements.
Targets of political crime can be "hardened" and risks averted,
by a politically responsible information infrastructure policy. We
should guide the construction and connection of digital informa-
tion systems, recognizing that computer crime can indeed enter the
arena of political crime. Such a policy would concentrate security
measures on the value of information systems and the product they
carry, rather than focusing only on the mechanisms of protection.
This security analysis would yield the potential value of the system
to the strategies and tactics of politically motivated computer abuse,
as well as the system's "political character," or its ability to influence
masses of people.
Effectively legislating against computer terrorism will mean the
union of all the legislative difficulties inherent in proscribing com-
puter crime with those encountered in proscribing political crime.
Countering computer crime involves an area of law that is presently
ill-equipped to deal with the nature and range of offenses, 569 be-
cause technological innovation thwarts a traditional regulatory re-
gime which has become divorced from technological and
commercial realities. One must also bear in mind that political
crimes differ from other crimes in that objectives and gains are oc-
casionally abstract and difficult to determine, and the perpetrators
are seldom the sole "beneficiaries." For this reason, motives behind
political crimes are often difficult to understand by those excluded
from the extremist's views. Furthermore, complications arise in leg-
islating against political crimes on an international scale, since laws
proscribing political crimes are subjective opinions of the indige-
nous political system which fostered them.
To this union of obstacles will be added the further difficulties
of detection and investigation, as much computer crime goes unno-
ticed until its effects are apparent. Furthermore, many of these
crimes go unreported, particularly in the commercial sector, so as
568. Jones, supra note 566, at 489.
569. A good example is the area of data privacy. See, e.g., Wayne Madsen, Data
Privacy: Legislation and Intelligence Agency Threats, in COMPUTER SECURITY AND INFOR-
MATION INTEGRITY, supra note 553, at 297.
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not to embarrass or to erode consumer confidence. 57 0 While it is
not difficult to detect the bombing of a computer installation, an
undetected or unreported illegal funds transfer or arms consign-
ment re-routing would confound attempts to counter the act, to
establish sponsorship, to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators,
and-in the case of foreign sponsorship-to censure the sponsor
government.
The regulatory task at hand requires extensive international
cooperation. In legislation countering computer crime as well as
international terrorism, the territorial principle cannot be the key
determinant of jurisdiction. The principle of universality would
certainly be more relevant, finding precedents in international law
proscribing crimes such as maritime piracy, genocide, slave trading
and hijacking.571 International cooperation demands clear defini-
tions of what is criminal at the national and international levels, as
well as international coordination of deterrent and repressive meas-
ures. 57 2 It is still incumbent upon national governments, however,
to pass appropriate legislation and to seek effective international
agreements before such an international cooperative structure can
be realized.573
The European Union is the ideal forum in which to pioneer
such international initiatives, in light of its tested unifying mecha-
nisms, its degree of industrialization of the member states, and the
articulated intentions of member states and the European Union as
a whole to build an information infrastructure. The E.U. countries
have the most ambitious program of information infrastructure de-
velopment, reflecting the call for electronic integration to facilitate
real economic and political integration. 574 Having proposed a $150
billion project that will rival or exceed the United States' National
Information Infrastructure (NII), the European Union intends to
meet the demands of a strengthening economic union for more
efficient, powerful and versatile information technology systems. 575
The E.U. slice of the GII will resemble other regional contributions
in communication growth, personal computer proliferation,
570. Parker, supra note 553, at 364.
571. Crimes such as these, although perpetrated by individuals, are frequently
the product of a conspiracy or group, with a legal personality somewhere between
individuals and nation-states. Anthony Clark Arend, Address at American Bar As-
sociation Conference on Terrorism and National Security (Oct. 19, 1995).
572. Jones, supra note 566, at 487.
573. Id. at 489.
574. G-7 Information Society Conference Theme Paper (presented in Brus-
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greater connectivity, newer technology and digital integration of
voice, data, video and graphics technology. 576
The European Union will face unique problems. Member
states do not have the luxury, as the United States does, of formulat-
ing national legislation without carefully considering its place
within an international framework. This fact, and the sheer pro-
posed size of the E.U. Information Society, means that E.U. solu-
tions could be ideally internationalized, providing a good model on
which other countries can construct their NII policies and proce-
dures. Unfortunately, the European Union itself has far to go. De-
spite the E.U.'s initiatives, Europe must accommodate different
languages, different laws, and, in some cases, drastically different
judicial systems. The potential risks posed in digital globalization,
including the vulnerability to political violence, will only be exacer-
bated by the legal, political, social and economic problems that will
certainly complicate the process of future unionization.
Traditional political borders will not lose all relevance within
globalized digital systems, as they can be employed as "tripwires" to
assist in the geographical tracking, apprehension and prosecution
of computer criminals. The Schengen countries577 of the Euro-
pean Union lack even these modest barriers. Terrorists targeting
or using computers can exploit areas still under the province of
individual state sovereignty within the European Union (such as in-
telligence gathering, arms and nuclear materials control, encryp-
tion standards and the military complex) while finding safe haven
in the free movement across borders throughout Western Europe.
After possible full unionization, or as the Schengen Accord gains
signatories, terrorists will need to penetrate only one frontier to ac-
cess half a continent populated by varied peoples and cultures, in-
cluding many immigrants who look beyond E.U. borders to their
homeland.
These problems inherent in the European Union will have
analogies common to any globalization initiative. Currently, the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the Council of Europe and the U.N. all advocate interna-
tional cooperation in legislating against computer and political
crimes, and such cooperation would extend to deterring crime to
576. Id.
577. The Schengen Accord of 1985 provides for the total abolition of per-
sonal checks at common national borders among signatory states. Schengen Ac-
cord of 1985, 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991).
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the extent permitted under applicable national laws and treaties.578
These deterrence measures would include better systems for fron-
tier checks and searches, pooling information and intelligence, rais-
ing international awareness of national preventative measures,
smoother extradition procedures, national prosecution of foreign
judgments in cases where extradition is impossible, and harmoniza-
tion of laws addressing computer and political crimes. 579 Together,
these proposals help to close national legal loopholes that so often
render treaties and conventions impotent.580
Changes are also needed in financial and commercial laws-
especially in the G-7 and other wealthy industrialized countries-to
confront the spectrum of computer abuse available to criminals,
political or otherwise. These changes include responsible law en-
forcement access to digital transfers, encryption registration and
key escrow, and other regulatory measures designed to counter
computer exploitation by terrorists and organized criminals. Effec-
tive ideas have been proposed within the European Union, but
were thwarted by the simple fact that many E.U. countries are eager
to retain as many vestiges of national sovereignty as possible. One
example is a German vision for Europol: a law-enforcement organi-
zation that would combine the current communications and intelli-
gence functions of Interpol with the territorial enforcement and
apprehension powers of national police forces in Europe. Unfortu-
nately, the court that would provide the legislative foundation of
Europol-the European Court of Justice (ECJ) -is still too racked
by political turf battles among member states to achieve the legal
power of consensus needed to make Europol an effective law en-
forcement body.581 Until this transnational court becomes accepta-
ble as a criminal court, efforts at true international integration will
be as ceremonial and impotent as existing European legal regimes
to counter international terrorism.58 2
To be most effective, law should take on the same dimensions
as the actors it seeks to address. The Internet, however, has no geo-
graphical bounds, no formal political structure, no cultural con-
578. Jones, supra note 566, at 487.
579. Id.
580. This impotence is perhaps best embodied in the European Convention
for the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST), a Council of Europe legal regime specif-
ically constructed to close loopholes in previous treaties and conventions to
counter terrorism. CLUTTERBUCK, supra note 552, at 123. Unfortunately, the Con-
vention did little to close loopholes, and even created its own. Id.
581. Sofaer, supra note 567, at 902.
582. Id. at 901-02.
1996] 127
127
Perritt: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
128 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41: p. 1
straints; actually, no one is sure exactly how many people access it
or who pays for it. Its technology has intractably embedded itself
into our cities, societies and commerce, but no political ideology or
economic theory has yet evolved to explain or explore its implica-
tions. Such a global machine has almost incomprehensible dimen-
sions, connecting all the facets and flaws of mankind. Indeed,
digital globalization may be the first human effort that is truly inter-
national in scope and intent, and it presents a potent opportunity
in the evolution of the international legal system. Therefore, ter-
rorism targeting the GII is also necessarily global in character. Per-
haps in the future, supranational organizations will be in place to
better combat this threat. As the current legal order has as its base
the sovereignty of the nation-state, however, international coordina-
tion is vital to combating computer terrorism.
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